problem doos not constitute a separate issue, but in part of a package
deal. The fact that Kowloon and the island are logally different from
the New Territorios has not provented one recent riter from saying, "It
is highly unlikely that this loase will be renewed, and the Colony
cannot exist without the Now Territories. Another estimate made at the
end of an account of the 1967 disturbances in Hong Kong argued that,
without the New Territories, Hong Kong "may not be able
Some support was to survive as a separate functional and economic
unit".7
given to this view in the Annual Departmental Report of the Commissioner
of Labour in 1970. The Commissioner stated that "the New Territories is
an integral part of Hong Kong and must provide most of the industrial
sites
Thus any prosent and future development required by industry in the
future". of the entire colony as an industrial power can be seen only if
the Now
Such a situation night categorically Territories are included in Hong
Kong. rule out any suggestion of a continuation of Hong Kong's present
status after 1997. Moreover, Hong Kong's banking and financial
importance is likely to become less important, because the uncertainties
of the final decade of the lease are bound to reduce confidence in the
sensitive areas of business and
financial activity.
+
6 D.J. Haller, The Government and Politics of Communist China
(Hutchinson)
1970 p. 169.
7 J. Cooper, Colony in Conflict (Swindon Prosa) 1970 Introduction.
8 Commissionor of Labour, Annual Departmental Report 1969-70.
1969-70. Section 190, p. 5)
The question which most observers in and of Hong Kong constantly ask is
why does China permit Hong Kong to exist. The answer normally given is
economic,
that Cuina permits Hong Kong to exist because China gains quite
considerablo
economic advantages fron permitting the British Crown Colony on her
doorstep.
The entire rationale for China's toleration of Hong Kong is most
commonly
stated in economic teras. We may consider a number of those assertions.
Karold Hinton has stated that Hong Kong ig tolerated because "it is the
largest
single carner of non-Communist foreign exchange"." Pator Calvocorossi
believed
that China's tolerance developed after the Communist take-over in 1949
because "it (China) took a pragmatic and not a doctrinaire view of its
own interests.10
Another writer argued that "China has allowed it to remain British
because of the convenience it affords her to trade with the
non-communist world.
1.1.1
Alcost to a man, journaliste explain China's toleration of Hong Kong in
purely economic teras, The Sunday Telegraph of November 9, 1969 can fit
to
place its discussion of Hong Kong in the Business Section. 12 The Times
of London
produced two special reports on Hong Kong in quick succession, dated
October 30, 1969 and October 15, 1970. In the former report it was
stated that, "Hong Kong
is, in fact, China's only roxarding financial and banking bridgehead
with the
rest of the world and her most convenient springboard for export dumping
forays
into South East Asia
13 That. Hong Kong lives on "borrowed time" is seen as
--
a tribute to the appeal of the "good clean smell of money", assessed
variously
as between £250 million and £300 million in terms of Peking's earnings
of foreign
exchange.
Host arguments whether from acadzzies or journalists which attempt to
appraise
China's acceptance of Hong Kong's situation in purely economic terms are
not
convincing, Hong Kong is of course intolerable to the Chinese Communists
as a
9 R. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (Houghton Mifflin) 1966
p. 24.
10 P. Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945 (Longmans) 1968 p. 74.
11 D. Crosley, The Eackground to Current Affairs (5th edition) 1970
Papermac,
(Hacmillan), p. 226.
symbol of capitalion, but to argue that because it is accepted by the
Chinese
on account of its profitability needs closer examination. In short the
argument boils down to the simple belief that China is prepared to
swallow
her ideology for money, even during a period of ferocious ideological
upsurge
like the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1957. It must not be
forgotten that economien', the search for wealth before ideological
truth,
was one of the cardinal cins of the heretics' of 1967. It was better to
be
'red' than 'expert', bettor to be full of rovolutionary zeal and, if
necessary,
14 empty in the stomach. Yot Eong Kong survived, pace the 1967 riots.
What the 'economic argumont effectively suggests is the heresy, Poking
itsolf practisad (and still practisos) the revisionist sin of economiam
-
placing material well-being prior to revolutionary ideclogy. If one
accepts
the ideology of the Cultural Revolution even at a highly devalued level,
it is
still difficult to understand how unbridled capitalisa continues
unchecked.
