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It was emphasised at the Conference that recognition of a Chinese Communist Government in China and increased resistance to Communism in South-East Asia were not necessarily incompatible. What happens in China is the business of the Chinese and we should merely be recognising an accomplished fact; what happens in South-East Asia is the concern of the Governments there which are opposed to Communism.
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12. The Legal Adviser of the Foreign Office has given it as his opinion that our recognition should be without conditions, since no change in the inter- national obligations of a State are brought about by a change of régime, and it is, therefore, unnecessary to insist on explicit acceptance of this principle by a new régime. Indeed, to do so has its disadvantages, since this opens the way to the argument that a new régime is only bound by the previous obligations of the country if it expressly says that it will be. To seek such an assurance would not strengthen our position in law. On the other hand, it would certainly give consolation to bodies such as the Council of Foreign Bondholders, who have large vested interests in China. But, since an awkward answer from the Chinese to such an approach, if made, would speedily dispel any hope in the hearts of those interested, it would probably be better tactics to make a quite separate public statement in answer to an inspired Parliamentary Question, which would not invite any comment from the Chinese Communist Government.
V. TIMING OF RECOGNITION
13. At the meeting in London on 15th November with the Commonwealth High Commissioners the Foreign Secretary made the suggestion that it would probably suit the convenience of Commonwealth and other friendly Governments if the act of recognition was delayed until a date early in the New Year, since by then the Chinese motion in the United Nations Assembly would be out of the way, the Australian and New Zealand elections would be over, the Netherlands Government should have transferred sovereignty to Indonesia and the French Government should have ratified their agreement with Bao Dai.
14. In the light of the Indian Government's views referred to in paragraph 9 above, it seems probable that India will accord recognition in December whether other Commonwealth countries recognise or not. Since United Kingdom interests in China are far greater than those of any other Common- wealth country, and since we have also to consider our position in Hong Kong and our vital interests in Malaya and Singapore, it seems clear that a firm decision should be taken without delay. With a view to holding India on the one hand and on the other to stimulating the less ready among the other friendly Governments, all have been informed that His Majesty's Government expect to take a decision between 12th and 19th December.
VI. EFFECTS OF RECOGNITION
15. It will be appreciated that recognition does not of itself make the Communist authorities the rulers of China. They are that already. Recognition is no more than an acceptance of a fact, which its withholding would not alter. Nor, in view of the almost total collapse of the Nationalist Government, can it any longer cogently be argued that recognition would undermine what might otherwise have been effective resistance to Communism. Conversely, to with- hold recognition from the Communist Government now that no other effective authority exists in China would imply a deliberate policy of boycotting China. The effects of such a negative policy on our long-term relations with China as well as on our trading interests in China need no elaboration.
16. Politically, recognition implies our willingness to enter into diplomatic relations with the new Government and does not signify approval of its ideology or outlook. It follows logically from recognition that we would acccept the Communist Government's claim to represent China in all international organisa- tions. Her vote, by contrast with that of the Nationalist Government, would almost certaldgosastofghi97 us on most major issues. Thegooi4a0fadvantages of recognition are calculated on the assumption that we cannot afford to ignore, however much we may disapprove its political orientation, a government which
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