F4
PUER
DAILY TELEGRAPH
.14 OCT 1971
Colony in the dragon's mouth
FRANK ROBERTSON considers Hongkong's future and the treaties that
created it
STR
(IR DAVID TRENCH'S re forced to live in an impos
tirement next week; as-Sibly restricted area. Governor of Hongkong marks
the end of an era, for be was the last official ap pointed to this post
by the former Colonial Office, Murray Maclehose, his suc cessor, is a
career Foreign Office man with China service.
Sir
At this turning-point, how does the future of Britain's last important
colony look? While vast new long-range investment projects, both public
and private, are being avidly under- written, Hongkong's money men know
well that they can enjoy their remarkable prosperity only so long as
China wills it.
For Peking, fervidly jealous of all its prerogatives, regards the
British colony as Chinese territory which sooner or later must revert to
the homeland. -Sooner or later? There's the crux of the astonishing Hong
kong gamble.
The colony's legal position is regulated by three treaties, all regarded
by Peking
H
AS
unequal" And therefore not binding. The first of these, signed under the
mouth of British guns at Nanking by Manchu officials in 1842, states:
It being obviously necessary and desirable that British sub Jeeta
"should have some Port whereat they may careen and refit_their_~ Ships,
when ΓΕ quired, and keep Starex for that purpose, His Majesty the
Emperor of China redes to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, etc,
the Island of Hong- kong, to be possessed in pe: petuity by Her
Britannic Majesty. Her Heirs and Sue
cessori
+
This dealt only with Hong kong Island. In 1860 the Con- vention of
Peking was signed, granting Britain the tip of Kow Joon Peninsula on the
facing mainland needed to ensure the now of supplies from China, and
control pirates operating from that side of the port.
to
On June 9, 1898, a second convention was signed in Peking (it came into
force on July 1, 1898) extending British territory on the mainland, and
to outlying islands, under lease for 99 years. These are the New
Territories. which should revert to China on June 30, 1997.
Without these added lands Hongkong's four million (a Agure that
presumably will be increased greatly by 1997) would
More than that, the colony would lose much of its reservoir water
supply, most of the northern side of the narrow harbour would be in
potentially national airport might well be hostile hands, and even the
inter- claimed by China.
Clearly China can strangle Hongkong quickly and quite legally in 1997.
But will Peking act before then? Every couple | of years the Chinese
restate their attitude towards Hongkong,
K
In the last such reference the Peking People's Daily said:
Hongkong has been Chinese territory since ancient times. This is fact
known to every- body in the world, old and young. More than a
century-ago British imperialism came to Ching in pirate ships and pro-
voked the criminal 'opium war," massacred Dumerous Chinese people and
occupied the Chinese territory of Hongkong... This is an enormotis blood
debt British Imperialism owes to the Chinese people. Sooner or later the
Chinese people will make a thorough-going liquidation of this debt."
Declining role Certainly Peking is still mak- ing a lot of money from
Hong kong.
but, now that China is being rapidly opened up to direct foreign trade,
this is becoming less important to the Mainland.
F
14
Since the Chinese Commun ists always seek pretexts to justify, for their
party history books, the political correct- ness of any major political
would certain claim mistreat- action, in Hongkong's case they ment of
the colony's Chinese subjects.
Not that Peking really needs to justify action against the colony, for
the Chinese know that neither Britain nor the United States would try to
defend Hongkong.
kong's prospects by the Hoover An American study of Hong- Institution of
Stanford Univer sily has predicted that China could move against the
colony predicated on the basis of a 25 early as 1974, but this is
violent power struggle following the death of Chairman Mao.
If the money men of Hong- kong are disturbed by such pre- dictions of
disaster they are careful not to show it.
н
FE.D
Is itis Recant or
Inference
?
typied
C. M. Malchu 16/10
1
ร
Sir M MacLehose
UNCLASSIFIED
4
FEH 2/2
FRANK ROBERTSON'S ARTICLE ON HONG KONG : DAILY TELEGRAPH
14 OCTOBER 1971
1. We have consulted Research Department about your question. They do
not have full records of all NCNA pronouncements on Hong Kong but are
reasonably certain that no such sentiments have been published in NCNA
since 1969. Mr Davies who studied NONA daily in Peking since the
beginning of 1969 confirms this.
