13 JUN 1969
FEC 134/1
ра paper 16/1
DURING LORD SHEPHERD'S VISIT, I WAS REQUESTED TO CONSIDER WHETHER
THERE WERE ANY FURTHER STEPS WHICH COULD BE TAKEN HERE OVER GREY
AND THE NEWSWORKERS WHICH MIGHT HELP TO EASE THE PRESSURE ON
HMG, PARTICULARLY IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING BROOKE.
-
2. I THINK WE CAN ONLY WORK ON THE PREMISE, PARTICULARLY IN
VIEW OF MORETON'S INTERVIEW WITH MA, THAT ANY CONCESSION OR
GESTURE NOT DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH VONG CHAK AND THE TEN OTHER
NEWSWORKERS WOULD BE NOT ONLY INEFFECTIVE BUT IRRELEVANT. THE
PRESENT POSITION REGARDING THESE MEN IS THAT THEIR ACCELERATED
RELEASE KILL TAKE PLACE OVER A PERIOD OF ONE MONTH FROM
SEPTEMBER 3RD SEMICOLON THE LAST TO GO CUT BEING WONG CHAK HIMSELF ON
OCTOBER 30. WE ARE THEREFORE ONLY 11 WEEKS AWAY FROM THE LAST ACT AND
THAT TOO IS THE MEASURE OF THE VERY MOST THAT WE COULD HOPE TO GAIN:
ASSUMING CREY, IS NOT. SUDDENLY AND PRENATURELY RELEASED.
/3. IF
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3.
IES:-
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IF ANYTHING IS TO BE DONE AT ALL, THERE ARE ONLY TWO POSSIBIL:-
(A) TO RELEASE THE NEWSWORKERS AS AN OPEN POLITICAL GESTURE
(B) TO FIND SOME REASONABLY ACCEPTABLE COVER FOR THE REMISSION
OF THEIR SENTENCES, ON THE LINES OF THE ACTION TAKEN IN WONG
CHAK'S CASE.
4. BUT BEFORE COMMENTING ON THE LOCAL DIFFICULTIES OF THESE
T:O COURSES, IT IS VERY RELEVANT TO BE SURE THAT EITHER WOULD
IMPROVE GREY'S SITUATION: IN SPITE OF THE OBVIOUS DIFFICULTY
OF ASSESSING THE EFFECT ON THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT OF ANY
FURTHER GESTURE.
5.
+
WE HAVE EVIDENCE THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ARE ALREADY
PUZZLED OVER THE RECENT REDUCTION IN SENTENCES, AND INGLINED
TO BELIEVE THAT HORSE TRADING HAS BEGUN. ANY FURTHER GESTURE
OF THIS KIND MAY CONVINCE THEM THAT PROGRESSIVE BARGAIN ING HAS
STARTED, AND THAT OUR EXPLANATIONS THAT THE PREROGATIVE CAN
ONLY BE USED IN THE INTERESTS OF TRUE JUSTICE, AND NOT FOR
POLITICAL ENDS, ARE INSINCERE AND CAN BE OVERRIDEN. WE HAVE
A BARGAIN OF SORTS THROUGH MA, AND TO DISTURB THIS BARGAIN
INEXPLICABLY MIGHT ONLY PUZZLE AND CONFUSE THE CHINESE TO THE
POINT THAT THEY MIGHT HELL CONSIDER İT WORTH' HILE TO TRY
RAISING THE IR PRICE FOR GREY (WE HAVE STILL 254 CONFRONTATION
PRISONERS IN CUSTODY). THIS COULD RESULT IN PROLONGING HIS
DETENTION.
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16. A
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:
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HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 478 TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
- 3 -
FURTHER CONS IDERAT ION, EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO EVALUATE,
CONSIDERATION
IS THAT OUR LOCAL CONTACT MAY BE CORRECT WHEN HE SAID THAT THE
IF WE REDUCTION OF SENTENCES MAD EMBARRASSED CHOU EN -LAI.
ARE CORRECT IN OUR BELIEF THAT CHOU IS A MODERATING INFLUENCE, WE
SHOULD NOT RISK WEAKEN ING HIS POSITION,
7.
