00241
IC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
strictly limited.
ITEE
Copy No.
44
LN
ning staff
by the Commander-in-
ements of Hong Kong
years.
111 not have been
od under review for
plans;
·
any plan made
to be of an interim
in weapons are likely
strategy. In addition,
ts botween 1947 and 1951"
ill not be possible to give
a provisional reply.
N
Ref:
CO 537/1260 THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
N
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leafel.
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright
major war between the ears and that in any defensible against nlan of China. No nce
inst a major
is connection we do not
or power, at any rate
n-C. Hong Kong's appreciation
ly to attack Hong Kong. ntral Government is to tic means, and in their Lomatic support from the
}
1946.
00242
y is supplied
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
N
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet ct to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigh
(b)
The most likely threat to the security of Hong Kong is from infiltration of large numbers of agents into the Chinese population to organise civil unrest and boycott, also to carry out attacks on the European population. This threat is not
a likely danger unleas civil war breaks out in the vicinity of Hong Kong.
(c) Piracy on local shipping is a possibility at all
times.
(a)
(0)
direct land assault by a Chinese army of up to 75,000 men, led by a Southern War Lord is a potential threat.
querilla army might march on Hong Kong as the result of internal unrest or civil war in China. There are at present Communist guerillas operating against the Contral Government in the vicinity of Hong Kong, and a well-organised Communist cell Jxists in Hong Kong.
Summary of Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee_Report
5.
We attach at ..mex I a report by the J.I.C. in which they examino Sections II and III of the C.-in-C. 's appreciation. These sections covor potential enomy forces available to attack Hong Kong, and the possible forms of attack open to the enemy.
Tho J.I.3. roport any he summarised as follows:-
(a) They agree with C.-in-C. Hong Kong, regarding
China's aspirations.
There are imlications,
however, that the Chinose will not confine themselves to purely diplomatic means in bringing pressure to boar for the recovery of Hong Kong.
(b) The most likely form of attack is by infiltration of
a large number of agents into the Chinese population
(c)
(a)
(e)
to organise strikes, civil unrest and boycott. This might well be carried out in conjunction with the interruption of food and other supplies to the Colony from China, to lend weight to the political copalyn for recovery of liong Kong.
Should this occur, the probability of individual
raids by pirates for personal gain is likely to increase. Piracy is also likely to increase in the ovent of a lirect land attack.
..direct lant assault on the New Territorius, coupled
with ineffective air raids on port or military installations (which might have some effect on civilian morale) is only likely in the future if open hostilities bronk out with the Central Government.
Modern arins
and equipment, including aircraft and transport, would not in all probably be availablo to a Provincial War Lord, should one rise in
S. China to challenge the rule of Chiang Kai Shok.
+ Draft at this stage. Final will
be attached to Final of this Report.
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