2. From the tone of the passage quoted it seems likely to date from 1967
or 1968. Recently NONA has even taken to mentioning "the Hong Kong
British authorities" in straight- forward news items from Hong Kong. The
most recent example of this was a report of attendance at National Day
celebrations in Hong Kong. The passage quoted by Frank Robertson is
therefore far from being typical at present.
R.b. Gr
RB Crowson
Far Eastern Department
18 October 1971
Mi Cruse.
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which would to settled of mystiction when the tim
that until then the status quo. wild to muitinit.
right when
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such a
rife ht
sttent most recently manly?
UNCLASSIFIED
*
19/10
FIF
P3/4
Putr
+
L
DAILY TELEGRAPH
.14 OCT 1971
Colony in the dragon's mouth
FRANK ROBERTSON considers Hongkong's future and the treaties that
created it
STR
NIR DAVID TRENCH'S rẻ be forced to live in an impos
tirement next week asbly restricted area. Governor of Hongkong marks the
end of an era, for he was the last official ap pointed to this post by
the Former Colonial Office. Sir Murcay Maclehose, his sue cessor, is a
carcer Foreign Office man with China service.
At this turning-point, how does the future of Britain's last Important
colony look? While vest new long-range investment projects. both public
and private, are being avidly under- wrillen, Hongkong's money men know
well that they can enjoy their remarkable prosperity only so long as
Ching wills it
For Peking, fervidly jealous of all its prerogatives, regards the
British colony as Chinese territory which sooner or later must revert to
the homeland, "Sooner or later? There's the crux of the astonishing Hong
kong gamble.
The colony's legal position is regulated by three treaties, all regarded
by Peking *unequal" and therefore not binding. The Arst of these, signed
under the mouth of British guos at Nanking by Manchu officials in 1842,
states:
It being obviously necessary and desirable that British gubi jects
should have anme Port whereat they may careen and reft their Ships,
when quired, and krep Staves for That purpose, His Majesty the Emperor
of China redes to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, etc, the
Island of Hour kong, to be possessed la per petuity by Jer Britannic
Majesty, Her Heirs and Suo
Cessore.
This dealt only with Hong, kang Island. In 1860 the Con- vention of
Peking was signed, granting Britain the tip of Kow loan Peninsula on the
facing mainland-nerded to ensure the Now of supplies from China, and to
control piratex operating from that side of the port.
On June 9, 1898, a second convention was signed in Peking it came into
force on July 1. 1898) extending British territory on the mainland, and
to outlying Islands, under lease for 99 years. These are the New
Territories, which should revert to China on June 30, 1997.
Without these added lands Hongkong's four million (a figure that
presumably will be Increased greatly by 1997) would
More than that, the colony would lose much of its reservoir water
supply, most of the northern side of the narrow harbour would be in
patentially national airport might well be bostile hands, and even the
inter- claimed by China.
Clearly China cap strangle Hongkong quickly and quite legally in 1997.
But will Peking act before then? Every couple of years the Chinese
restate their attitude towards Hoogkang,
to
In the last such reference tha Peking People's Daily said: territory
since ancient times. "Hongkong has been Chinese
This is a fact known to every- body in the world, old and young. More
than a century-ago British imperialism came China In pirate ships and
pro- voked the criminal 'opium wark massacred Aumerou Chinese people and
occupied the Chinese Territory of Itongkong ... This 15 an enormous
blood debt Aritish Imperialisın owes to the Chinese people. Sooner or
later the Chinese people will make a thorough-going liquidation of this
debt,"
Declining role
now
Certainly Peking is still mak- ing a lot of money from Hong- kong, but,
that China Is being rapidly opened up to direct foreign trade, this is
becoming less important to the muxinland.
Since the Chinese Commun- Ists always seek pretexts to justify, for
their party history books, the political 14 correct- ness of any major
political action, in Hongkong's case they
would certainly claim mistreat- ment of the colony's Chinese subjects.