BUT TO RETURN TO THE TWO COURSES IN PARA3 AND THE LOCAL
DIFFICULTIES OF PURSUING THEM. I DOUBT IF I NEED MORE THAN BRIEFLY
RESTATE MY FIRM OBJECTION TO COURSE (A), TO WHICH I HAVE ALREADY
EXPRESSED DISAGREEMENT IN PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE
IT WOULD KHEN IT HAS BEEN ADVOCATED BY THE CHARGE IN PEKING.
EE A SERIOUS REVERSAL, CARRYING PERMANENT AND CONTINUING DANGERS, CF CUR
ESTABLISHED POSITION THAT WE GOVERN HERE ONLY UNDER THE
RULE OF LAW, AND THAT, WHILE WE MAY BE OPEN TO REASON AND REASONABLE
NEGOTIATION, WE ARE HCT OPEN TO UNREASONABLE PRESSURE
OR TO DEMANDS FOR A KOW-TOW. IT IS MY CONSIDERED OPINION THAT
IF ANY FUTURE CONCESSION IS MADE IN RESPECT OF THE 11 HEMSWORKERS,
UNLESS IT COULD BE POSITIVELY DEMONSTRATED THAT THAT CONCESSION WAS NOT
POLITICALLY INSPIRED, OUR WHOLE POSITION AND REPUTATION
WITH THE CHINESE WILL BE PUT AT RISK, AND THAT THE PRESSURE FOR
FURTHER KOW-TOWS WILL SLOWLY MOUNT. TO QUOTE A COMMUNIST
SOURCE, IF HONG KONG LOSES A ROUND, IT LOSES THE WHOLE GAME''.
/8. FINALLY
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8.
FINALLY THERE IS THE EFFECT OF COURSE(A) ON CONFIDENCE IN
HONG KONG, I AM SURE THAT A SIGNIFICANT LOSS OF CONFIDENCE
BOTH IN MYSELF AND IN HMG'S SUPPORT FOR THE COLONY WOULD RESULT
FROM ANY FURTHER REDUCTION IN THE SENTENCES OF THE NEWSWORKERS.
THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF LOCAL OPINION IS NOT IN THE LEAST
SYMPATHETIC EITHER TO THE NEWSWORKERS OR TO CONFRONTATION
GENERALLY. ANY LENIENCY WILL BE REGARDED AS EVIDENCE THAT THE
GOVERNMENT IS WILLING TO GIVE GREATER CONSIDERATION TO
PROTESTS MADE BY THOSE DISLOYAL TO THE ADMINISTRATION THAN
TO THE FEELINGS AND INTERESTS OF THOSE WHO SUPPORTED GOVERNMENT
IN THE EMERGENCY.
9. THIS FEELING WILL BE HELD PARTICULARLY STRONGLY BY THOSE
WHO HAVE HAD TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH, AND SUFFERED FROM THE COMMUNIST
SUBVERSIVE, PARTICULARLY THE POLICE, THE AUXILIARY POLICE,
THE VARIOUS VOLUNTARY SERVICES, THE STAFF OF THE PRISONS AND
AMONGST OTHER PRISONERS, INDEED I HAVE ALREADY HAD TO DEAL
WITH A SMUGGLED PETITION ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN SIGNED BY
SC ORDINARY ''LOYAL'' CONVICTS ASKING, VERY PERSUASIVELY,
WHY THEY SHOULD BE TREATED LESS GENEROUSLY THAN THOSE WHO HAD
SCUGHT TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT.
TROUBLE IN THE PRISONS OVER THIS ISSUE.
