TNAG-1167-FCO40-1447-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1982 — Page 41

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Son Sann's point that a loose coalition, by associating him

with the Khmer Rouge, would taint his reputation. Mr Dhanabalan

agreed but argued that a loose coalition was better than the

Khmer Rouge option and the aim was to take over the legitimacy

of Democratic Kampuchea. The Khmer Rouge needed ASEAN's

political support not just to retain the UN seat but to avoid

a breakdown of international pressure on Vietnam. He thought

that both China and the Khmer Rouge recognised this.

8.

Lord Carrington commented that this was a very powerful

weapon to use and asked whether Dr Mahathir's recent remarks

threatening the withdrawal of ASEAN's support for the Khmer Rouge

had helped. Mr Dhanabalan said that he thought it had been

a useful sign even though Dr Mahathir had spoken without

consulting his colleagues. Mr Donald asked how Singapore thought

the next UN vote on credentials would go. Mr Dhanabalan replied

that there was a hard core of 60 or so who would vote with

ASEAN, adding, in reply to a question from Lord Carrington,

that he hoped this would include Britain and the EC countries.

9. Mr Dhanabalan then went on to say that Son Sann

complained that he received insufficient aid through the

international agencies. ASEAN would like to see more aid go

directly to him. Lord Carrington said that when he had seen

Son Sann in January he had told him that ASEAN were his best

friends and that he should do as ASEAN told him. Was there

any more advice he should give Son Sann? Mr Dhanabalan

said that what ASEAN wanted was to get Son Sann into a seat

of authority. He was trapped in conventional thinking and had

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