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CL. 96 ес
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT).
TO BE KEIT UNDERTOOK & KEY.
It is requested that cordial care may be taken to
ensure the secrecy of this document.
SECRET.
C.0.S.(41) 17 (Final).
7TH JANUARY. 1941.
COPY NO.
24
WAR CABINET.
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.
(Brick & J.R (41) 3)
DEFENCE COLLABORATION WITH THE DUTCH.
Memorandum.
We have examined the form of assurance, contained in paragraph 8 of the Foreign Office Memorandum, which it is proposed should be made orally and informally to the Dutch Minister. Our views on this proposal are as follows.
2.
No change in the strategic situation has occurred which causes us to modify the conclusions we reached in C.0.S.(40) 796. These were:-
3.
(a) In view of the serious additional commitment
involved at the present critical stage of the war with Germany, we cannot recommend the adoption of a definite policy under which Japanese aggression against the Netherlands East Indies should, under all circumstances, be treated as a casus belli.
We should not, therefore, enter into a binding obligation with the Dutch.
(b) Nevertheless, Japanese aggression against the
Netherlands East Indies would constitute so serious a threat to our vital interests that it is almost inevitable that we should be compelled to support the Dutch, if they resisted.
At the same time it is of considerable importance to the defence of our Far Eastern position that the Dutch should resist a Japanese move against the Netherlands East Indies and should agree to implement the recommendations of the Staff Conversations held at Singapore regarding mutual defence measures.
4.
If the United States of America were to give a clear indication that they would join us in supporting the Dutch against Japanese aggression, the position would be
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