WE CANNOT RISK SERIOUS
/10. FURTHER
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HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 478 TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
5
FURTHER MORE, LOCAL CHINESE OPINION MIGHT WELL TAKE THE LINE
WHILE THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT SEEMED TO BE WILLING TO GO ANY
LENGTH FOR A EUROPEAN UNCONNECTED WITH HONG KONG, IT WAS INCAPABLE
OF TAKING ANY EFFECTIVE ACTION TO SECURE THE RELEASE OR PROTECTION
([2 MUT. GPS:]) OCAL FISHERKEN KIDNAPPED (AND ON ONE OCCASION MURDER
BY CHINESE COMMUNE OFFICIALS. THERE IS, AS YOU ARE AWARE,
ALREADY A SCHOOL OF THOUGHT THAT HMG ARE TOO READY TO SUBORDINATE
THE INTERESTS OF HONG KONG TO THOSE OF THE U.K. AND IT WOULD
BE EXTREMELY DAMAGING, NOT ONLY IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES BUT
IN THE LONG TERM, IF THIS FEELING, AT PRESENT CONFINED,
WERE TO SPREAD SEMICOLON PARTICULARLY AMONG THE SECURITY FORCES
UPON WHOM ALL DEPENDS.
11. FOR ALL THESE REASONS, I MUST CONTINUE TO ADVISE FIRMLY
AGAINST COURSE (A) IN PARA 3.
12. THERE REMAINS THEREFORE COURSE(B) IN PARA 3. HERE THERE
ARE TWO ASPECTS TO BE CONSIDERED:-
(A) THE EFFECT OF ARRANGING EARLY RELEASES EVEN ON A REASONABLY
GOOD COVER STORY: IT BEING REMEMBERED THAT EVEN IF A CAST-IRON
COVER STORY WERE FOUND, IT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE ENTIRELY
TO PREVENT THE PRESS AND EVERYONE ELSE FROM JUMPING TO CONCLUSIONS
SE ICOLON AND
•
(5) THE PROBLEM OF FINDING SUCH A COVER STOPY.
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/13. THE
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12. THE PLAIN FACT IS THAT THE DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING ANY
CREDIBILITY FOR COURSE (B) VIRTUALLY MEANS THAT ALL THE OBJECTIONS
TO COURSE(A) ATTACH ALSO TO COURSE (B). CREDIBILITY FOR THE
RECENT REDUCTIONS IN SENTENCES DEPENDS ENTIRELY ON THE INTER-
VEĽTION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW AND THE FACT THAT ONLY 1 NEWS-
WORKER WAS INVOLVED. WE CANNOT POSSIBLY USE THE BOARD OF REVIEW
AGAIN, AND HERE WE ARE SPECIFICALLY CONSIDERING ALL THE
NEWSWORKERS.
14. INDEED, FOR SOME 18 MONTHS NOW WE HAVE BEEN SEARCHING FOR
SOME ACCEPTABLE EXCUSE ON WHICH TO RELEASE THE NEWSWORKERS,
AND OF COURSE IT WAS AS A RESULT OF THIS SEARCH THAT A WAY
OF REDUCING WONG CHAK'S SENTENCE WAS FOUND. WE HAVE EXAMINED
THE PRISONERS FAMILY BACKGROUND, STATE OF HEALTH, AND EVERYTHING
ABCUT THEM SEMICOLON AND HAVE EVEN CONSIDERED EXTREME MEASURES
SEMICOLON BUT WITHOUT SUCCESS SO FAR. NATURALLY I AM PREPARED
TO CONTINUE THE SEARCH, BUT IT WOULD BE QUITE WRONG OF ME TO
LEAVE ANY IMPRESSION THAT I HAD ANY HOPES OF SUCCESS. I REGRET
TO HAVE TO SAY THAT I HAVE VIRTUALLY NONE.
15. IN CONCLUSION, MAY I MAKE THE POINT THAT IN BROOKE'S
CASE NO SERIOUS ADDITIONAL THREAT TO THE FUTURE SECURITY OF THE
UK CAN BE INVOLVED. HERE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A VERY SERIOUS
THREAT TO HONG KONG'S SECURITY IS THE ESSENCE OF CUR DIFFICULTY.
/16. TO
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HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 478 TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
- 7 -
16. TO SUM UP:-
(A) I CAN ONLY CONTINUE TO ADVISE STRONGLY AGAINST COURSE (A)
IN PARA 3 SEMICOLON AND
(B) I WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK A SOLUTION ALONG THE LINES OF COURSE
(B), BUT I HAVE TO SAY THAT MY EXPECTATIONS OF FINDING ONE
KHICH DOES NOT IN FACT CARRY ALL THE DANGERS OF COURSE (A)
ARE VERY SLIM INDEED.
