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JIC (FE) (49) 21(Final)

2 June 1949

Maritime Threat

21.

During a cold war period no purely maritime threat to the harbours of Hong Kong is to be expected. The carriage of Communist leaders and agents in and out of the colony by junks and other shipping will continue and saboteurs and agitators must be expected to be brought in as and when the Communists wish.

THREAT DURING THE PERIOD IN WHICH THE COMMUNISTS DISCLOSE THEIR INTENTION TO SECURE THE RETURN OF THE COLONY WITH OR WITHOUT THE USE OF FORCE

General

22.

In the event of the C.C.P. considering that the advantages of expelling the British from Hong Kong outweigh those of using it as a trade entrepot under British administration, an effort would probably be made to secure the return of the Colony by subversive methods, in conjunction with a military threat from a P.L.A. force on the border. It is only if this method should fail that a military offensive would be likely to be opened under the pretext of an incident.

Internal Threat

23.

We consider that a major outbreak of internal unrest and sabotage would undoubtedly be instigated during this phase by further intensification of the activities described in paragraph 17.

24.

We also consider it likely that at this stage the enemy would place an embarge on trade with the Colony.

25.

The object of these manoeuvres would be to make conditions in the Colony so difficult and its economic value so negligible that H.M.G. would find its continued retention purely as a fortress too heavy a liability. The enemy might hope that, in these circumstances H.M.G. would be prepared to submit to this pressure and that, failing this, the way would be cleared for a successful assault on the Colony.

Land Threat

26.

The prerequisite to a military offensive against the Colony would be the completion of the occupation of South China and the deployment of the necessary P.L.A. formations in Kwangtung, adjacent to the border. This build-up could be undertaken during the existing cold-war period and could occur during the third quarter of 1949, as already mentioned in paragraph 14 of this report.

27.

We estimate that any frontal attack against British forces in Hong Kong would be attempted by one, or possibly two P.L.A. armies,

Supporting each organised into three rifle divisions of 10,000 men. arms could include artillery of 400 guns and armour up to 100 light tanks. It is unlikely that any frontal attack would be carried aut by more than two P.L.A. armies owing to the limited frontage of the New Territories border, but additional troops might well be used to carry out diversionary raids by sea. Two or three armies similarily organised, but without any appreciable artillery or armoured element, might be held in reserve. The majority of equipment would be likely to be of U.S. origin without any great quantity of mechanical transport. 28.

The fighting value cf the P.L.A. is difficult to assess in as much as it has, up to the present, met with only negligible resistance. It is known however, that a relatively high standard of discipline has been attained in the recrganised formations, and that some Soviet

The morale assistance has been received in varicus forms of training. under very heavy fire shown by CommandBETartillery units during the Amethyst incident was unexpectedly high." It is possible therefore that the fighting value of the best formaticns of the P.L.A. may not be

The much lower than that of Scviet rifle divisions in the late war. cffensive would be likely to take the form of a frontal attack across

border, coupled with air attack on Kai Tak airfield

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