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children were collected in the houses.
Some of these houses were at the time being shelled and on fire, so I was informed, and it may be observed here that for some time past we had been unable to make any reply to the enemy's artillery. It was also now open to him to come down the Magazine Gap road on which he would have met with no opposition until he was practically in the heart of the city and behind, 1.0., west of the Military and Naval headquarters mentioned hereafter. As I have said above, we were already in the last pocket of resistance; the loss of Magazine Gap opened another
seam.
7. On the left of our line, which ran in a southerly direction from the harbour front, the enemy had just previously gained considerable advantages. He had captured Leighton Hill,
and after putting out of action all our machine guns on Morrison Hill had cut off the troops in that sector by penetrating the air raid tunnels under the Naval Hospital. He was now advancing along the streets of Wanchai and the news which was given to me by General Maltby was that Col. Stewart, Commanding the Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment, had just informed him that his battalion and his defence positions in Wanchai had been completely overrun, and that what remained might hold out in the neighbourhood of his battalion headquarters for another half hour, not more. This would bring the enemy right up to the General's own headquarters and those of the Commodore i.e., the Naval Dockyard. These with a few remaining posts of the Punjabi Regiment might be able to hold out for two hours, but not longer. That would be the end of all defence on the vital sector of the harbour front, and the enemy would then have before him the undefended centre of the city, which
he would be able to reach, if the appreciation was correct, not later than 6.0 p.m. on that day. An important element in the situation was that there was now no room for postponement of the decision which I was called upon to take without involving the General's headquarters in hand-to-hand fighting. As soon as this happened, it had to be presumed that all staff work and all possibility of communication would come to an end.
*
8. Such was the situation reported to me by Major-
་
General Maltby. I discussed it with him in some detail and he made
歇
it clear that the saw no possibility whatsoever of restoring the
situation on any of the three sectors. We were communicating by
He
telephone and I had with me in my office in Goverment House two of the three civilian members of my Defence Committee, namely the Colonial Secretary, and the Attorney General; the Defence Secretary who was the third civilian member was not available. I kept my civilian colleagues informed of the position throughout my conversation with the G.0.0. Immediately after it I telephoned to the Commodore, who was also in full possession of the facts. agreed with Major-General Maltby's recommendation. Let me say at this point, although it does not need to be said, that both the General and the Commodore were very willing, and made it clear to` me that they were willing, to defend their respective headquarters in their own persons and with the persons of their staffs. Their advice however, which was based on the considerations that I have set out above, was clearly and definitely in favour of cessation of hostilities. My two civilian colleagues were of the same mind. Their view, which agreed with my own, was that there was now no other possible course open to me but to exercise the discretion which a recent telegram of yours had authorised me to use when further resistance ceased to be posible. Let me observe here · that both at this stage and throughout the whole of the preceding period of hostilities the support of my advisers was of incalculable assistance to me, and that in quoting their views on the question which I now had to decide I am not attempting to obscure the fact that the responsibility was mine alone.
9.
:
I enquired once more from the G.0.0. whether anything
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