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ANNEX,
20
Copy of a telegram dated 24th December, 1940, from Sir M. Palairet (Athens) to Foreign
No. 1420.
IMPORTANT.
1.
My immediately preceding telegram.
Office.
As it is conceivable that Italy may sue for armistice before Germany intervenes in the Balkans, I asked the President of the Council yesterday what he supposed Germany
He replied that he would do if Italy were knocked out. thought she would form a defensive block in Central Europe. Even if she occupied Trieste and other Italian ports our supremacy in Mediterranean would, he said, still not be in danger.
2.
In such circumstances Greece and ourselves would continue to be separated from Germany by belt formed by Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Hungary, the neutrality of which
In that case, it may be in nobody's interest to violate,
I do not see how Greece can help us actively in the prosecution of the war against Germany or indeed how we can make use of our ally Turkey.
3.
The President of the Council would not of course have said to General Heywood that we must remain Allies after the war unless he had intended_Greece to continue as our ally throughout grp. undec. (see also my telegram No. 1405). But he may not have realised the full implication of such intention. Supposing Italy to have been defeated, Greece will have preserved her independence and achieved her war aims and I do not think even the
President of the Council could bring the nation grp. omit.7 war against Germany unless the latter had first committed an act of aggression. Certainly nations would be far from united on such an issue, for they would realise that if we asked Greece to allow us to use her bases against Germany, the population would be exposed to severe punishment by air from which we could probably not protect them.
4.
Above hypothetical points, though worthy of consideration, do not alter practical requirement of the moment which is (see my immediately preceding telegram) to make immediate choice in the matter of aerodromes and supplies knowing probability that Italy will still be in the war in the spring and possibility that Germany will
At the same time, come to her support in the Balkans.
I repeat that it is important not to provoke Germany to a step which, unless provoked, she seems to me in the present crisis unwilling in her own interests to take.
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