SIR D. TRENCH
FILES
F. EAST. DEPT.
P.U.S.D. -
FFFFF
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FEC IJC,
15/5/69
Mr. J. Murray
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Попоский час губ
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Mo Conform !!)
With the Compliments of the
Political Adviser
Hong Kong
20/5-
A
Mr. Shalom A
Ente
13
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806
Loy
Political Adviser
As you are avare, I spoke to Mr. K.C. Jay yesterday and arranged to see
him at 9.15 a... this morning.
2.
It was an unexpectedly lengthy and in some ways difficult interview,
mainly because of a local mini crisis in the money exchange following a
decision to suspend dealings in Deutschemarks: this meant that Jay was
busy most of the time I was with him answering questions on the local
situation and giving advice on the Deutschemark, Franc and US. Dollar.
3.
I started the discussion by making a personal remark on the problems
apparently facing the Bank of China in Singapore. On my asking what the
true situation was down there, Jay said that this was a problem which
had existed for some time: that he himself had advised Peking a long
time ago that they would probably rua into difficulties in Singapore:
that, although LO, the local Singapore Manager of the Bank of China, had
many good ideas, he was "a little too corrupt". More recently Peking had
decided to "dry up" funds held in Singapore: this they had done by
instructing Singapore to buy sterling on behalf of Peking and in turn
they had paid the Singapore branch in Hong Kong dollars deposited in the
Hong Kong branch to the credit of Singapore. Jay said that the newspaper
reports of low liquidity vere very much an under- statement of the true
facts, which were simply that the Bank of China now had very little
liquid funds available in Singapore. As agreed with H.E. yesterday, I
then took the opportunity of making what I said was a purely personal
comment to the effect that I sincerely hoped that this action by the
Bank of China and the counter-action/the Singapore Government would not
have repercussions here in Hong Kong: Jay seemed a little surprised by
this and asked what could possibly happen to affect the Hong Kong
situation. I said that although I had no precise knowledge of the legal
position, nevertheless it occurred to me that if they so desired the
Singapore Government might well attempt legal action in Hong Kong and
try, say, for a legal order of attachment on funds held in Hong Kong. I
went on to say that this, if it did happen, would be most unfortunate.
Jay certainly appreciated this point and said he would like to look
further into the matter.
4.
Then, as agreed, I informed Jay that, as a result of the R.K.G.'s
continuing appraisal of the security situation locally, it was intended
that the last of the detainees would be released within the next few
days. Thereafter it vas probable that Governsent would, in the next few
weeks, give consideration to placing Regulation 31 and its attendant
rules "into cold storage". From this I led into the question of
reduction of sentence for the 11 confrontation prisoners: I spoke, of
course, to my brief, along the lines of the press release. I further
said that this action was yet another indication of the H.K.G.'s desire
that relations return to normal.
/Contd...
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I
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I also added the comment that we hoped the C.P.G. would also contribute
to the restoration of normality, for example by re-considering the
position of British subjects detained in
China,
5.
I was interrupted on several occasions whilst putting across the above
message: Jay felt, as he had often said before,
He wanted that we were too easily giving up bang gining points. to know
how ve knew that this was the "right price" to offer for an improvement
in the situation or for the release of Anthony Grey. I referred him back
to the many discussions we had had on this point over the last year or
so and said that this was not a question of a political deal and that
our actions had been taken on grounds of justice. Jay, of course, has
never been convinced that we were right in acting as we do but on this
occasion contented himself with the comment that as a business- man he
would certainly feel it wrong not to take advantage wherever possible.
6.
I asked that the message be passed on to LI Cho-chih as soon as
practicable, to which Jay replied that he would try
I said that this would not and contact LI to-morrow morning.
be very satisfactory as a public announcement would be made, probably
tonight or to-morrow morning. Jay then undertook to contact LI as soon
as possible. (NOTE: Later in the morning Jay telephoned to say that LI
was still in Canton and therefore be had passed the message to him
there.)
