CO537-(205_1260-1262) — Page 291

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(f) Sporadic guerilla attacks as the result of internal

unrest or civil war in South China are most improbable. In the event of civil war, however, strong military and police patrol of the frontier would be necessary to prevent the influx of arned deserters,

(g) The movements of Chinese to and from Hong Kong

cannot be controlled; similarly arms up to and including L.M. G. and small mortars can be smuggled into the Colony in large quantities.

Comment

6.

It would appear, therefore, that the attack by a Southern Wer Lord with an army of 75,000 men, as onvisaged by C.-in-C. Hong Kong, is not likely to materialise, and in any case such an eray is unlikely to possess modern equipmont or aircraft to support it. For these reasons, the defences to meet such an attack would not need to bo on the scale recommended by tho C.-in-C.

Attack by China.

7. is is shown in the J.I.C. Report, there is a possibility that en hostilities might break out with the Central Government, but at present this does not appear likely.

The most promisin; line of ttack for. the Chinese would be

to fed in a large number or agents into the Chinese

population of Hong Kon; to foment unrest and at the same time to interrupt the fool and other supplies to the Colony, in order to lend weight to the political campaign for recovery of Hong Konj

We consier that a well-trained Police Force rather than a large garrison is required to meet this danger. Should, however, a threat c open hostilities with China appear, it will be necessary to review the situation and probably to increase the garrison to at least the size recommended by the C.-in-C.

C.-in-C. Ilon” Konr's Recommendations.

8. We examine at Annex II, dirnl Harcourt's recommandations

of naval, army and tir forcos required, also for the establish- ment of an intelligence organisation, the re-forming of volunteer forces, the provision of mobile . Defences and for additional accommodation.

Oonclusions

9.

We conclude that:-

(a) C.-in-C. Hong kong has over-estimated the likelihood

and scale of attack which might materialise, and therefore over-estimated the defences required to meet this potential threat.

(b) We adhere to our previous estimate that one brigade

is sufficient garrison for Hong kong. We note that should a thrent nt onun hostilities with China appear, it will necessary to review the situation and probably to increase the garrison.

+ J. P. (45) 277.

-3..

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Ref.

CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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24TH JANTÍ