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could possibly be done to hold the enemy in the Wanchai Sector and he obtained a further appreciation from Colonel Stewart, after which he confirmed what he had already told me. I then issued to the General and to the Commodore the order that steps were to be taken to bring about a cessation of hostilities.

10. I should perhaps mention here that there was one section of our forces which was outside the areas of the Island mentioned hitherto, namely the force which was on Stanley peninsula. The situation in regard to this force will doubtless be explained in the military commentaries on the operations and it will suffice if I say that it was agreed in our councils that by this time there was no prospect of this body affecting the general situation by counter attack or otherwise.

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11. After the necessary immediate action consequent on my decision had been taken, including the despatch of a telegram to you, I asked General Maltby and Commodore Collinson to come to Government House and to await with me there the expected arrival of the Japanese. After we had waited for some time & message was received from the local Japanese commander. It was brought orally by two of the officers who had been sent forward on General Maltby's instructions to communicate to the enemy the cessation of resistance.

12. The message was that unless General Maltby and Ipersonally went across at once to the Japanese local headquarters

and confirmed that the cease fire had been ordered on our side, the Japanese commander would launch his attack at a named hour (this was, I think, 6.30 p.m.). I was most reluctant to go, but it seemed best that I should do so, and General Maltby and I accordingly went forward, and from the front line in the street in Wanchai were taken in a Japanese car to the local Japanese head- quarters, where after considerable delay and some difficulties of interpretation we confirmed that the order to cease fire had been given to our forces except to those at Stanley, with whom it had been impossible to communicate. Thereupon arrangements were made for a message to be sent to Stanley by road, and the Japanese commanding officer then said that he would give the order countermaniding the attack, and apparently did so.

13. There followed other talk, in the course of which General Maltby and I said in reply to questions that we realised that we were prisoners of war, and we were told that the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Lieut. General Sakai, was coming into Kowloon from his headquarters in the New Territories to see us.

14. We were then taken over by launch to Kowloon, where we met the Japanese General and his Staff Officers in the Peninsula Hotel. General Maltby and I confirmed what we had said before about the cessation of resistance and I told General Sakai that we had crossed the lines only in consequence of the threat that an attack would be launched if we did not do so. We were asked whether the cessation of resistance was unconditional and I replied that I had made no conditions, There was some further talk, in the course of which I protested strongly against the appearance of some cameramen and they were ordered away; I cannot say whether they had been able to take any photographs.

15. I do not of course know whether any publicity has been given to this interview by the Japanese for purposes of propaganda, but I realise that it may have been, and I have been considering whether I could have avoided it. As I have said above, I was most reluctant to cross the lines but decided that if I refused I should be running the risk of bringing about a disaster in the shape of an attack by the Japanese forces on an area in which the few remaining troops had been ordered to lay down their arms. We might perhaps have resisted the proposal that we should go on to Kowloon to meet the Commander-in-Chief, but I doubt whether anything would have been

gained/

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