7.
Jay said that when there was more time to discuss things leisurely there
were one or two general iteas he would like to mention to me, in
particular concerning communications he had received from Peking. Among
other things he said that he had heard from the Prime Minister's
office:-
(1) that CHOU En Lai remains disappointed at the outcome of the recent
Party Congress and was rather moody in his dealings with people;
(2) that LIN Piao's original draft political report had contained some
hard-hitting comments on "imperialists" including Britain, but that CHOU
in committee had successfully managed to have these references cut out
of the final report
(3) that CHOU had been particularly upset when the names of the
that Standing Committee of the Politburo were announced: because the
names were in alphabetical order CHOU had appeared after CHEN Po Ta: it
is alleged that afterwards in committee CHOU had rather petulently said
that in the circumstances perhaps CHEN Po Ta should be made Prime
Minister in his place but that MAO had smoothed the matter over and
insisted on CHOU retaining his position.
8.
Jay enquired what the position was concerning the 8.C.I.V. land at Tsuen
Van: I said that I hoped to be in a position to give him at least a
broad indication of how things were going within the next few days.
9th May, 1969.
C.C.
Mr. J. Murray (F.C.0.)
Mr. J.B. Denson (Peking)
D.3.B.
H/A.R. G.;
E.S S.
جعة
(J. Cater)
SECRET
MR. MURRAY.
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Political Adviser
SECRET
Yesterday Mr. K.C. Jay telephoned asking whether be could see me: he
stated that it was not urgent but that he had one or two general things
to say to me. Accordingly, I arranged to have lunch with him today
(Friday, 2nd May).
2.
As agreed, I informed Jay that LAU San was due for release from
détention on 3rd May and that LOK Tin-sung would be released on 5th May.
3.
During lunch time I took the opportunity of mentioning VONG Cho-fan, the
ex-leadmaster of the Chung Vah Middle School. As agreed, I said that on
several occasions during the past few veeks VONG had been in
contravention of the Education Ordinance in that he had visited the Yu
Hua School: I said that such action on WONG's part clearly meant that
there was a possibility of a clash with the authorities. However,
recently WONG appeared to
have heeded warnings given and had kept away from the school: it was
hoped that, in everybody's interest, WONG would continue to be sensible
and avoid contravention of the Ordinance. Jay said that he would
certainly see that this advice was passed on to the appropriate people
but that he was aware that VONG was a stubborn, difficult person and
that it had been necessary for the communists to instruct hia to be
careful and not to cause trouble.
4.
The discussion ranged over many topics:-
(1) Bong Kong.
(a)
(b)
Jay said that the communists were anxious to obtain the support of
retail market stall holders. It was believed that, during the 'food
strike' of 1967, the stall holders, even those who dealt exclusively
with Mainland goods, had not readily and properly supported the local
communists. Accordingly, the banks would be making small loans at very
low interest rates to stall holders, particularly those dealing in
Mainland goods:
this way
it was hoped that local communists would assure them- selves of support
from the stall holders. Consideration had also been given to extending
similar credit facilities to hawkers, but it was felt that initially
this might prove too difficult and that the situation should be reviewed
again when experience had been gained of dealing with the stall holders;
May 1st Celebrations. Jay said that the local communists had received
very strict instructions from Peking that the May 1st celebrations
should be held in orderly fashion and that no trouble should be caused
the Hong Kong authorities. Jay said that the local communist leaders
vere so concerned that these instructions should be properly carried out
that the originally planned 'morning gathering' had been cancelled and
also communist flags in most instances had not been hoisted until about
10 a.a as a meeting had been called first thing on the morning of May
1st to discuss the flying of communist flags;
SECRET
/contd....
J
(c)
(a)
(e)
(F)
(g)
SECRET
2-
Jay reported that LI Cho-chih remained rather depressed: Jay believes
that LI had attracted a certain amount of criticism from Peking recently
and Feels rather badly about matters. I asked whether there was anything
in particular of which Jay knew that could be causing LI this distress.