Ideology and myth are of course the abstractions produced by the
political
culture, which can be crudely defined as the mass perception of the
political
'rules of the gane' in all its aspects. Can it be argued that such a
funda-
mental and all-pervading phenomenon as the Chinese political culture
suddenly
stops short at the Shun Chun river border between Hong Kong and New
Territorios
and the mainland of China? Can China's communists believe in an
inspirational
ideology except for Hong Kong, where the highest value is the stock
exchange
and the bank? One explanation for the puradox is that so does not take
his
own ideology seriously. Indeed he told the French writer Andre Kalraux
that
"husan nature left to itself does not necessarily reintroduce
capitalism, but
it does reintroduce inequality. It is moreover true that the political
and
rhetorical value of ideology is there to be capitalised on particularly
amongst a people so attracted by ideology as are the Chinese.15
14 Ping-tillo and Tang Taou, China in Cricis (Chicago) 1968 vol. I, Book
II,
p. 519.
15 Lucian Pyo, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (M.I.T.) 1968 pp. 12-16.
particular, Chapter Two, The Comforts of Hierarchy and Ideology "The
Chineco haya olmayn falt profoundly uncomfortable. disentințând, and
throstened
In
9
Yot, for a life-long communist, such as Mao, it is inconceivable that he
should be cynical enough to tolerate the casa Nao cult nythology, yet
behaving hicself as a complete cynic in private. so has not swallowed
his ideology for economics, neither has he assumed a now devioumess, the
answer therefore must
be sought elsewhere,
Indeed if Hong Kong were to be condemned as an ideological outrago, it
would have been re-absorbed into China at any time after 1949, if not
long before. It is sometimes forgotten that Hong Kong has beon in the
British Empire (to use that term in the strict historical sense) for a
century and a third of
a century sixty years before Nigeria for example, Hong Kong has, it
could
-
be argued, been an affront to Chinese pride long before it became the
important
Of course the Hanchus did inlet of foreign exchange which it has now
become, not then have the power to resist foreign devils, but on the
contrary, the Chinese communista do possess this power. Thy do they not
use it?
If.
The answer can only be a guess because there is unlikely to be a single
anover which would satisfy the political scientist in the way that it
would possibly satisfy the economist. It may perhaps be nearer the park
to auggest that Hong Kong is essentially a political pawn in the game of
Chinese pover politics. Hong Kong may perhaps be regarded as a Trojan
Horse in reverse. as is sometimes said, Britain is a Trojan Horce for
the U.S.A, in Europe, it may be that by a process of oriental logic,
Hong Kong can be used as China's Trojan Horse in the U.S. sphere of
interest in Asia. Through Hong Kong, China has been able to penetrate
the consciousness of the West, particularly in the two decades after
assuming control in China.
While a colonial government remained in power in Hong Kong firmly wedded
to the legalistic poker-faced syndrome, the Chinese authorities have of
courca asserted their "rights" through the large numbers of communists
in the colony. To create a disturbance in Hong Kong may be the
communist's method of warning Britain that China was annoyed not with
the colonial government but with tho
Hong Kong United States. Riots in 1952 and 196 fall into this category.
could also be used as a sounding-board for Poking's exasporation with
Taiwan.
1
↓
+
10
i
In October 1956, there were Rationalist riots in Kowloon, severe enough
to
cause Chow on-lad to state that China "could not permit such disordere
on
16
the doorstep of China". The policy of confronting China through Hong
Kong
General had already been developed by the United States during the
Korean war,
McArthur hud stated that, in spite of the embargo of the U.S.A. on trade
with
Communist China, Hong Kong's authorities had peraitted "substantial
quantitios"
of patrol to find it way to the mainland. No support was given to the
general's
assertions either by the U.S. Consulate-General or by the Hong Kong
government.
but Hong Kong's role in Asian power politics was spelt out clearly. The
advico
given by the U.S. Consulate-General, in Hong Kong in January 1951 for
all American
citizens to evacuate the colony spelt out the fears, and indeed the
appraisal,
17 of China's intentions as they were perceived by the U.S.A.
·
British policy to stand by the legalistic implications of the three
treatios
vas spelt out immediately after the victory of Mao's forces in 1949. As
early
as 1951, the British government, through the somewhat improbable person
of the
Chief Justice, Rome, stated that mainland China had been lost to the
Nationalists,
no longer in effective control, and that H.1.G. was "fully alive to the
probability
18 of the withdrawl of recognition by the British government in the near
future".
