TNAG-0476-FCO40-541-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 81

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consider it essential for her own security to keep some form of

bridgehead in Europe, behind a major physical obstacle such as the

Channel or the Pyrenees. In such circumstances the UK might hope

to reach a bilateral defence arrangement with the US.

124. The UK would be left with the possibility of exploiting the

military advantages of its geographical position either by adopting

some form of armed neutrality or through an independent defence

policy based around a strategic nuclear deterrent directed against

the Soviet Union. Either option raises important and difficult

questions.

Armed neutrality, as exemplified by Sweden, could require

heavy expenditure on sea and air defences, and possibly conscription

to provide a home defence militia. Its adoption would be a lengthy

process. An independent strategy, similar to that of France, would

require improved strategic nuclear forces and the re-adoption of a

But it is doubtful "trip-wire" doctrine which carries great risks,

whether either strategy would be relevent to the security of the UK:

the current policies both of France and Sweden are largely dependent

on the existence of NATO. With the destruction of military

confidence in Alliance strategy, the United Kingdom would be open,

as would the rest of Western Europe, to political pressures from

the Soviet Union, backed by erwhelming military force. In such

circumstances the Soviet Union would have the capability,

Sp

and

would no doubt use it if it suited the purposes of the Soviet leaders,

to limit our freedom of political action in domestic as well as

foreign policies by the threat of force to which we would no longer

have a credible counter.

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