TNAG-1167-FCO40-1447-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1982 — Page 40

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that it would be unrealistic to think of the Soviet Union leaving

J

Vietnam but he thought their presence could be balanced. The

sooner the Vietnamese recognised that they could strike a balance

between the Soviet Union, China and possibly, later, the United

States, the better.

6.

Lord Carrington asked what were the chances of the Chinese

giving support to an alternative to the Khmer Rouge.

Mr Dhanabalan said that Singapore had been very disappointed

by the Chinese performance at the United Nations Conference on

Cambodia in July 1981. They had then given the impression that

the Khmer Rouge would be the only acceptable government. This

was very different from the impression which Deng Xiaoping had

given to Mr Lee Kuan Yew when they had met in Peking. He said

that, speaking frankly, he did not believe China wanted a

solution. They were content to bleed Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

Mr Donald suggested that in the circumstances the Chinese should

logically support any group which could carry the fight to the

Vietnamese. Mr Dhanabalan said he was not sure how the situation

would develop but ASEAN had bought time in which to try to build

up Son Sann who, he thought, could attract the support of the

Cambodian people.

7. Lord Carrington asked whether, if the proposed loose coalition

failed, ASEAN would go it alone with Son Sann and Sihanouk.

Mr Dhanabalan replied that the view was slowly emerging within

ASEAN that they should continue to push for a coalition but

increasingly to support Son Sann. However, he was not an easy man

to deal with. He had unrealistic views and if ASEAN gave him too

much support he would be reluctant to join a coalition. On the

other hand, if he was not given backing he would have no input to

give to a coalition. Lord Carrington said that he could see

CONFIDENTIAL

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/Son Sann's