Mr. Harold Macmillan from the Conservative back benchos asserted, during
the
debate on the Amothvat incident that the Conservatives supported
Britain's
decision to remain in Hong Kong and he described the colony us "the
Gibraltar
19 of the East" At sono stage the authorities in Peking must have
calculated to
them the value of a military operation to absorb the colony in
propaganda terns,
in ideological termo, in financial terms, and this calculation must have
been
made early on.
No doubt the calculation has been made many times since, most
recently during the Cultural Revolution in 1967. These calculations have
not
resulted in an invasion. There have been puzzling moments such as
occurred
during 1962, when border guards on the Chinese sido permitted 70,000
people to
leave in a Great Produs, Most of those were in fact returned, and the
colony
*
|
continued as before. The triumph of legaliom behind the facade of
lagalicm continuod.
16 Times, October 13, 1956.
11
Some writers have seen, somewhat crudely that Hong Kong 10, in
internationel
20
Where thera has torno, "a means of exerting pressure on the United
States" been, somewhere in the Far East came particular problem, the
Chinese authorities hava decided to make internal discard in Hong Kong.
There is a grain of truth in the idea for while the British cufforad
severe disconforture in Hong Kong they would react by impressing on
their American friends a policy of greater caution. However, China's
calculations in terms of her international politics were probably far
broader than this, but the very fact that Hong Kong was left untouched
ray in sone vay explain that while Britain was prepared to recognisa the
Chinese Commmists, and keep all its dealings 'correct', the colonial
government could retain its (albeit loose) role over the "capitalist
city". In Peking's terms, given the full growth of the Mao-cult, this
was a conciderable price to pay. This was at a time when, during the
1950's, "Republican leaders paid regular dues to the "China Lobby" and
talked about "unleaching Chiang Kai-shek. It is only 10 years since the
House of Representatives voted by 395-0 against the admission of China
to the U.N.21 In contrast with the U.S. attitude, the correct legalism
of the British government was calculated to be accoptable.
21
However, it would not do to accept the situation without demur, Chinese
attacks upon continued British occupation nevor ceased to be made and
may be considered from two angles. In the first place, British occupancy
of Hong Kong was not unexpectedly subjected to much rhetorical and
ritualistic language, so characteristic of revolutionary systems or
political systems in revolutionary turmoil. Such language has two
functions. In the first place, it serves to stool the nerves of those
who, for reasons of internal policy, require either to steel or be
steeled against all dangers and enemies both internal and external.
Outsiders are depicted as 'paper tigers', monsters or villains, and
particular worda come to have particular connotations, such as
'imperialist' or 'reactionary'.
21 Far Eastern Economic Review, May 1, 1971 p. 11
22 S.R. Schram, The Party in Chinens Communist Ideology in J.W. Lewis
(ed.),
Party leadership and Revolutionary Pover in China, (Cambridge University
Press), 1970, p. 195.
***** 12/-
22
12
ihatover
A second element in the Chinese Communist position relates to the need
to
give aid and comfort to Communist party monbers in Hong Kong itself.
posture, negative or positive, which Peking adopts over Hong Kong, the
bizarro
situation continues whereby devoted revolutionary communists exist in,
and draw
sustenance from a Crown Colony. If imperialien in a paper tiger, what is
the
good communist to do when he is a cubject in a colony those existence is
tolerated
by his superiors? The bizarre nature of the situation is increased and
enhanced
by the active involvement of Hong Kong'o communists in the commercial
life of
Hong Kong, including ownership of ships, banks, department stores, ovon
Suzie Wong establishments scattered throughout the city.23
Hong Kong's communiots
become just one other (albeit more highly politicised) interest group
within the
vast interest group spectrum which makes up the colony's political
sub-structuro.
The high-point in the aid-and-confort syndrome lay in the riots of 1967
when
the party apartchiki in Hong Kong or Canton took to the streets to
demonstrate
solidarity with the Cultural Revolution. Yet, paradoxically, the
aid-and-comfort
was rather more a product of the Hong Kong communiste vis-a-vis the
mainland
rather than vice versa. It has been suggested that Hong Kong communists
were
not, in provoking the riots, acting in strict accordance with the wishes
of
party headquarters in Peking. During the 1967 riots, Hong Kong's
communists
may have acted with an excess of zeal in their determination "to prosent
Hong
Kong as a humble gift to Chairman Kao", The course of the evouts of 1967
has
24
25 been minutely described, both from an official, as well as an
unofficial,
+
The problem of ascertaining Chinese thinking on the matter of Hong
Kong's
future is complex, so much so that we require to grapple with unlikely
with
clues provided from many diverse sources. Such an examination may not
necessarily
bo reduced to mero Pekinology but may take the observer on occasion to
written
Communi
evidenco as to what Communist China conceives to be hor national
interest in
23 The Tires.
October 30, 1969. Article by Richard Hughes.
