CO537-(205_1260-1262) — Page 290

00242

Ref.:

CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

restrictions Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet

note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigh

Becurity of Hong Kong

ge numbers of agents

1 to organise civil

› carry out attacks

This threat is not

L1 war breaks out in

I possibility at all

linese army of up to

ern ar Lord is a

in Hong Kong as the

or civil war in China.

at quorillas operating nunt in the vicini ty ganised Communist

unittee Report

/ the J.I.C., in which

the C.-in-c.'s appreciation.

forcos available to attack attack open to the enemy.

Lood as follows:-

i Kong, regarding

› are imications,

ill not confino

atic means in bringing

covery of Hong Kong.

ck is by infiltration of

to the Chinese population

unrest and boycott. This in conjunction with the

ther supplios to the

weight to the political on Kong.

bility of individual

malain is likely to likely to increase in

attack.

New Territories, coupled on port or military have some effect on ikely in the future if

with the Central

including nircraft and

1 probably be availablo

should one rise in

rule of Chiang Kai Shok.

Final will

1 of this Report.

ง

00243

cm

N

Ref.:

CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

2

restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of Nailona! Archives' leaflet Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archivea' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigh

(f) Sporadic guerilla attacks as the result of internal

unrest or civil war in South China are most improbable. In the event of civil war, however, strong military and police patrol of the frontier would be necessary to prevent the influx of armed deserters.

(g) The movements of Chinese to and from Hong Kong

cannot be controlled; similarly arms up to and including L.M. G. and small mortars can be smuggled into the Colony in large quantitios.

Comment

6.

It would appear, therefore, that the attack by a Southern Wer Lord with an army of 75,000 men, as envisaged by C.-in-C. Hong Kong, is not likely to materialise, and in any case auch an ermy is unlikely to possess modern equipment or aircraft to support it. For these reasons, the defences to meet such an attack would not need to bo on the scale recommended by the C.-in-C.

Attack by China.

7. is is shown in the J.I.C. Report, there is a possibility that en hostilities might brank out with the Central Government, but at present this does not appear likely. The most promising line of ttack for. the Chinese would be

to fe in a large number ol' nvents into the Chinese population of Hong Kon; to roment unrest and at the same time to interrupt the food and other supplies to the Colony, in order to lond weight to the political campaign for recovery of Hong Kon

We consiler that a well-trainod Police Force rather than a large garrison is required to mast this danger. Should, however, a threat ca opan hostilities with China appear, it will be necessary to review the situation and probably to increase the garrison to at least the size recommended by the C.-in-C.

C.-in-C. Hong Kong's Recommendations.

8. We examine at Annex II, admiral Harcourt's recommendations of naval, army and air forces required, also for the establish- ment of an intelligence ornisation, the re-forming of volunteer forces, the provision of mobile .. Defences and for additional accommodation.

Conclusions

9. We conclude that:-

(a) C.-in-C. Hong kong has over-estimate the likelihood

and scale of attack which might materialise, and therefore over-estiunto the defences required to meet this potential threat.

(b) We adhere to our previous estimate that one brigade

is sufficient garrison for long hong. We note that should a threat of open hostilities with China appear, it will be necessary to review the situation and probably to increase the garrison.

+ J.P. (45) 277.

-3..

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