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threatened with attack, as they probably would be. Even if the objective were thought worth the risk, the probability of such an unwieldy flotilla crossing the Atlantic unmolested is very small.
This form of attack is therefore, in my opinion, so highly improbable as not to require serious consideration.
As regards (3), a landing in force, I assume, (the present strength of the garrison being well known,) that a landing would not be attempted with a smaller force than 2,000 men.
If this is to come from men-of-war, about ten large cruizers would be required to furnish this force, i.e., a powerful squadron, which would have to come from Europe, as no European nation, except Spain and ourselves, keeps in the West Atlantic anything but a very small naval force.
If troops are to be employed, they also must come from Europe, as no European nation, except perhaps Spain, has such a force available on the station.
The risks attending such a landing are great. Smooth water is essential, which cannot be assured even in summer on this Atlantic-washed coast. There is no good anchorage off the island, and, consequently, no secure base for the invaders; added to which is the risk of being caught in the act of landing, by hostile vessels, of which there is a nucleus in the harbour.
No man in command of a squadron would, under such circumstances, make an attack on Bermuda unless he were assured of our having lost the command of the sea in those waters, as he would run great risk if caught even by an inferior force on the open sea, with the bulk of his fighting complement on shore.
The only attack, therefore, which can reasonably be expected to be made on this station, is that by a small force of cruizers.
Finally, although Bermuda is generally classed in the same category as Malta and Gibraltar, the necessary standard of defence is very different to that required for those places.
The justification for a strong defence for Malta and Gibraltar lies in the fact of their close proximity to powerful foreign squadrons, by which, in certain contingencies, they might be attacked; but a powerful European squadron must cross nearly 3,000 miles of ocean to reach Bermuda.
The Colonial Defence Committee entirely concur with the views above expressed, which, they understand, represent the opinion of the Admiralty. If these views are correct, it follows that the local Defence Committee have framed their recommendations in accordance with an erroneous standard of the requirements.
The whole question of the defence of Bermuda and of the necessary strength of the armament and garrison is so inseparably connected with the considerations above pointed out that, before dealing with the details of the Report before them, the Committee consider that it is essential that a clear understanding should be arrived at as to the first principles. They therefore recommend that the views above set forth should be submitted to the War Office and Admiralty, and if accepted, that they should form the basis of a reconsideration of the armaments at present approved. It will then be possible to lay down the details of the defence of Bermuda and to fix the necessary garrison in accordance with the real requirements of that station.
G. S. CLARKE, Secretary,
Colonial Defence Committee.
August 20, 1888.
(Signed)
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PRINTED AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE Y T, HARRISON,-21/8/88.
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