24 H.K. Government Annual Report, 1968.
25 J. Cooper, Colony in Conflict (Swindon Press, Hong Kong) 1970.
13
Asia. According to Foking orthodoxy on the subject, the areas which
about
China itself nay bo` divided into three parts.
1) "Lout territories, like Taiwan, the Ryukus, Blutan, Sikkin, which are
subject to recovory at come time.
2) Areas which voro forcorly states in tribute to China, such as Burk,
Thailand, Korea, Vietnam, Loos and Cambodia, described comovhat
rhetorically
by Poking on arons where Foking "refuces to sit idly by while helpless
stated
aro ravaged by foreign powers,
3) Areas of "just ambition", which have historical or race tien with
China.
26 Thoso include Russien, Turkiston and the Maritimo Provinces,
This is indeed a comprehensive analytical list, but it studiously omits
both Hong Kong and Hacao, which one might have considered to have been
included
in the first or third categories listad. However, both Hong Kong and
lacto ero
conspicuous by their abronce. It may be, as the Hoover Institution
suggests,
that this omission indicates a "degree of progmatic flexibility'on the
question
of the future of Hong Kong. On the other hand, the Peking authorities
may not
27
wish to categorise either Hong Kong or Macao because the international
futuro of
these territories is as much a puzzle to Ching as to everybody also.
Some indication of the dilemma which prevails may be illustrated by the
atlitude of the Chinese authorities to the visit of U.5. warchips to
Hong Kong.
Peking clearly disapproves for all possible reasons, military and
ideological.
28 Nevertheless V.S. varchips continue to call. Of course, the cynię
might argue
that a prosperous Hong Kong must directly or indirectly assist Communist
China,
from wherever the income lo dozived and U.S. serviceson alone opont
¡3430 million
in Hong Kong. Indeed, during the palny days before 1971, (whon the
inflow of V.5.
serviconon diminished), it was ostimated that overy day about 5000 0.1.0
visit
26 D.J. Doolin, Territorial Clninc in the Sino-Soviet Conflict
(Stanford, loovor)
1955, pp. 16-17.
27 Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Arms Control
Arrangements
for the Far East, Yuan-li wu (ed.) (Stanford, Hoover) 1957.
14
the British colony.
29
It may well be that such expendituro does benefit China, but it would be
cynicias indeed to argue that these are the cole and sufficient reason
why China permits her North-Vietnamose ally to suffer for China to gain
some share of Hong Kong's var profiteering. It may well be that there
are come things best left unsaid. To borro
To borrow Hermon Kahn's paraso on nuclear warfare, the detailed
discussion of Hong Kong's future may be tantamount to "thinking the
unthinkable". Hence Peking says nothing about Hong Kong and Macao.
J
There is however an interesting attempt to assess the probable worst
eventuality which may befall Hong Kong, given a 'high-tension' scenario.
This gloony prediction foresees a falling off in tourist trado, in the
amount of foreign capital passing to China through Hong Kong and a
resulting decisive military action taken against the British colony. The
Hoover Institution's prognosis is worth quoting in full:
!
NB
"As of 1973, China's foreign exchange receipts from the Hong Kong trade
have fallen to one-third those of 1966. China decides that the time has
come when she no longer wishes to pay the humiliating price of continued
colonialism on Chinese soil for Hong Kong profit, and in a bold military
action, beginning on June 23, 1974 and ending less than forty-eight
hours later, both colonies (Hong Kong and Macao) aro seized by the
P.L.A. The action is so swift that only a few thousand escape to Taiwan
and elsewhere. British protests to the United Nations Security Council
are unavailing. The United States and Britain, in consultation, agree
that there is little that can be done, although the United States
Seventh Flect stands close to Hong Kong for some weeks to aid in picking
up small vessels with refugees abroad.
1,30
Clearly such a forecast is extremely bold. As from the date of this
article, the future of Hong Kong is restricted to a mere three years. It
is admitted that such an assesment forms part of a "high-tension
scenario", and that the date of June 23, 1974 is clearly a hazardous
guess at an exercise in pinpoint
29 The Timon, October 30, 1969. Article by Margaret Allen.
stay was five days, it was revealed, and their average expenditure vas
Their averago the substantial figure of HK$5,780.
