TNAG-0476-FCO40-541-Strength-of-garrison-in-Hong-Kong-1974 — Page 80

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savings within the first 4-5 years. For obvious reasons it is

much more damaging to a programme with the long lead times and the complexity of the defence programme to make a given reduction over

4-5 years than to make the same reduction over 10 years.

Savings

that had to be made within 4-5 years would not permit an orderly

forces would have reduction of either commitments or capabilities;

to be reduced in the short term below the level that might be sustain-

able in the longer term if a reasonable period of time, such as ten

years, were allowed for the reductions.

122. Cuts of the order required to reach the Second, Third and Fourth levels, and especially those (the Second and Fourth levels) that require reductions in a very short timescale, would have a major

military and psychological effect on the credibility of Alliance strategy. Under such conditions, the retention of the US commitment

to Europe would be even more important to the security of Western Europe and the UK: both rest ultimately on the guarantee provided by the US strategic nuclear forces, and any major unilateral reduction of the 300,000 American troops in Europe would weaken the credibility

Yet of the US nuclear guarantee in both European and Soviet eyes. the current basis for MBFR reductions, to which the US attach such

importance, would have been destroyed. Any new UK defence policy would therefore have to be shaped with the primary aim of retaining

US involvement in Europe.

123. The loss of military confidence in the Alliance could lead to & major US disengagement from Europe. In this event the US might

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