00242
Ref.:
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THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
restrictions Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet
note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigh
Becurity of Hong Kong
ge numbers of agents
1 to organise civil
› carry out attacks
This threat is not
L1 war breaks out in
I possibility at all
linese army of up to
ern ar Lord is a
in Hong Kong as the
or civil war in China.
at quorillas operating nunt in the vicini ty ganised Communist
unittee Report
/ the J.I.C., in which
the C.-in-c.'s appreciation.
forcos available to attack attack open to the enemy.
Lood as follows:-
i Kong, regarding
› are imications,
ill not confino
atic means in bringing
covery of Hong Kong.
ck is by infiltration of
to the Chinese population
unrest and boycott. This in conjunction with the
ther supplios to the
weight to the political on Kong.
bility of individual
malain is likely to likely to increase in
attack.
New Territories, coupled on port or military have some effect on ikely in the future if
with the Central
including nircraft and
1 probably be availablo
should one rise in
rule of Chiang Kai Shok.
Final will
1 of this Report.
ง
00243
cm
N
Ref.:
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
2
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of Nailona! Archives' leaflet Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archivea' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigh
(f) Sporadic guerilla attacks as the result of internal
unrest or civil war in South China are most improbable. In the event of civil war, however, strong military and police patrol of the frontier would be necessary to prevent the influx of armed deserters.
(g) The movements of Chinese to and from Hong Kong
cannot be controlled; similarly arms up to and including L.M. G. and small mortars can be smuggled into the Colony in large quantitios.
Comment
6.
It would appear, therefore, that the attack by a Southern Wer Lord with an army of 75,000 men, as envisaged by C.-in-C. Hong Kong, is not likely to materialise, and in any case auch an ermy is unlikely to possess modern equipment or aircraft to support it. For these reasons, the defences to meet such an attack would not need to bo on the scale recommended by the C.-in-C.
Attack by China.
7. is is shown in the J.I.C. Report, there is a possibility that en hostilities might brank out with the Central Government, but at present this does not appear likely. The most promising line of ttack for. the Chinese would be
to fe in a large number ol' nvents into the Chinese population of Hong Kon; to roment unrest and at the same time to interrupt the food and other supplies to the Colony, in order to lond weight to the political campaign for recovery of Hong Kon
We consiler that a well-trainod Police Force rather than a large garrison is required to mast this danger. Should, however, a threat ca opan hostilities with China appear, it will be necessary to review the situation and probably to increase the garrison to at least the size recommended by the C.-in-C.
C.-in-C. Hong Kong's Recommendations.
8. We examine at Annex II, admiral Harcourt's recommendations of naval, army and air forces required, also for the establish- ment of an intelligence ornisation, the re-forming of volunteer forces, the provision of mobile .. Defences and for additional accommodation.
Conclusions
9. We conclude that:-
(a) C.-in-C. Hong kong has over-estimate the likelihood
and scale of attack which might materialise, and therefore over-estiunto the defences required to meet this potential threat.
(b) We adhere to our previous estimate that one brigade
is sufficient garrison for long hong. We note that should a threat of open hostilities with China appear, it will be necessary to review the situation and probably to increase the garrison.
+ J.P. (45) 277.
-3..
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