30 Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Poace (Stanford University)
Commund at China and Arms Control (1968) 'p. 144
I
L
t
1
15
accuracy often associated with astrologers rather than with cober
political noientista. The parallel "lon-tension-scenario", hoxover, does
not include a dicevasion of the future of liong Kong, though it does
envisage the death of Kao in spring 1972.31
Thore is howevor, an important non-participant in the dialogue over long
Tho
Kong
the United States. The United States has had double thoughts regarding
In the Hong Kong. At one end of the ambivalence is the question of
China. early days, Britain was rogarded as perfido Albion in the Orient
(just na the French have seen the United Kingdon in thic light in the
European context). In coze respecto this thinking has been related to an
ideological commitment. U.S.A. had a cause to pursue, the global
containment and defeat of Communism whose worldwide oncroachments
constituted a major threat to the peace and
The British were often neon by soourity of what was called the "Free
World". the Americans as either "poft" on Communism (a "fact" somehow
strangely linked up with the occasional existence of Labour governments
in Britain), or es more concerned with trade than justice. Seen at its
lowest estimate, Britain'o recognition of the Chinese People's Ropublio,
was just one other means of currying favour with Orientals in order to
cling on to the 'rags and tattors' of the British Empire. The point was
made by Mlinton in which he linked up a number of widely dispersed
variables including thinking on Hong Kong.
"The U.K. recognised the Chinese People's Republic not only because it
was
the de facto governmiont of the mainland of China, but in order to
protoot Hong Kong, and as much as possible of British trade with and
investmonts in China, to avoid if possiblu dáving the C.P.R. further
into the arua of the Soviet Union, and, perhaps cost important of all to
pleasa Nehru (who was vory insistont on recognition of the C.P.R.) and
keep India in the Commonwealth."32
It is the vory opitono of perfido Albion.
31 on.cit. p. 130. Thio feconario' alco enviragos the democratication of
Taiwan at the lower level, and a defeat for the (rain) Congreso Party in
India, while Pakistan, "boset by economic and political problems of hor
own, roadily taken the opportunity to nako come retronchmont in her own
uilitary expenditures". ep.cit. p. 134. tione of thece territories acted
in the ways onvisaged.
16
Hence until 1969, trade man utterly prohibited as betwson the U.S.A, and
China, and American visitors vero permitted to savour the delights of
Hong Kong,
but had to ensure that they bought no goods whose origin was on the
mainland.
Even after the wild thaw of 1971, following on the new ora of ping-pong
democracy..
it could be stated authoritatively by the U.S. Defence Secretary that
trade
should be avoided where this would "help the Chinese raise their
relatively lou level of technology 33 However on the day on which the
Defence Secretary spoko,
the U.S. Consulate-General in Hong Kong announced a proposed increase of
sales
of its fara goods into Hong Kong of twenty-five per cent and entered
into direct
competition with China as a supplier of food into Hong Kong. In short
whatover
might be the course of Sino-America relations, Hong Kong would naturally
and
necescary be the stamping ground for their rejected ideas and surplus
goods. For
the situation could so easily become that as depicted by Byron in his
versas on
Tear Alexander I.
"Now half dissolving to a liberal thaw
But hardened back whene1er the morning's raw.
The other 'face' shown by the U.S.A. to Hong Kong is admittedly the
'public
smiling face' of visiting politician. Perhaps the most bizarre judgment
was
made in Hay 1961 by Lyndon Johnson (then Vice-President of the U.S.A.)
when he
34 described Hong Kong as the "show window of the free way of life in
Asia" Yot
while such hyperbole would not be given much credence (oven coming from
the
travelling politician), the trend of American foreign policy has always
containod
a heavily moralistic element which must be taken seriously but not
exclusively when China is involved. 35 To adapt a modified form of the
thinking well-known
from the writings of Hans Korgenthau, the U.S. attitude to China has
been 'moralistic'
while the U.S. attitude to Hong Kong (apart from the immediate period
after Korcan
War), has been Tealistic,36 Such an appraisal may well continue to be
characteristic
33 Report in liong Kong Standard, Kay 11, 1971
4
34 New York Times, 16 Hay 1961. Johnson also said of Chiang Kai-shek
"not only in the history of his own nation but also in the wider history
of free mon's couraço against tyranny everywhere, President Chiang's
name will never be forgotten". Seo D.C. Watt, Survey of International
Affairs (Oxford University Pross) 1961 p. 355.