Not that Peking really needs to justify action against the colony, for
the Chinese know that neither Britain nor the United Slates would try to
defend Hongkong.
kong's prospects by the Hoover An American study of Hong- Institution of
Stanford Univer sity has predicted that China could move against the
colony predicated on the basis of as early as 1974, but this is violent
power struggle following the death of Chairman Mao,
if the money men of Heng- kong are disturbed by such pre- dictions of
disaster they are careful not to show it.
H
EE.D
Is this
kecant
nference
A
?
A
typicł
16/10
RESTRICTED
Reference
i
(3A
Mr Davies, Far Eastern Department.
1)
CHINA/HONKONG
[FEH 2/2 :
As you are aware, the Chinese regard Hong Kong as part of China, and
refer to the "compatriots" of Hong Kong. Specific references to the
status of Hong Kong are, however, few.
2) On 8 March 1963, the Feople's Daily published an editorial entitled
"Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of the U.S.A." Although
nominally directed at the American Communist Party, this was in fact a
reply to Khruschev's attacks on the Chinese position over the Cuban
crisis. Khruschev, in the course of his attacks, had made somewhat
disparaging references to China's failure to end the colonial status of
Hong Kong and Macao. The Chinese, in reply, stated that :- "With regard
to the outstanding issues, which are a legacy from the past, we have
always held that, when conditions are ripe, they should be settled
peacefully through negotiations and that, pending a settlement, the
status quo should be maintained. Within this category are the questions
of Hong Kong, Kowloon and Macao...
3)
Although Soviet propaganda occasionally returned to the subject of Hong
Kong and Macao in subsequent years, the Chinese do not appear to have
paid much attention to such references. However, the Chinese delegation
to the World Youth Forum held in Moscow in September 1964 did protest
strongly at a resolution which called for the independence of various
Asian colonial territories, and included Hong Kong and Macao in the list
of such territories. The Chinese insisted that Hong Kong and Lacao were
different from the other colonies because they were Chinese territory,
taken by unequal treaties.
4) During the disturbances in Hong Kong in the summer of 1967, there
were several Chinese references to the position of the colony. While
these were often delivered in somewhat militant language, they seemed to
indicate, at least obliquly, that the 1963 statement in the Feople's
Daily still held good. Thus a People's
aily Daily editorial of 3 June 1967 called upon the
T patriotic compatriots" of Hong Kong to unite against "British
imperialism". It went on :- "The fate of Hong Kong will be decided by
the patriotic compatriots there, by the 700 million Chinese people,
absolutely not by decadent British imperialism." Similar sentiments were
expressed by Chi Pen-yu, then a member of the Cultural Revolution Group
under the Central Committee, at a meeting of the Afro-Asian Writers
'Bureau on 5 June. He also said, as a warning to British imperialism,
that "The old debt you owe us for launching the dirty Opium War and
forcibly occupying Hong Kong by taking advantage of the corruption in
the Ching court is not yet repaid."
RESTRICTED
/ 5)
RESTRICTED
5) There were other newspaper items in similar style in the following
weeks, but the most explicit statement on the position of Hong Kong came
in
an article by the People's Daily "Commentator" entitled "Hong Kong is
Chinese Territory published on 20 August 1967. This rejected claims,
allegedly being made in the Hong Kong press and radio, that Hong Kong
was British territory.
Ħ Hong Kong has been Chinese
territory from time immemorial. This is known all over the world.More
than a hundred years ago, British imperial- -ists sailed to China in
theippirate ships and unleashed the criminal Opium War in which they
massacred countless Chinese people and, moreover forcibly occupied our
territory of Hong Kong.This was followed bytheir annexation of our
Kowloon and the seizure of our New Territories. This i is a heavy debt
in blood which British imperialism owes to the Chinese people. The
Chinese people will sooner or
later completely settle this account with British imperialism,"
"Commentator" also asked : "Is it conceivable that Hong Kong will for
ever remain under British rule?", and replied, "Of course not, a
thousand times no, ten thousand times no!"
became
6) "Commentator" repeated some of these themes in another article on
"Baring British Imperialism's Crafty Features", which appeared on 21
August, but thereafter, references to the Hong Kong dispute less and
less frequent and were usually confined to details of specific
"struggles" carried out by the "patriotic compatriots." As far as we can
trace, the Chinese do not appear to have referred to the status of Hong
Kong nor to its eventual takeover by China until Chou En-lai did so with
Malcom MacDonald.
