00 135
been brought up to nuary 1947) to ne
in:: f which we are
n the situ: tion in
fan assault force, we do lled upon to mount an inese territory, no matter
•
the Chinese situation,
the vision a brigado
requirement for landing
he Clony itself to ensure
C
ld not be against my degree
craft should not be
n
nifers that the following
unti: 1:-
n with P.2. clemont
-engined night
connicornce aquadron.
t for metoprol vical,
munication duties.
"ilter rom end
antins tre based on the
3 mi thứ be m de by mixed
by, cmaistin! f 30 to 40 adfihters, .nnex I shows Ikuly to toricline, Ve
there is justificatim fr 0.-in-0. reen...mends.
nth.lf flyin: bret carry out anti-pire cy rrison. Reinforcements Bowhore in the ther tro.
Ret:
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
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restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed "Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigt
00 136
Ref.:
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
N
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright
.
14.
C.in-0. Hong Kong envisages the possible need for supply and reinforcemunt by air. We do not consider that the probable scale of attack is likely to prevent normal supply and reinforcement by sea, although difficulties might arise fram organised strikus, and disorganisation of local dock labour. We do not, therefore, consider that any special measures for air supply are necessary over and above the normal air transport services.
15.
C.-in-C. Hong Kong, raises other detailed points in his ir Plan, including the provision of fighter control organisation. In view of the J.I.C. report we do not consider that their defence of the Colony need be taken into account at all in implementing our short term policy. With regard to our long term policy we recommend that these points should be examined by the Defence of Bases Committoc and the air Ministry, when assessing the scale of defences required at Hong Kong.
OTHER RECOMEND..TIONS
Intelligence Organisation
16. C.-in-C. Hong Kong, recommends that a Joint Intelligence Committou, including civil representation, bu maintained; the servicos of rulisblo agents for reporting from the mainland are consideral essential.
The J.1.C. agree with this course, and recommend that closc linison should be maintained with H.M. Embassy in China and H.M. Consul Genoral in Canton.
Volunteer Forçus
17.
C.-in-C. Hong Kong, requests approval in principle to the formation of volunteer forces including an auxiliary air force and police reserve.
There are four factors which affect the formation of volunteer forces,
(a) They are the most economical method of providing a
roserve to back up the Police Force in the event of trouble.
(b) There inny be a requirement for volunteer forcus to
hulp in the manning of local defences, for which provision must be made in accordance with our long-tura policy.
(c) In view of our shortage of man-power it is desirable that Colonies should have a reserve of trained man-power on which we could call in time of war.
(a) Financial considerations.
The form.tion of a voluntour Police Force is affected only by factors (a) and (a) end we consider that it would have many advantages. This is m.ttur primarily for the Colonial Office and we suggest, therefore, that they should bu invited to examine this.
Annex I Paru. 11
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