CO537-(205_1260-1262) — Page 153

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CO 537/1260

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet ne that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your usa ofil may be subject to copyrigh

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(f) Piracy is probable at all times and is likely

to increase if the situation developed as in (d) above.

(c) Sporadic querilla attacks as a result of

internal unrest or civil war ir South China are most improbable. In the event of civil war, however, strong; military ană police patrel of the frontier votli be necessary to prevent the influx of red desertors.

Policy for Dufunce of Hong Kon

4. We do not enstler that under modern conlitions Hong Kong could be defended sprinst attack by a major power in occupation of the Chinese mainland. We should not, therefore, lock up in Hong Kong against such attack, forces or defences which will either not be required or else overrun and lost.

5. Circumstances mint, however, frize in which we should require to use Hong Kon as tai onurntional naval and sir base in the event of war in thr. Pacific, in which Chinn was in friendly hands. In that event mbile defences against attack from a distence by 304 or nir could 36 moved into #ng Kong or inst:.llet a short notice, in the same way na would be done for any advanced base frem which it was decided to op.raic, pleus mai preparations being made to onable the necessary toconcce to incr: tuce at short notice.

6. The Defence omittee have agreed that our future policy for Hong Kong; shoul be to permit na an unlofonde port so far as fixe defences are concerne..

Short term Policy

7. Wo consiar th 2, 95 cheurs internal security, as a protection against pirney, m' 26 1. leterrent to an attempt at incursion by Chiresc uorillas, BOLL. Turcus will be required at Hong Kong for a consirable time.

The lisposition of forces for garrison luties in 3.E. Asia must be Joverno? by ch, total forece available for the overall aren. In view of the small size of the forces available in S. 3. Asin, it is eBoor.tial to keep permanent garrisons in outlying stations such as Hong Kong to the minimum relying on reinforcements from elsewhere within the throatre when necessary.

Requirements for Defence of Hong Kong

8. On the basis of the policy sot cut in the previous pragraphs, we have examined at Amex II G.-in-C. Hong Kong's Retailo ricommentations. Our conclusions are:-

(a) The British Pacific Fleet basel on Hong Kong

should affert quVicient local protection,

in particular for the suppression of piracy mit other nets of violence, Certain allitional ships coul with cavantage be place in reserve at Hong Kong, which would be availablu for service shoul: this be calle for.

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D.O. (46) 7th Mooting.

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