22 September 1971.
Kultowe
JE Hoare
Far Eastern Section, Research Department.
RESTRICTED
CS. 41A
2600077
15,000-4/71-B26483
REF.
BY BAG
SCR 4/3571/62 v
UNCLASSIFIED
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 30 21 SEP 1971
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT
LOWER ALBERT ROAD
HONG KONG
3 September, 1971
L V Appleyard Esq
FED
F CO
FEH 2/2
༡༥
Door Len
PAPER BY PROFESSOR HARRIS
J
X
Chris Hovells wrote to you on 14 July enclosing a copy of a paper by
Professor Harris. The Professor has now sent us a copy of his paper
without any security classification.
You may therefore regard the enclosure to Chris Howells's letter of 14
July as unclassified. The version we have now received contains the note
that the article is "an earlier uncorrected draft of an article
published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London)".
الله
Yoin
Ather
(A F Maddocks)
cc.
RC Samuel Esq (Peking) J D I Royd Esq (Washington)
3
1
41A
15,000-4/71-1
REF.
SCR 4/3571/62 Pt. V
CONFIDENTIAL
Enfis
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT
LOWER ALBERT ROAD
HONG KONG
L V APPLEYARD ESQ
FED
F CO
14 July 1971
Deem Len
PAPER BY PROFESSOR HARRIS
A copy is enclosed of the paper by Professor Harris that you asked for
in your letter of 17 June. We came by it circuitously. He did not want
to part with a copy yet having sent it in, he says, to the editor of "a
journal of high international repute". It is not an impressive paper;
perhaps what we have got is an early draft.
2.
Of course ve don't like speculations about the future of Hong Kong to be
aired in public, and in this paper we disagree with or dislike :
(a) the introduction of Hong Kong into the curious
equation on Sino-Soviet relations at the head of page 6;
(b) the reference to declining commercial confidence
at the foot of page 6;
(c) the identification of Chinese tolerance of Hong
Kong with 'economism' on page 8;
(d) the reference to US warships and servicemen on
pages 13 and 14:
CONFIDENTIAL
-/2
رجم
CONFIDENTIAL
2 -
Cu
2.
(contd)
(e) the absurd mention of an 'independent Cantonese
republic' on page 20; and
(f) the suggestions of sudden change in the post-Mao
period at the end of the paper.
3.
But think ve must accept that speculation of this kind is likely to
increase. As a good deal will be generated abroad we cannot hope to
check it and, for the moment at least, our best course seems to remain
detached in order to be able to disclaim it all and, if necessary,
to dismiss it as unfounded,
Vocans
Chais
(C.J. Hovells)
Assistant Political Adviser
c.c.
Encl:
R C Samuel Esq Peking
JDI Boyd Esq Washington
w/o encl:
CONFIDENTIAL
Herodontiste conta
The International Futura of Hong Konr
Hong Kong's legal position is regulated by three treaties reflecting the
tripartite division between the island itself and the two extensions of
the
hinterland, Kowloon and the so-called Now Territories. The actual
details
contained in the treaties are very infrequently quoted, but it may be
valuable
to examine the provisions of the treaties with a view to establishing
tho
position of Hong Kong in law.
In the case of Hong Kong island itself, Article III of the Treaty of
Nanking (1842) contains the following:
Treaty of lianking Art III
"It being obviously necessary and desirable that British subjects
should have some Port whereat they may careen and refit their Ships,
when required, and keep Stores for that purpose, His Majesty the Emperor
of China cedes to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, etc., the
Island of Hongkong, to be possessed in perpetuity by Her Britannic
Kajesty, lier Heirs and Successore, and to be governed by such Laws and
Regulations as Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain etc., shall see
fit to direct.nl
The island of Hong Kong clearly devolves in perpetuity to the British
Crown, though it may be remarked that what was envisaged in 1842 was a
puroly
maritime exercise. In the liong Kong of the succeeding contury, of
course llong
Kong commercial, industrial, financial and banking role for surpassed
her
significance as a port whoreat only "British subjects", "may careen and
rofit
their Ships, when required, and keep Stores for that
purpose,............." Tho
second aide in the Hong Kong colonial triangle refers to the peninsula
of
Kowloon which is of course actually a part of the Chinese mainland. The
island
was itself increasingly dependent upon Kowloon for supplies and for
access to
1 Treaties, Conventions, etc. between China and Foreign States
Vol. I, Socond Mition 1917. (China. The Karitime Custom III Mico.
