-4--
that it would be unrealistic to think of the Soviet Union leaving
J
Vietnam but he thought their presence could be balanced. The
sooner the Vietnamese recognised that they could strike a balance
between the Soviet Union, China and possibly, later, the United
States, the better.
6.
Lord Carrington asked what were the chances of the Chinese
giving support to an alternative to the Khmer Rouge.
Mr Dhanabalan said that Singapore had been very disappointed
by the Chinese performance at the United Nations Conference on
Cambodia in July 1981. They had then given the impression that
the Khmer Rouge would be the only acceptable government. This
was very different from the impression which Deng Xiaoping had
given to Mr Lee Kuan Yew when they had met in Peking. He said
that, speaking frankly, he did not believe China wanted a
solution. They were content to bleed Vietnam and the Soviet Union.
Mr Donald suggested that in the circumstances the Chinese should
logically support any group which could carry the fight to the
Vietnamese. Mr Dhanabalan said he was not sure how the situation
would develop but ASEAN had bought time in which to try to build
up Son Sann who, he thought, could attract the support of the
Cambodian people.
7. Lord Carrington asked whether, if the proposed loose coalition
failed, ASEAN would go it alone with Son Sann and Sihanouk.
Mr Dhanabalan replied that the view was slowly emerging within
ASEAN that they should continue to push for a coalition but
increasingly to support Son Sann. However, he was not an easy man
to deal with. He had unrealistic views and if ASEAN gave him too
much support he would be reluctant to join a coalition. On the
other hand, if he was not given backing he would have no input to
give to a coalition. Lord Carrington said that he could see
CONFIDENTIAL
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/Son Sann's