CAB129-37 — Page 825

4

Page 825 has effective authority over a vast territory and population. Similarly, it is assumed that without relations with this Government, we shall be in no position to exert any influence on its future development.

17. We have had no diplomatic representation with the Nationalist Government since Canton fell on 14th October, so that the withdrawal of recog- nition from that Government presents no immediate practical problem in China. His Majesty's Consular Officers would remain in Nationalist areas, including Formosa, and maintain de facto relations with the local authorities.

Military Effects

18. The Chiefs of Staff have studied the military aspects of recognition and have reached the conclusion that de jure recognition of the Chinese Com- munist Government is likely, on balance, to have an adverse effect on our military position in the Far East and South-East Asia. The military disadvantages will not be sufficient, however, to outweigh any strong political or economic advantage which might accrue from recognition.

Treaty Rights

19. While the Chinese Communist Government have on the one hand announced their willingness to "establish diplomatic relations with any and all foreign Governments willing to observe the principles of equality, mutual interest, and mutual respect for territorial sovereignty, their press on the other hand has announced that all Kuomintang agreements are liable to re-examination and revision. We should therefore assume that, irrespective of any unilateral state- ment we make about the Communist Government's assumption of China's international obligations, in fact it is improbable that these obligations will be regarded as binding. Delay in recognition is, however, unlikely to lead to any satisfactory assurances on this point, and in the absence of relations, the Treaty rights are themselves of no value. Recognition may therefore lead to a laborious and unpromising series of negotiations on the revision of existing treaties with China and in particular of the Sino-British Treaty (1943) on relinquishment of extra-territorial rights, on which our existing rights of property ownership and of travel, and our rights in respect of shipping and consular representation in China are based. Similar considerations apply to the various Financial, Air and other Agreements. We should have no illusions in this respect, but should be prepared to insist on strict reciprocity.

Propaganda

20. In the propaganda field we may expect that, at the worst, the Chinese press and radio will continue their attacks upon "Western imperialism," and that Chinese Communist propaganda will follow the Moscow pattern. In such circumstances recognition of a Chinese Communist Government should not in any way deter us from taking appropriate counter-measures in the territories for which we ourselves are responsible, or from encouraging our friends in South and South-East Asia to do the same. In this country careful publicity will be required to explain that recognition implies neither approval nor disapproval of the ideo- logy or outlook of the new Government but is merely an acceptance of the fact that they are now rulers of China.

British Trading Interests

ence.

21. While recognition is unlikely to provide any immediate panacea for British trading interests in China and to a lesser extent Hong Kong, it may be expected to provide that minimum protection necessary to their continued exist- While the new régime is not at present so corrupt as its predecessor, its authority may well prove even more arbitrary and vexatious in its regulations. Its realisation of its need for some Western trade is, however, indicated by the very fact that the foreign trading communities have not been uprooted. individual cases, their position, particularly under the totalitarian juridical system of the "People's Courts," may prove precarious.

Hong Kong

In

22.Page 85 Bufk109erene Conference the GovPage 82 Hong Kong expressed himself in favour of early recognition of the Chinese Communist Government in

414

5

and

view of the very emhese Population in Hong Kong of the New Perritories.

tar It is true that with recognition all Chinese Government assets will necessarily be regarded as vested in the new Government. This may create a difficult problem for the Governor of Hong Kong, but it may be less embarrassing than the present position in this respect. The Governor of Hong Kong, who recognises that the appointment of a Communist representative after recognition cannot be avoided, would prefer that such a representative should continue to have the undefined status which the Nationalist representative at present enjoys, though his present title of "Special Commissioner for Kwangtung and Kwangsi" should if possible be changed to" Special Commissioner for Hong Kong. On balance it is thought preferable not to press for the appointment of a Consul-General, who might insist on exercising privileges not at present exercised by the Special Commissioner.

Malaya and Singapore

23. The Governor of Singapore and the High Commissioner for Malaya both favour early recognition of the Chinese Communist Government, since they feel that continued non-recognition will be misunderstood by the large Chinese population in these territories and render them less co-operative. It is recognised that the appointment of Chinese Communist consuls will create difficulties. It is felt that the appointment of Communist consuls cannot be long delayed, though any possible delay should be contrived while the present emergency remains. While Chinese Communist consuls can facilitate communications, their presence is not essential to the conduct of subversive Communist activities in Malaya, which can easily be stepped up by the infiltration of Communist agents who may or may not have affiliations with Chinese consulates.

