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Bach one of these tasks presents difficulties of the first magnitude. If attempted, the mos daring measures must be employed such s very lucevy attacks on the Taranto model, and the whole naval strength of Germany must be used and if necessary sacrificed in order to prevent interference by British naval forces.
The British air force will have to be defeated and this will necessitate a resumption of large scale operations by day. With our ner engines now being introduced the engagements will probably take place at greater heights where our aircraft may not suffer from inferiority of performance as they have in the past.
a.
The risk is great. Failure is not necessarily final failure since our home propaganda could, for time at least, make failure appear to have been well worth while because of the tremendous damage inflicted upon England.
We must make every possible effort to bring off a
In any event the mere successful invasion of England. threat of invasion contains military forces in Britain and above all is of inestimable advantage in diverting British naval forces from the essential task of protecting sea comunications,
19.
Starvation, if it can be brought to pass, also
It is less certain than means the defeat of England.
America invasion and success may be long in coming, can, and if pecessary will, placo great shipning resources at the disposal of England.
20.
We have reliable information regarding the rate of British imports of raw materials and foodstuffs, and we can calculate the rate of consumption and probable stocks.
We estimate that, even with imports cut off altogether, Great Britain could subsist on her stocks for three months at least.
It must therefore regretfully be admitted that with 21 million tons of British ship ing at the outbreak of war, supplemented by new construction, captures, and purchase from the United States of America, the present rate of sinkings presents no immediate danger to the United Kingdom.
21.
We must therefore increase the pressure on British shipping and our air attacks should show a
A closer co-ordination change in direction, between our sea and air efforts will ensure that just as the naval effort and some long-range air effort is now directed against shipping so the normal bombing attacks vill be directed against the contents of these ships at their morts of arrival,
Such a rather than against industrial targets. policy will meet with opposition in some quarters, but blockade cannot hope to be effective unless supported by the hole weight of our o'm force.
22.
Certain subsidiary operations to facilitate the blockade operations must be considered,
(a) Occupa sion of such parts of Spain and Portugal as are necessary to enable Atlantic ports to be used as naval and air bases and to hinder passage
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