seriest No. 30. Published by Order of the Inspector General of Customs,
Shanghai.) p. 352
P
2
the mainland, as well as recognising the need to control piracy in and
around
Hong Kong itself.
The actual tores of the Convention of Peking, 1860, are as follows:
Convention of Peking (1860) Art VI
"kith a view to the maintenance of law and order in and about the
+
harbour of Hongkong, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China agrees to
code to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, and to Her
Eeiro and Successors, to have and to hold as a dependency of Her
Britannic lajesty's Colony of Hongkong, that portion of the township of
Cowloon, in the province of Kwantung................."2
+
It is to be noted that the tera in perpetuity' does not appear in this
article but it is no doubt a reasonable assumption that if Kowloon
devolved to the United Kingdom "to have and to hold as a dependency of
Her Britannic Majesty's Colony of Hongkong", then Kowloon's future would
be Hong Kong's future. In short Kowloon too may be regarded as a colony
in the legal sense.
With the case of the so-called New Territories, or 'ooded territories',
the situation is quite different and, hence gives rise to the whole
discussion regarding the future of the entire colony on the legal
(though not the political)
level.
A document signed at Peking on June 9, 1898 which came into force on
July 1, 1898 read as follows:
".... the limits of British territory shall be enlarged under lease
to the extent indicated generally on the annexed
map........................" "the term of this lease shall be
ninety-nine years,"3
The justification for the extension, according to the document, lay in
the bald statement that, "an extension of Hong Kong territory is
necessary for
2 op.cit. p. 433
3 Convention for the Extension of HongKong 1898 (Peking, June 9, 1898)
MY
nocdo
the proper defence and protection of tho Colony", The needs of the
military olearly czerzod as the over-riding factor in the rationale
behind the annoxation,
+
To imagino what the situation might be a century hence is an extremoly
difficult. For those who negotiated a lezoo in 1898 whoco terminal date
vas 1997, future calculations and prospects were sufficiently far away
to be of
rolatively 1itle concern. For the army and navy officera who beliovod
that
they could defend and protect Hong Kong only if they cocured
squaro miloo
of Chinese mainland territory, a ninety-nine year lease must have
appearod necure enough, Indood, in 1893, China itcolf appoared unable to
withstand the onslaught of western imperialics, let alone · Cope
with logal nicotion
such as the length of a leaso and a disguised annexation. In 1898, Hao
Tco-tung
wan five years old.
!
Etrictly speaking thereforo, the legal position is that the New
Territoriog
will revort to the owners of the lease, the Chinose government, whatever
and
whoever that might be, on June 30, 1997. In a sonso, we are not so very
for
removed in teran of uncertainty of the futuro situation than the
signatórios of the Peking Convention of 1893. For one thing while the
legal situation
rosadno unchanged, the political situation is always flexible and no one
can
foresee either the likely attitude of the Chinese government in 1997 or
who may be in pover at that tice. The crucial question asks who will
succoed to the mantle of Hao, and to the leadership of the Chinese
Communist Party. The Hoover Institution has estimated the possible death
of Hao Tse-tung as 1974, but evon this guons, whether correct or not, is
of little value in knowing that China'a "political formula" is likely to
be two decades after the death of Hao. It is hardly possible that Kao
can survivo to ago 104 and oven if he could, he
is not necessarily likely to be capable of directing policy.
Fon grasp at certainty wherever they can. Bolingbroke's Reflections uron
Edilo put the point regarding cortainty in politics with succinct
accuracy:
de "Truth lies within a little and cartala compass, but error is
immenco." AG for an Hong Kong in concorned the margin for error is
immenso and the margin
+
time absolutely programmed (in strictly legal terms) but, at the same
time
absolutely unknown. That the British authorities in Hong Kong have in
fact
done is to behave as if the legal situation woro the absolute cortainty,
and
this has also appeared to be the appraisal of the Chinese Communists.