Chinese Nationalist Representation in London

24 On the day that we choose for according de jure recognition to the People's Republic of China it will be necessary to inform the present Chinese

Ambassador of this decision and to request him to consider himself hence

as a private person. Dr. Cheng, who has a life-long connexion with the United Kingdom and is a Bencher of the Middle Temple, is certain to ask for permission to establish residence in this country. It is recommended that this should be granted and that the same concession be allowed to any members of his staff whò can make out a reasonable case. In practice the majority will probably opt for service under the new régime.

25. As regards consulates, having regard to the position in Malaya and Singapore, it may be desirable not to close the Nationalist Consulates forthwith but to allow them to continue until such time as the Chinese Communist Govern- ment notify us of their intention to take them over. In the interim period, the position of Nationalist consuls will be anomalous, but it is by no means improbable that certain consular staffs will go over to the Communist side and take service under the Communist Government.

British Representation in Nationalist China

26. As stated in paragraph 17 above, we have no diplomatic representatives in Nationalist China. Day-to-day business with the Nationalist authorities on the Chinese mainland will be carried on through His Majesty's Consul at Kunming so long as Kunming remains in Nationalist hands and through His Majesty's Consul in Formosa. These officers should be left at their posts and should maintain local contact with the local authorities as before on a de facto basis.

United Nations

27. The Soviet Union and certain satellites have already expressed the view in the United Nations Assembly that the present Chinese delegation no longer represents China. Until, however, the status of the various Chinese representa- tives in the United Nations is changed by a decision of some organ or organs of the United Nations, they will presumably continue to retain their seats. question is of particular significance in relation to the Security Council, where, in accordance with the normal procedure, the Chinese representative will be in the

by the Council.

This

chair in Januapile there seems to be no reason why the United Kingdom chair in January 18502ben, the

1950, when the Kashmir dispute may still be under consideration should take any initiative in the matter (since it would not be inconvenient for

6

us for the Nationalist representative to retain his seat in the Security Council until such time node is displaced by some generally accepted decision), we must accept the position that after recognition we shall have to cast our vote for the admission of the Communist representative. Assuming that we have accorded de jure recognition to the Chinese Communist Government, our attitude should be, if approached by that Government, that the replacement of the various Nationalist representatives by Chinese Communists is a matter for the United Nations and concerns the United Kingdom only as an individual member of that organisation.

28. We must nevertheless accept the fact that a difficult position is bound to arise sooner or later, and that no precedent exists for the expulsion of repre- sentatives who refuse voluntarily to vacate their seats which are claimed by a successor Government. If, as we may suppose, the United States delay recognition of the Chinese Government, there may be the two extremes that the United States openly support the Nationalist representatives, while the Soviet Union (and presumably Yugoslavia, who has recognised the Chinese Communist Government) will refuse to do business with them. In between these two extremes the situation may be that the United Kingdom and India, for example, who by then will have recognised the Chinese Communist Government, will refuse to take sides in the matter until the question of representation has been thrashed out. It must be admitted that such a situation will not be conducive to the smooth working of the Security Council, or indeed the other organs concerned. But since the Soviet Union and satellites have already taken their stand in the matter, the situation is likely to arise whether the United Kingdom and India recognise the Chinese Communist Government or not.

29.

CONCLUSION

We have now reached the stage when we have consulted with friendly Governments on this question and have to make up our own minds. There is an obvious danger if recognition is delayed too long, and the time may not be very far distant when, if it is withheld any further, the Chinese Communist Govern- ment will begin to put pressure upon our interests in China, and even demand the withdrawal of our officials. We shall then be compelled either to accord recognition under duress or to withhold it indefinitely as a gesture against coercion. To adopt the first alternative would be to weaken our whole position and prestige in the Far East. To adopt the second would be to sacrifice our interests in China which we have been at such pains to maintain. Therefore, though it is possible that we may not carry all the friendly Governments with us and though it may be difficult for the United States to follow our lead, at any rate for some time to come, everything points to the conclusion that we should now decide to accord de jure recognition to the Chinese Communist Government at an early date.

30. If this conclusion is accepted, it is suggested that the Chinese Communist Government should be notified at an early date of our decision to accord de jure recognition. An opportunity should be given for friendly Govern- ments, if they feel so disposed, to synchronise their own action with ours.

RECOMMENDATIONS

31. I invite my colleagues to agree that--

(a) A decision be taken to accord de jure recognition to the Chinese

Communist Government at an early date.

(b) Other Commonwealth Governments, the United States and other friendly Powers be notified of our decision and the reasons for making it and invited, if they feel so disposed, to synchronise their action with that of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

Foreign Office, S.W. 1,

12th December, 1949.