Jay was unable to nase any specific item but felt that possibly LI felt
a sense of failure that comparatively little had been achieved through
the LI/Jay/Cater Channel;
Jay said that LIU, the Chief Superintendent of the Bank of China (Hong
Kong branch) had been to see Jay on several occasions since returning to
Bong Kong from Peking: LIU was a very much subdued man and clearly had
been criticised severely for the part he had played in the 1967
disturbances. Jay made great play of the fact that virtually everywhere
he went LIU was accompanied by a colleague in European-type clothing:
referring to this person as a 'mystery man', Jay said that he had been
unable to find out any details whatever about his but vas of the opinion
that the man was of considerable standing (at times he appeared to give
LIU instructions) and the guess in banking circles was that possibly he
was there either to supervise LIU's activities or even vas understudying
LIU with a view to replacing him;
Fei Yi-ming. Jay repeated what he had said often in the past few months,
that FEI was very much out of favour with Peking and that he was working
under strict instructions not to cause trouble in Hong Kong: in
particular, Jay claims that FEI has now been told that he must not
concern himself with trade union matters any more and that he must stick
to matters concerning the Ta Kung Pao;
Detained yachtsmen. According to Jay, it was now quite clear that the
Chinese authorities had been in error over the nationality of some of
the detained yachtsmen: Jay said that originally the Chinese vere
convinced that among the group were some Dutchsen and that it was not
until they had received my assurance to the contrary that they were
convinced of the situation and therefore prepared to release the yachts-
san other than the two Americans. In making this statement, Jay said
that the question of the two Americans was one which he wished to keep
well away Prom: that he had no information as to the possibility of
their release but thought that it could well be many weeks ahead;
South China Iron Works. Jay enquired the present position and I said
that I would make enquiries and let his know. He was particularly
anxious that no mention should be made in any future correspondence on
this matter to the letter which the District officer, Tsuen Wan, had
sent to Migel of Johnston, Stokes and Masters as, at Jay's request,
Nigel had held up action on the letter pending action being taken by me
to ascertain the position. Jay asked that nothing
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/contd...
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further be put in writing on this matter until it vas kaova firstly
whether such a proposition were possible and secondly, in very broad
terms, how much Government sight be prepared to pay for the 8.C.I.V.
land. If it were thought that such a deal were possible and if the price
were reasonable, then Jay would be pleased (if the H.I.G. were to agree)
to enter discussions with the appropriate land authorities before
anything officiäi vere put in writing.
(2) CHOU In Lai. Jay said that he had not received any direct
communication from Prine Hinister CHOU En Lai recently:
in that bou
no doubt he was "very busy on other more important matters" However, Jay
claimed tht he had received a letter from one of the P.M. ' s
Secretaries. In this letter a consent had been zade that CHOU as a
result of the 9 People's Congress, now felt himself to be in a rather
isolated position, being outnumbered in the main Centra committee by
hard-line communists such as KIANG Sang and CHENG PO-ta. But it was the
Secretary's view that the sanoeuvring for power was far from finished
and that it was expected that event ally CHOU, as usual, would 'come out
on top'. According to Jay, the letter also referred to a criticism which
had been made of CHOU in committee that, as a result of his lenient
policies, the sit ation in Hong Kong was not particularly good from the
Chinese point of view: to this criticism CHOU had allegedly replied that
Hong Long was in itself a very small watter but that if the Chinese
decided to interfere in the affairs of Hong Kong, then there would be
very serious consequences. far as CHOU was concerned, when he dealt with
Hồng Kông he did so as if he were dealing with Britain itself. Jay, and
apparently some of his colleagues to whom he had mentioned this
incident, thought CEOU's reply to be "brilliant.
So
Although Jay was of the opinion that CHOU had somewhat unexpectedly
suffered a setback in recent weeks, he nevertheless thought it
significant that of all the top communist hierarchy in Peking CHOU was
the only one who could still travel free from fear in any part of China.
