CAB80-13 — Page 339

Page 339

Page 339

316

Economic Pressure.

9. Our ability to apply economic pressure by control at source is largely dependent upon complete pan-American co- operation. The scheme for applying control is a matter for the Ministry of Economic Warfare and will form the subject of separate conversations with the U.S.A.

General.

10. We suggest that the guiding principle in determining the employment of any U. S. forces that can be made available to assist us should be that United States forces should reinforce or even replace British forces in those areas where America's own interests lie and where they can thus also contribute to the defence of those interests. A second principle might be that U.S. forces should be used in those areas where they have bases of their own from which they could secure British interests within their orbit.

Air Co-operation,

Sea Reconnaissance and Striking Force,

110

The most effective assistance which the U.S.A. could afford initially in this respect would be the provision of flying-boat squadrons to supplement our Coastal Command in Home Waters and G. R. squadrons overseas. The occupation by the enemy of the European coast from the North Cape to the Pyrenees has vastly increased our requirements in flying-boats, and the situation would be still worse in the event of Spanish intervention against us. We have not, nor is there any chance of our being able to raise from our own resources, anything approaching the number of flying-boat squadrons required,

12. The U.S. Naval Air Service should therefore undertake such commitments as they are able to meet, Areas of responsibility must be a matter for detailed discussion, but on the principles in paragraph 10 above, the following is a suggested order of priority:-- Eastern Atlantic, Northern Patrol (based on Iceland), Carribean, Singapore.

13. Any shore-based squadrons that can be made available for seaward reconnaissance or striking force should be employed in the same general areas.

Bombers.

14. We should of course welcome any reinforcement that U.S. could make available to our long-range bomber force operating against Germany. It is suggested that plans should be based on an initial contingent of four heavy bomber (B/17) squadrons, which could be flown across the Atlantic, to operate from bases in U.K.

15. The U.S. might be willing to consider the employment of medium bomber squadrons, of a type not suitable for operations in the European theatre, to reinforce or relieve British and Australian medium bombers at Singapore, Alternatively - or possibly even in addition U.S. medium bombers which, though not of very high performance or armament, have a long range would be a valuable reinforcement to our Air Forces in the Middle East area, where the U.S. has important oil interests.

影响

--3--

Page 339

Page 339

Page 339