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28.

In regard to 22(e) the capture of Iceland; Britain has a strong garrison in occupation which has had some nine months to prepare defences. together with the uncertain climatic conditions makes the operation inadvisable in winter.

This

29. In regard to 22(f), the occupation of portions of Eire; an effective occupation would add very much to the efficiency of blockade measures both by sea and air. Britain has considerable forces available in Northern Ireland. Although help is to be expected from the I.R.A. and other sympathisers in Ireland it would be useless to undertake the invasion without large forces. The maintenance of such forces would not be possible.

We cannot therefore recommend the operation, except, possibly, as part of the invasion of the United Kingdom.

30.

There are certain other courses, not directly connected with the early overthrow of England, which must be considered:-

(a) Assistance to Italy in Albania and Libya;

(b) Invasion of. Greece through Bulgaria and,

possible,Yugoslavia.

(c) An advance south-eastwards towards the

Bosphorus and Dardanelles with a view to operations in the Middle East.

(a) The occupation of Unoccupied France.

(e) The occupation of Italy.

31. In regard to 30(a), assistance to Ttaly in Albania and Libya. We cannot of course afford to see Italy overthrown. But failing this danger, which does not seem imminent, there is no particular reason to dissipate our forces on a large scale either in Albania where there is little room to deploy them or in Libya where there is now little prospect of successful offensive action. Some air assistance and even the provision of certain specialists may, however, be necessary particularly in Albania.

32. In regard to 30(b) above, invasion of Greece, Bulgaria will probably be drawn into the Axis or at least can be compelled to facilitate the transit of

Turkey German troops. Mugoslavia might resist.

There would be might take action against Bulgaria. the danger of throwing the Balkans into a turmoil which might hamper the supply of Rumanian oil and

These economic other urgently required commodities. disadvantages and the importance of not dissipating forces unnecessarily render this operation inadvisable except under the following conditions:-

(i) As a security measure, to meet a British Air threat to Rumanian oil supply and to prevent the consolidation of a Balkan bloc against us.

(ii

As a first step in a Mediterranean

offensive, if experience shows that a direct blow against England will not win the war at this stage, and that we must first attack her in the Near East.

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