CAB129-37 — Page 822

SECRET

C.P. (49) 248.

12th December, 1949

Cerculated 13/12/49

"at' 5pm.

Page 822

412

Copy No. 31

Printed for the Cabinet. December 1949

CABINET

RECOGNITION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. INTRODUCTION

C.P. (49) 214 of 24th October set out the case for and against recognition of the Chinese Communist Government and drew the conclusion that on political as well as practical grounds, we should recognise the Peking Administration. In the light of this appreciation of the situation the Cabinet on 27th October (C.M. (49) 62nd Conclusions, Minute 7) authorised consultation with the rest of the Commonwealth, the United States and other friendly Powers on the basis of the views set out in C.P. (49) 214.

2. The results of these consultations are set forth below.

II. ATTITUDE OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

3. United States.-The United States Government felt strongly that as long as there was any opposition to the Communist régime it would be a stab in the back if recognition were to be accorded. They attached great importance to obtaining an assurance that the Communist Government is prepared to accept China's international obligations. Mr. Acheson, at a press conference on 7th December, reiterated the view that recognition of the Chinese Communist Government in the immediate future would be premature and that even con- sideration of recognition was premature. Subsequently, Mr. Acheson expressed the hope to Sir Oliver Franks that there will be a large-ish time gap between a decision on the date and the act of recognition in order that public opinion. in the United States may be properly prepared. He also expressed the hope that we should not seek concerted action by members of the Commonwealth, since he feared that this would tend to give emphasis to the suggestion that the British and Americans were going their separate ways. The United States Government would accordingly favour an arrangement whereby members of the Commonwealth would accord recognition "at several intervals of time."

4. France. The guiding consideration for France is her difficult situation in Indo-China and the fear that de jure recognition of a Chinese Communist Government without any corresponding gesture of approval towards the Bao Dai Administration would jeopardise the prospects for the latter. On the general political issues involved in recognition the French Government's views coincide fairly closely with our own. They would like to see a united front maintained, since recognition by some, in advance of others, might lead to discrimination, but at the same time they would be loath themselves to accord de jure recognition to the Communist Government until the control of South-West China has passed into their hands. They have expressed the hope that we shall delay our recognition of the Chinese Communist Government as long as possible, and though they may well expect that we shall accord recognition in the fairly near future, they may reproach us if we do.

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5. Paget Berban &1.09The Netherlands Governmengear3infgeneral sympathy with what they call our "realistic approach." They are, however, anxious not to accord recognition before the transfer of sovereignty in Indonesia. This is now due to take place on 27th December, and recognition in the neighbourhood of that date is unlikely to raise any acute problem for the Dutch.

6. While the Scandinavian countries are generally prepared to accord recognition as soon at we have done so, the Italian and Portuguese Governments are somewhat more hesitant and are most certainly influenced in this by the American attitude to recognition. The Belgian Government have associated themselves with the French desire that our recognition should be delayed as long as possible.

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7. Of the attitudes of the Powers mentioned above, clearly that of the United States is of the utmost importance. Moreover, whatever the attitude of the United States Government, there will certainly be widespread dislike in the United States of the necessity of recognition. There may well be criticism of our action, and unless carefully handled this may become vocal in Congress. Mr. Acheson's views, recorded in paragraph 3, therefore merit serious considera- tion. As regards France and Belgium, our Brussels Treaty relationship would naturally incline us to meet their wishes as far as is practicable. On the other hand, neither France nor Belgium plays a leading part in Asian affairs, and European reactions to recognition are not, on balance, the most important.

i.

8. In Asia, Burma has indicated a desire to accord recognition soon after 11th December, and may be unwilling to defer the date. Siam, which before 1946 had no relations at all with China, may be reluctant to accord recognition, while the Philippines may conceivably follow the lead of the United States.

III.—ATTITUDE OF OTHER COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS

9. Commonwealth views reveal a wide measure of agreement, and while there is some divergence as to timing or tactics, in no case have the reasons which had led us to decide in principle in favour of recognition been disputed. The most important points of difference are that Australia on the one hand is against immediate recognition and would prefer to see the question put on the agenda of the Colombo Conference, while India on the other hand is anxious to accord recognition as soon as the present Session of the General Assembly is over. India has indicated that she may in fact accord recognition at some time between 15th and 25th December. The Australian Government, in addition, consider that some prior assurance should be obtained from the Communist Government to the effect. that they would assume China's international obligations and respect the territorial integrity of China's neighbours. The views of Australia and New Zealand have been influenced by the general elections in both countries.

The views of the new Government of New Zealand are as yet unknown.

10. Ceylon, Pakistan, Canada and the Union of South Africa have expressed views which agree generally with our own, although in the case of Canada there is reluctance to march too far out of step with the United States, and the Canadian Government have recently stated that they would prefer to postpone their recognition until after the Ceylon Conference. The Government of the Union of South Africa have also indicated that they would prefer not to be in the first batch" to recognise.

IV. SINGAPORE CONFERENCE

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11. The Conference of His Majesty's Representatives in the Far East, which was held in Singapore between 2nd and 4th November, considered that the situation in South-East Asia and the Far East demands that de jure recognition should be accorded to the Communist Government of China at the earliest possible moment. They recommended that no formal conditions should be attached to such recognition. In their view recognition should be accompanied by a strengthening of our resistance to the spread of Communism in South-East Asia. The Conference, in addition, emphasised the need for-

(4)

an extensive propaganda campaign to explain that recognition does not

(b) every effort to minimise the adverse effects of any disagreement with the

United States over recognition.