CO537-(205_1260-1262) — Page 162

00134

opers cannot

estimat

k out with

ikelihood

o be

minesweepers

be boon

rcus

used as

roup plus

and Div.

ion

roup less

on

s (including Defunco

t for an

"ne

1 serious

12

Ref.:

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

CO 537/1260

N

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright

poly of National Archives" leaflet.

restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply

;

.tunod

1,000 mun.

.des;

police

yot of

the

tated that ruiting and pean y and

orce should

aged on

ho ground

tacker.

ired

. lead

Lord is

f the

ts and overall

Defence

ld be

00135

Ref.:

CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

N

restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives" leaflet.

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyngh

11.

(a) Then the police force has been brought up to

stron;th (i.e. rbout J nury 1947) to no brigde.

(3) Further reduction, the timin; f which we are

unble to forec:st, when the situ tion in China allows.

Regarding the provision f on nosnult force, we do not consider that we shall be c: 11ed upon to mount an oper: ti n of gay size nginst Chinese territy, no untter h: scriuo the deteriorati n in the Chinese aitution.

do not, therefore, consider thrt the pr vinion of a brigado lift is required it Hong Kong.

There might, however, be r. requirement for landing sm:11 foreca n the islands f the Clony itself to ensure internal security. is this would not be against ny dogroo of oppositi ́n, spcciclisod Indin: cruft should not be necessary.

12.

IK FORCES

The C.-in-C, Hong Kong, considers that the following measures for ir defuncu eru esaunti::1;-

(1) irrces e naisting <f:-

(1) 1 8.3. Tighter squadron with P.. element

cab lied.

(ii) detachment of 3 twin-engined night

fighters.

(iii) 1′′n; rruge ::oner:l recom:iosence squadron.

+

(iv) Dot-chmunts f virerit for metool vical,

ir-sor rescue and communication dutics,

(b) keficient radar cover.

(c) Fighter per tins room, filter room and

G.0.1. facilities.

(a) Anti-aircraft defence.

(u) Pacilities for ir lift.

(r)

Comment

13.

reinforcement plan.

C.-in-C. Hong Dong's recomen.tions are based on the nssumtion that onely rip ttocks ud ht bʊ m do by nixod formations of lw fighting ability, maistin 30 t 40 bonbors escorted by 12 to 15 mixed fighters. .nnex I shows

that this so-lo of attack is unlikely to maturi:line. do not, therefore, consider that there is justification for the size of air forces which the C.-in-0. recommends.

le c ́nsider that detachment half « flying bort squadron should be sufficient to carry out anti-pir:cy patrols and to provide the cir garrison. Roinforcements if roquirod will be drum from olsovhore in the thertro.

1

3