SECRET
SECRET
consider it essential for her own security to keep some form of
bridgehead in Europe, behind a major physical obstacle such as the
Channel or the Pyrenees. In such circumstances the UK might hope
to reach a bilateral defence arrangement with the US.
124. The UK would be left with the possibility of exploiting the
military advantages of its geographical position either by adopting
some form of armed neutrality or through an independent defence
policy based around a strategic nuclear deterrent directed against
the Soviet Union. Either option raises important and difficult
questions.
Armed neutrality, as exemplified by Sweden, could require
heavy expenditure on sea and air defences, and possibly conscription
to provide a home defence militia. Its adoption would be a lengthy
process. An independent strategy, similar to that of France, would
require improved strategic nuclear forces and the re-adoption of a
But it is doubtful "trip-wire" doctrine which carries great risks,
whether either strategy would be relevent to the security of the UK:
the current policies both of France and Sweden are largely dependent
on the existence of NATO. With the destruction of military
confidence in Alliance strategy, the United Kingdom would be open,
as would the rest of Western Europe, to political pressures from
the Soviet Union, backed by erwhelming military force. In such
circumstances the Soviet Union would have the capability,
Sp
and
would no doubt use it if it suited the purposes of the Soviet leaders,
to limit our freedom of political action in domestic as well as
foreign policies by the threat of force to which we would no longer
have a credible counter.
- 71
SECRET
SECRET