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16.
Another alternative role for U.S. medium bombers would be to co-operate in the defence of Iceland. We are unable
to find the full number of aircraft required for this purpose, and the U.S. type would be particularly suitable for employment in this area.
Fighters,
17. The principle might be that the U.S. should provide fighter co-operation for their own bomber and G.R. squadrons. We do not suggest that initially U.S. fighter squadrons should be employed from bases in the United Kingdom or Eire. We should, however, welcome U.S. fighter squadrons at Singapore or in Iceland, where German high-performance fighters are unlikely to be encountered; they would also be valuable in the Middle East.
18. Later, when existing U.S. fighters have been fitted with increased fire-power or when new types are available, U.S. fighter squadrons would be valuable either in Eire or the United Kingdom, Provided our aircraft industry is not seriously reduced by enomy air action, we may be in a position to re-equip U.S. squadrons with British 8-gun fighters.
A. A. Defences.
19. It is suggested that the U.S. should provide the necessary Heavy and Light A.A, defences for aerodromes and flying-boat bases used by U.S. squadrons. Any additional equipments that could be made available would, of course, be welcome.
Sea Communications.
20.
It is understood that in principle the United States naval authorities would prefer their naval co-operation to take the form, as far as possible, of assuming responsibility for certain definite areas within which they would have full operational control,
21. In general, it is suggested that the responsibility for providing cover against the main hostile, or potentially hostile, naval concentration in the Pacific should rest with the U.S.A., and in the Atlantic with the British.
22, To that end it would be convenient for the U.S.A. to assume operational control over the whole Pacific Ocean, including the entire British China Station, but excluding the Australian Station and that portion of the New Zealand Station which lies south of the equator and west of longitude 170°We
23. In order to implement our responsibility for providing cover in the Atlantic, it would be necessary for us to have operational control over the entire Home Station, in Northern Waters and in the eastern portion of the North Atlantic Station. This area might be extended to include the whole of the North Atlantic northward of Cape Sable (Nova Scotia), so as to include the Canadian coast and the Halifax convoy route, which are important British interests.
24. The U.S.A. would probably wish to control the remainder of the existing A. and W. I. Station. We may have to occupy the Azores and Cape Verde Islands, in order to deny them to the enemy and in the case of the Azores to make use of them as a fuelling base for our own forces if Gibraltar becomes untenable; and it would be appreciated if the cccupation could be undertaken by the U.S. Marine Corps, in which event the area under U.S. operational control might conveniently be extended to include these islands,
STA
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