35 M. A. Guhin, The United Stoles and the Chinese People's Republic
International
·
17
of the future. In the past, the U.S.A. has hoped that the Chinese
Communiat
authorities would "encounter incurmountable obstacles in their attempt
to gain.
control"
37
Communies would thereforo prove to be unworkablo as well as
undesirable. Hong Kong was useful because, as Lyndon Johnson, perhaps
over- stated the position, it appeared to be at least workable (no a
"show window") if not quite roopectable in that it wag under the
supervision of a colonial
power.
Britain of course, fully accepted the de facto situation in China and on
many occasions brought pressure to bear upon the United States to do the
case. Even in Barch 1951, during the negotiations over the Japanese
Peace Treaty, the British Foreign Office puggested that Communist China
should be made a party to
30 the negotiations and that Formosa chould be restored to China.
Tho United
States did not comply then or later fer reasons which "lio deep in both
the national interoat sa percaivad by American leadership, and in the
relationship
postures",39 between dozeotic political situations and infernational
postures".
ween
P
Clearly the Horgenthau "solution" would have been the whole of China in
the Bare light - us Hong Kong - as a vast trading area, in which
national interesto could compete and profit and prosper without too much
attention paid to other people's ideological convictions. Korgenthau
believed that the effect of V.S. policy towards China vas to produce
"one of the most resounding defeats our 4:5
foreign policy" had "even sustained". In 1951, the People's Republic of
China was declared "an aggresnor in respect of assistance to North Korea
in the Korean
42
Affair". By 1971, an izsense change had come over the thinking processes
of
the diplomatic world.
Where did Hong Xong stand in all these developmento?
·
37 Guhin, or.cit. p. 54.
38 Guhin, er.cit. pp. 56-57. He argues that the urge to give Hong Kong
cocurity
of trada lay at the root of these canoeuvres.
39 Culia, on.cit. p. 63.
40 11. Forgontbau, American Foreign Policy: A Critical îxamination
(London: Kethuon)
13
The internal situation in Hong Kong is not the concern of this essay.
However it may be of some considerable use to ask como questions upon
which the
discussion of the future of Hong Kong is based. It is commonly belioved
that
to
Hong Kong is a dynamic laforsk-fnira rocioty in which capitalics
flouriches in
a ruthless and unbridled fashion. It is believod that any investor must
secure
a roturn on his investments within five years, liong Kong to presumed to
vorchip
ono god
*
Goney and to naimowledge but one ethic that of mammo11.
-
This is true only in the crudost conco. To a western political theorist
the post characteristic featured of capitalics are coon as part or whole
of a
package deal. Theco have been recently conveniently listed as: "the
absoluto rule of private property, the subjection of the whole of
economic life to
market influences, the domination of the profit motivo, the noutrality
of
government, the typical laissez-faire division of incomo, and the
ideology of
individual rights".
42
No
1464
-
What Hong Kong'a version of "capitalism" is a particularly truncated
form
of this credo. Private property exists only in the narrow conce of bank
ascoto, stocks and sharos (on one of the three stock exchanges), and
mutual funds or
unit trusts of doubtful merit. Land values are calculated puroly as cach
assets,
realizoable in the very short run and a subject for overall government.
Moreover,
while it is true that nocial oorvices are only on the verge of
existence, the
operation of market influencos is not absolutely without rostriction.
Govornsent
pays particularly close attention to price levels in the sphore of
transport. It was, after all the proposed increase in ferry fares which
was the occasion for the rioto in 1967. By its use and manipulation of
transport franchises, such
as roducing the amounts payable by the various bus companion, the
government
Indirectly suboidicos auch public transport. In the sphore of public
transport
the authorities require constantly to 'hold the balance', to ensure
that, within
the colony's restricted road space, a Hobbesian state of nature does not
suddenly
42 Her Fabian Ezcaya, K.N.S. Crocaman (ed.) (Third Impression) 1970,
J.K, Dont,
The Prunition Iron Canitalim by G.A.R. Crossland, p. 46
19/-
19
develop. The market economy does not work in the area of housing either
for alsest one-half of Hong Kong's population will be in receipt of
public housing. The Hong Kong govorament has been forced to bacomo a
public landlord becauso the prospects of an immigrant population housed
in squattor make-chift 'homoo' could not be tolerated even under the
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.