We may perhaps call a reliance upon the strictly legal view, and the
implication that the New Territories will (in the absence of a new but
unexpected negotiated extension), revert back to China, a 'poker-faced
theory', The 'poker-faced theory' of Hong Kong's future operatos in such
a
way that all parties play the game of international politics as if the
legal
programe were literally true. It suits the llong Kong government to act
in
absolute conformity with the poker-faced syndrome, to maintain a perfect
poker-face as it were. The Chinese government, it could be argued, has
consistently played poker-face diplomacy over Hong Kong.
The point was made quite explicitly by a former governor of liong Kong,
4 Sir Robert Black in a newspaper interview on April 14, 1971. On the
particular
} question of the future of the New Territories, Sir Robert declared
that it was
quite conceivable that China would agree to a renewal of the lease in
1997.
Sir Robert was perhaps taking the poker-faced syndrome to its reductio
ad
absurdum. Few persons would be so bold as to speculate what choicos the
Chinese government would cake in 1997, for all the political choices
romain
with the Chinoso. In contrast, the British must stake everything upon a
legal
interpretation of the three treeties signed in the last century which we
have
already quoted in the relevant extracts. Some persons have argued that
Hong
Kong can continuo to survive even if it does lose the New Territories.
sense such a view is a refinement of the legalistic argumont, for it
argues
that, even if the official Chinese authorities were to clain the New
Territories
in accordance with the Convention of 1898, they would still be bound by
the
earlier treaties of 1842 and 1350. Hong Kong's four millions would be
forced
to live, if they still chose to live within the jurisdiction of the Hong
Kong
government, in an impossibly confined area. For the colony to survive
without
In a
the low Territories would bo, tantamount to saying, in the words of one
journalist, that it is possible for somebody to leave his house and live
in
the toolshed'.
Before we leave the territorial question however, it might be worth
remarking that the legalistic poker-faced argument containe two sorts of
advantages. In the first place, quote obviously, it suggests a polite
fiction all round that Hong Kong's security is assured in an uncertain
world. Idoology becones 'neutralised', as it were, for the time being,
in that it is not permitted to generate action. The second advantage
which attaches to the legalistic approach is related to cortain
attitudes. In paychological terms, it may be true that when nobody knows
where they are going it is better to bo guided by a lowest common
denominator, in this case the law, in particular, sono antiquo treaties
signed on behalf of two long-dead monarchs. In short the greatest
advantage to be derived from an uncertain situation is a neutral fora of
certainty. In the extraordinary conditions of Hong Kong, "where 200 per
cont capitalia faces 200 per cent communism", the future is best shelved
in the
contemplation of the miracle of the present.
5
In international terms, however, such a situation has not been lost upon
China's rivals, friends and enemies. The Russians in particular have
mado sarcastic references to the anomalous situation in which a
communist country accepted the existence of colonies on its very
doorstep. In a speech made to the Supreme Soviet in December 1962,
Khruschov made several particularly cutting references to China's
toleration both of Macao and of Hong Kong. While Khruschev's
denunciation was doubtless mado as part of the Sino-Soviot var of
nerves, it certainly did not suit the Chinose People's Republic to have
raiced the sensitive issue of colonialism. The legalistic argument might
not necessarily survive if confronted by the stark facts of communist
ideology and
'orthodoxy.
5 Boe C.A. Linden, Khruscher and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-64 (1966)
John Hopkins Preco, p. 175
6
However, for particular but unstated reasons, the Chinese politbureau
clearly believed that, Hong Kong was more important than Khruschov's
friendship, (though rhother, in the long run, it is more important than
Soviet friendship is perhaps another matter). Whatever the calculations
made by Peking in tho goneral evaluation of options, stences and
positiona, Hong Kong did not appoar to be reclaiming either before or
for some time aftor Khruschov's renoval in
October 1954.
"6
is
Apart from the legalistic arguments which operate at the official level,
there are a number of other assessments of the future of Hong Kong. The
assumption underlying of most of them is that the New Territories
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.