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To meet (2), they propose to erect two iron forts on coral reefs off Ireland Island.

To meet (3) and (4), they propose to construct a work to the south of Castle Harbour, besides minor additions to existing arrangements.

It will be seen that important works are proposed to be added to the existing defences of Bermuda, and it may be well to consider briefly the forms of attack that may reasonably be expected to be made on this possession, and that it must therefore be able to resist.

Bermuda is situated near the centre of the West Atlantic, 650 miles distant from the nearest mainland, the United States, 2,900 miles from the nearest French home port (Brest), 1,200 miles from Havana (Cuba), the principal Spanish Colony in the West Indies, and 1,100 miles from Martinique, the French naval strategic base in those waters.

Geographically, therefore, the United States constitutes the greatest danger to Bermuda, but a force from any one of these places must cross a considerable distance of water, and can make use of no base in its vicinity.

The United States at present possess no ships capable of making the attacks described under (1), (2), and (4); nor is there any indication of an intention to build vessels suitable for undertaking (2) or (4), and even were they to construct such vessels, the position that would be taken up by our fleet off the Atlantic coast of this Power in the event of war, would not only provide ample work for such vessels in defending their own coast and ports against our attack, but would render any attempt on their part to put to sea for the attack of a British possession extremely hazardous.

Two vessels suitable for (1) are about to be commenced, but the above reasoning applies with equal force to them.

In the case, therefore, of the United States, there is no reasonable probability whatever of Bermuda being subjected to the attacks described under (1), (2), or (4).

The only form of attack practicable to this Power is that by a small cruizer force, though even that is improbable, as the damage this force could effect by attacking British commerce would be much greater than anything that could possibly be expected from an attack on Bermuda, not to speak of the greater inducement offered by prize-money.

As regards European Powers, though some of them have vessels capable: of undertaking (1), these vessels would have to be brought across the Atlantic, as no vessels of the nature required are maintained on the station.

Having regard (a) to the greater damage which such vessels might do to us in home waters; (b) to the comparatively small coal endurance of foreign armour-clads, particularly the French; (c) to the necessity of their bringing a large extra supply of coal with them, whether they come direct, or as the French might, viâ Martinique; and (d) to the necessity of bringing an extra supply of ammunition owing to the limited quantity carried by modern foreign armour-clads, and especially by the French, it is highly improbable such an attack would be made. If France contemplated detaching an armour-clad force from her home squadron, the objective would be much more likely to be a place whose capture would either give her command of an important trade route, like Aden, or would prevent our interfering with their command of such a route, such as Sierra Leone (whose capture or destruction would lessen our power of controlling Dakar), than Bermuda, which, though our principal naval repairing station in the West Atlantic (though not now the only dock), commands no trade routes.

As regards (2), "attack by a flotilla of heavily armed light-draught vessels," no European Power at present possesses vessels of this description capable of crossing the Atlantic.

A vessel answering to this description means one of small coal endurance, and also, if a sea-going vessel, a small one. Such vessels, even if able to keep the sea, would not be able to carry sufficient coal to steam the distance, either direct or from Martinique, and would have to be towed by larger vessels

Hitherto vessels answering to the above description have been built only for coast defence.

France possesses a few such vessels, but it is exceedingly unlikely she would allow them to leave her own shores, more especially if her ports were

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