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ANNEX I.
DRAFT TELEGRAM.
From:
Chiefs of Staff.
To:-
Boxes No.
185
Joint Staff Mission, Washington.
Repeated to:-
$.0. Force G.
A.C.N.B. (for Australian Defence Authorities) N.Z.N.B. (for New Zealand
C.-in-C., Far East. Spenavo.
}}
Reference Boxos 131 paragraph A. Following are our comments on Gleam 163 paragraphs (ii) and (iii). Substance of these comments should be conveyed to the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff.
2.
11
Glcam 163 paragraph 2. Point can best be dealt with by C.-in-C., Eastern Fleet during forthcoming conferences.
3.
Gleam 163 paragraph 3 (iii). We fully realise the importance of air strength in relation to our problems in the Far East and we had hoped to have built up a larger and more effective air force in that area by this date. The necessity for sending large numbers of aircraft to Russia, and the large reduction in anticipated aircraft deliveries from America have had serious effects on planned expansion of the R. A. F. at home and abroad.
A
We wish we could agree with U.S. Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff that air situation in United Kingdom justified us in reinforcing Malaya now. For reasons in paragraph 3 above fighter strength here will fall and may be below danger Iine if enemy again threaten invasion in Spring. Similarly in the case of bombers wo are behind schedule and are seriously concerned about our deficiencics in this respect.
5.
In these circumstances it is impossible for us to send appreciable ir reinforcements to the Far East at present. Even if such reinforcements could be spared from United Kingdom, they would have to travel round the Cape and could not be effective in the Far East for many months, and not in time to affect the present critical situation in that area,
6.
Our strategy in Far East must be mainly defensive while we are so heavily engaged with Germany and Italy. Thus apart from sea reconnaissance our most important requirements are fighters and medium range bombers capable of such tasks as attacking ships, assembly ports in Indo-China or Thailand etc. or supporting land operations as may be necessary. We have built up our fighter strength
We are to beyond recommendation of Singapore Conference. admittedly weak in modern bombers but the mark IV Blenheims and Australian Hudsons now in Far East are suitable types for tasks required.
7.
Our policy with regard to bombers is largely dictated by the very small numbers available, disappointments regarding numbers likely to become available in near future and consequent necessity to economisc and use each type where its qualities make best contribution to victory. governing factors are:-
Principal
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