FO371-46257 — Page 120

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Kowloon 28th December, 1941.

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Sir,

It is with the utmost regret that I have to record the circumstances in which on the afternoon of December 25th 1941 His Majesty's Forces, which had been engaged in the defence of Hong Kong since the outbreak of war with Japan, ceased to be capable of offering further effective resistance to the enemy who having already over-run the mainland and a large portion of the Island of Hong Kong was then enabled to occupy the remainder of the Colony including the seat of Government in the city of Victoria.

2. It is not my intention to deal in this despatch with the whole course of the operations subsequent to the landing of the Japanese forces on Hong Kong Island on December 19th. I will confine myself in the main to the events of the afternoon of December 25th, but it may be said here that for several days before that date it had been evident to my military advisers and to myself that the question before us was not whether but when the enemy would be able to occupy the whole of the Colony, and that while we had no chance of preventing that calamity it was our duty to use every effort to postpone it for the longest possible period of time. I trust that it may be found that this duty has been properly performed.

3. Up to about 3.0 p.m. on December 25th the position on the fighting line was extremely grave but not desperate.

We still had a reasonable hope of being able to achieve our daily ambition, namely to add another 24 hours to the credit of the account. An hour or so earlier I had telegraphed to you reporting that street lighting was in progress, and probably making it clear to you that we were in what had been described in our telegraphic correspondence as the final pocket. I had mentioned in the same telegram that I had just summarily rejected the third of the enemy's peace offers'. This one had been brought, but not in any way supported, by a member of my Executive Council who had fallen into the hands of the enemy.

4. Shortly after 3.0 p.m. I received from General Maltby

a report of three new developments in the situation, which were of a positively disastrous character, and with this report he gave me his considered advice that there remained no possibility of further effective resistance and that in his judgment it was now necessary to recognise that fact. These three decisive developments had occurred, in order of ascending gravity, on the right, in the centre, and on the left.

5. On the right our line ran down from the slopes in the neighbourhood of Wanchai Gap in a southerly direction towards the sea east of Aberdeen, and made contact with the very small mixed body which was gallantly maintaining access to the magazines of Little Hong Kong. General Maltby's report on this sector was that the whole of the line had 'gone'. I have had no opportunity of ascertaining to what pressure the troops in this sector had been subjected; General Maltby made it clear that they were no longer formed up either on their original line or in any alternative position.

6. The news from the centre was that both Wanchai Gap, where a battalion headquarters had been situated, and Magazine Gap, which was the position of Brigade headquarters, had fallen into the hands of the enemy. This blow was as serious as it was unexpected. By attaining Magazine Gap the enemy had disrupted our communications and reached a position from which it was open to him to occupy the Peak district, where the European women and

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