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23.
(b)
through the Straits of Gibraltar by occupying a region about and north of Tarifa.
The attack on Gibraltar ould be a
subsidiary object.
The occupation of the Ceuta Peninsula of Spanish Morocco, including the Tangier Zone.
(c) Occupation of, or the use of, Dakar as
(a)
a submarine base.
The occupation of certain Portuguese or
Spanish Islands.
(e) The capture of Iceland.
(f) The occupation of portions of ire.
Rail and road
of the above, 22(a), the Atlantic ports of the Peninsula and the Tarifa area offer the best prospects of assisting in the attainment of the object. communications in Spain are poor and in bad condition. The possibility of sabotage on the lines of comunication must be reckoned with, even if organised resistance is not encountered. As has already been pointed our (para. 11)
These the economic problem would be most serious. difficulties are great, but not, of necessity, insuperable. The principal obstacle is Franco's cowardice and no effort must be spared to bring about a change in his attitude. Meanwhile so long as he continues to refuse co-operation we advise against the operation, attractive though it is.
24.
It must be noted that the advantages brought by a penetration into Spain or Portugal might be offset to some extent by British occupation of some of the Atlantic islands. If Iceland is any clue, the British are certain to go for those islands as soon as we cross the Spanish frontier.
119
25.
In regard to 22(b) above, the occupation of the Ceuta Peninsula of Spanish Morocco and the Tangier Zone; this operation might follow upon the occupation of Spain and Portugal and would be of great importance in obstructing the navigation of the Straits of Gibraltar by British shipping. Bute cannot undertake it without the occupation of lines of communication through Spain or without the co-operation, active or passive, of Spain itself.
26.
In regard to 92(c) above, the establishment of a submarine base at Dakar; while this would be of great advantage in extending our distant blockade measures it could only be achieved with the co-operation of the French African Empire. We cannot forcibly occupy Dakar from land or sea and at present French co-operation is improbable.
27.
In regard to 22(d) above, the occupation of certain
the object would be Portuguese or Spanish Atlantic Islands; to prevent their occupation by Britain and to provide refuelling-bases for vessels engaged in distant blockade. A seaborne expedition and regular supply would be necessary in each case. The risk is so great that it could only be justified as a desperate effort to forestall the British there. We cannot readmend the operation as an isolated one.
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