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1
Ref.:
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
N
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leafel
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terma and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright
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00 128
N
Ref:
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
N
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet i note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigh
(f) Piracy is probable at all times on is likely
to increase if the situation developed ns in (d) above,
(c) Sporadic querilla attacks as a result of
internal unrest or civil war in South China are most improbable. In the event of civil war, however, strong military (må police patrol of the frontier voull be nucessary to prevent the influx of unnod deserters.
Policy for Dufunce of Hong Kong
4. We do not consiler that under nodern conìitions Hong Kong could be dofended against attack oy a major power in occupation of the Chinese mnini-na. We shoull not, therefore, lock up in Hong Kong against such attack, forces or defences which will either not bromuired or else overrun and lost.
5. Circumstances might, however, frisc in which we should require to use Hon; Kon as an operațional navel end sir base in the event of war in the Pacific, in which China was in friendly hands. In that ovent m. bile defence reinst attack from a distance by sun or nir could be moved into Hng Kong or installed a short Lovice, in the same way as would be done for any alvm-ced base from which it was decided to op.rnic, plas al preparations being made to enable the nücessor lofenace to So inte. lucc? At short notice.
6. The Defence omitted have cyroot the our future policy for Hong Kong shoul be to pogrn it as an untefonde port so far as fixe defences are concernen.
Short term Policy
7. We consilow th 6, un darure int.runl 30curity, an a protection against pirt.cy, (a" c.5 leterrent to an attempt at incursion by Chiresc quorillas, SOLL. Tuess will be require2 at Hong Kong for a cons)`rblu timo. ་་
The lisposition of forces for garrison lutics in S.E. Asia must be governe? by ch, total forces available for the overall aron. In view of the anall size of the forces available in 5.3. Asin, it is esBor.tial to koop permanent carrisons in outlying stations such as Hong Kong to the minima relying on reinforcements from elsewhere within the thruatre when necessary.
Requirements for Defence of Hong Kong
8. On the basis of the policy set cut in the previous paragraphs, we have examined at Amex II C.-in-C. Hong Kong's detaile recommentations, Our conclusions are:-
(a) The British Pacific Fleet bescl on Hong Kong
should affer? sufficient local protection,
in particular for the suppression of piracy
mit other nets of violence, Certain alitional ships coul" with cavantage be place in reserve at Hong Kong, which would be available for service shoul this be callo for.
D.0. (46) 7th Mooting.
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