2 June 1949
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JIC(FE) (49) 21(Final)
possibly prefaced by guerilla raids and infiltration across the frontier, to test defences, and supported by diversionary raids by sea-borne guerillas on the coast line, and by maior internal unrest and sabotage in the Colony.
29.
Soviet advisers might be attached to the P.L.A. to give technical assistance, and it is also to be expected that a number of Japanese would be found in the more technical appointments.
30.
Little is nown regarding the supply of ammunition and the ability of the P.L.A. to maintain its equipment, although there have been indications that the supply of artillery ammunition is causing difficulties. It is possible that the industrial capacity of Manchuria may already, with Soviet assistance, be capable of manufacturing at least some types of ammunition and spares.
31.
The P.L.A. is relying on mule transport and porterage for the bulk of its field equipment. Motor transport is used in the main to supplement rail transport on the lines of communication.. The P.L.A. artillery consists of 75mm, 105mm and 155mm pieces and is normally sub-allotted on the basis of 12 guns to each army supple- mented by centralized artillery formations, each of approximately 324 guns.
The P.L.A. may have up to 300 ex-US Stuart tanks and ex-Japanese light tanks mounting 37mm guns, only a proportion of which would be available for operations against Hong Kong.
Air Threat
32.
The threat would be from reconnaissance, bomber and ground attack aircraft. The scale of attack which could be mounted depends upon the number of defections from the Nationalist Air Force as active assistance from the USSR is considered to be unlikely. The possibility of purchase or loan of aircraft from the USSR cannot however be entirely ruled out. As the majority of the Nationalist Air Force is based in Formosa with small forces based in rotation in China, early large scale defections and captures are unlikely. It is unlikely, moreover, so long as any substantial Nationalist resistance continues, that the Air Force in Formosa will be affected by any local settlement between the K.M.T. in South China and the Communists.
33.
The defection of the entire Nationalist Air Force would in theory permit a maximum of 4000-5500 sorties in all roles per month, according to the season of the year. In practice, however, aircraft unserviceability, low morale and inexperience of personnel and casualties would reduce the figure considerably. The maximum serviceability to be expected from the force is between 20% and 50% and the absence of spares would necessitate cannibalization. Consequently 20% is the more likely figure. Supplies of fuel and ammunition would depend upon existing holdings as American supplies have ceased and Soviet supplies have not yet, openly at all events, begun.
34.
It is probable that a first raid on Hong Kong would comprise the maximum effort and that the airfield at Kai Tak would be a first priority target. Despite the low quality of the force, and in the event of war not having previously been declared, the bomb load of Liberator aircraft could do great damage, particularly as political considerations might prevent effective interception before
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