In referring to General VANG Ving- sing, the Army Chief of Staff, Jay
said that the Chinese authorities dare not let him travel outside
Peking: vas known to have been a strong opponent of Peking when he vas
in Canton and had only been promoted Chief of Staff In order to
in take his influence away from South China.
General VANO
(3) Johnston. Jay only referred to Johnston in passing but in doing so
said that he thought this case vas likely to be long drawn out and
difficult to resolve.
(4) Canton Spring Trade Fair. Jay said that the Fair
a thorities and local communist authorities had been convinced that
invitations would be given to British businessmen in Hong Kong to attend
the Fair: rather surprisingly, approval had not bean forthcoming from
Paking and it now seemed too late for such approval to be given in time
for this Trade Fair.
/conté...
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•
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(3) Sino/Russian Relations.
It was Jay's opinion that, from information now being received from
Peking, China
was anxious to play down this whole affair and to 'normalise' matters.
5.
In summing up his general feeling about the future, Jay said that
undoubtedly China vanted no trouble and would be taking f rther steps to
de-escalate sensitive positions wherever practicable.
2nd May, 1969.
x.c.
Mr. J. Murray (F.C.0.) Mr. J.B. Denson (Peking D.S.B. H/A.R.G. *.8.3.
ex
(J. Cater)
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1
41C 2600079
30,000-1/67-B52117
TOP SECRET
804
No. TSX 15/64 IV
Dear James
GREY
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT,
LOWER ALBERT ROAD,
HONG KONG,
2 May, 1969.
نشاه
130
In our telegram No.10 of 6 January we mentioned a Special Branch paper
on Grey that the Governor gent-to Sir Arthur Galsworthy. We also sent a
copy to Peking, partly by bag, partly by telegram (our telegram No.5 to
Peking).
2.
I now enclose a copy of a
further paper dated 16 April on the same subject. I am sending a copy to
John Denson in the same split style as in January.
ever
Your
Arther.
(A.F. Maddocks)
J. Murray, Esq., CMG,
Far Eastern Department,
+
An intersting Summing
but it introduces no was
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, element in our
LONDON, S.W.1.
Encl.
Sensible proper
Encipa Y6JB
conscienter of the problem
た
kam Many
2 Vol 2415
No Wild 2715
Reference: PA/1763
INTRODUCTION
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I
Page No. 1 of 7 Pages
Copy No. 19 of 20 Copies
Special Branch,
Hong Kong Police.
16th April, 1969.
ANTHONY GREY
-
INDICATIONS OF THE C.P.G.'S
ATTITUDE TOWARDS HIS RELEASE
Special Branch paper PA/1763 dated 2nd January, 1969 contained a study
of developments and intelligence concerning the C.P.G, attitude towards
the release of Anthony Grey, Reuters correspondent, detained in Peking
since July, 1967. The present paper brings together the main
developments since
that time and sees whether any fresh evaluation of Chinese intentions
towards Grey's release is possible following a re-examination of the
whole
of the material.
PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON GREY
2.
There have been no public statements from the C.P.G. concerning Grey
since the beginning of 1969 and the last official pronouncement is,
therefore, that put out by N.C.N.A. on 27th December, 1963. This stated
that the Chinese were justified in holding Grey because the Hong Kong
British authorities were still keeping patriotic journalists in jail,
and that "this was the consistent stand of the Chinese Government".
COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH COVINT CHANNELS
3.
The covert link with LI Cho Chih, General Manager of the Hong Kong
branch of the Bank of China, has continued through a former senior
Bank employee who still acts as an exchange broker for the Bank.
/2.
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4.
Towards the end of December LI visited China, The intermediary
belloves he either had a personal meeting with CHOU En Lai, or, at
least,
received a message from his. Before he left Hong Kong, he reportedly
made
Bone effort to find out if there had been any message from the British
side
and, by the same account, got in touch by telephone before his return
from
China to see if there had been any last-minute message. After I had
returned to Hong Kong, on 2nd January, 1969, his contact reported a dis-
cussion in which LI had said that he now firmly believed that CHOU En
Lai
was embarrassed by the Grey affair and had personally intervened to
prevent
the Paking Government (sic) from trying and sentencing Grey, because
this
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