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Printed for the use of the Colonial Office. August 28, 1888.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Scheme of Defence.

MALTA.

Remarks by Colonial Defence Committee.

THE Colonial Defence Committee have carefully considered the scheme of defence prepared by the Governor of Malta which has been referred to them by the Secretary of State for War.

Malta must be regarded as one of the most important of the British fortresses abroad, while, at the same time, it is, in some respects, the most liable to attack in force. With Malta in the possession of a strong hostile maritime Power, it would be impossible to carry on extended operations in any part of the Mediterranean except its eastern end, or to afford any protection to the passing trade. In such a case, British trade in these waters must practically cease.

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The most serious form of attack to be apprehended, as Sir L. Simmons points out, is that "by a combined naval and military expedition." Assuming the absence of the fleet "for a definite period of some duration, possibly three or four months," he arrives at the conclusion that Malta must be prepared against "the sudden appearance off the coast of a hostile squadron accompanied by transports conveying a land force of 10,000 or 20,000 men." The Committee do not consider it necessary to discuss the question whether this prolonged absence of the fleet is or is not a reasonable probability; as they are satisfied that, even without such a prolonged absence, Malta is liable to an attack of the nature which Sir L. Simmons considers it necessary to be prepared against.

The importance of Malta to Great Britain being well understood, an attack on this station, with a view to destroy the dockyard and so cripple the effective action of the fleet, might well be considered worth a great effort, and the acceptance of some risk. Powerful fleets and large armies are within easy striking distance of Malta, and the mere temporary absence of Her Majesty's fleet in a distant part of the Mediterranean would furnish the necessary opportunity for attack if the local defences were inadequate or the garrison incomplete. On these grounds, the necessity for defending Malta against an attack in force is unquestionable.

Malta must, therefore, at all times be prepared to resist an attempted coup de main by a powerful squadron, accompanied by transports conveying a land force. The Committee are informed that the present available trans- port at Toulon alone is capable of conveying from 15,000 to 20,000 men for a short trip, and that a force of this strength could be assembled and prepared for embarkation within forty-eight hours without special effort calculated to arouse attention to the action contemplated, and they are therefore of opinion that defence should be provided against a land force of 20,000 men, which is the maximum number specified by Sir L. Simmons.

In thus limiting the number of the hostile force it is to be remembered that, owing to the special conditions of the land front stretching across the

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