IT WOULD SEEM THAT THIS DIFFERENCE
3. TO THE CHINESE WE WOULD SAY, THROUGH CATER, THAT THERE HAS
SEEN NO INCONSISTENCY IN CUR ATTITUDES, YE OFFERED THEM A SIMILAR
ARLAMENENT
EXCHATICE ON TERMS, INDEED, EVEN ORE FAVOURABLE TO THEM: BUT THEY
HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE REPATRIATION OF THE NEWSWORKERS.
4. HOVEVER, THERE IS OF COURSE NO PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF THESE
NEGOTIATIONS. 13 BACKGROUND PRESS BRIEFINGS AND PRIVATE TALKS WITH
RESPONSIBLE JOURNALISTS, ETC., WE WOULD THEREFORE STRESS THE
ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO CASES, AS IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE.
THERE
TOP SECRET
I
:
Berge
Вго
TOP SECRET
-2-
THERE WOULD PROBABLY SE LITTLE HARM (SINCE IT HAS BEEN SAID BEFORE
AS LONG AGO AS 1967) IN ADDING THAT HAD THE CHINESE SUGGESTED A:!
ARRANGEMENT UNDER WHICH PRISONERS LEFT THE COLONY FOR CHINA, 14.STEAD
CF DEMANDING THEIR RELEASE IN HONG KONG, THEN A QUITE DIFFERENT
SITUATION WOULD HAVE BEEN CREATED AND THE CHINESE REQUEST COULD HAVE
BEEN CONSIDERED. THERE HAD BEEN ONE OR TWO CASES IN THE PAST WHERE,
IN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, THE PREROGATIVE HAD BEEN USED TO RELEASE
CONVICTED PERSONS IN ORDER TO PERMIT. THEM TO RETURN TO THEIR OWN
COUNTRIES, AND THIS WAS A JUSTIFIABLE USE OF THE PREROGATIVE. BUT
RETURN TO CHINA WAS NOT WHAT THE CHILLESE HAD DEMANDED AND HOW NE
"IGHT OR NIGHT NOT HAVE ACTUALLY RESPONDED WAS AN ACADEMIC QUESTION."
5. EARLY WARMING OF ANY POSSIBILITY OF THE KAGGER/BROCKE DEAL COING
THROUGH WOULD BE HELPFUL. IT WOULD OF COURSE BE BEST FROM OUR POINT
OF VIEW IF NOTHING WAS SAID ABOUT BROOKE AND THE KROGERS UNTIL GREY
HAS BEEN RELEASED.
FCO PLEASE PASS ROUTINE TO PEKING.
SIR D.TRENCH
PERMUN.
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
+
TOP SECRET
21/7
xx
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry No. FED
DEPARTMENT
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret 21/7
Seche
Cool Bitial
Rangpicted
TOP SECRET
PRIORITY MARKINGS
(Date).....
Flash
Immediate
Routine
• Date and time (G,M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(a).
-=-=-=-=-----------
मात्र
фот
CYPHER
NO COPIES MADE
fication]
TOP SECRET
[Secu
Security classification -if any
[
Privacy marking -if any
]
TO PARENJA MAANA
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
En Clair. Code Cypher
Draft Telegram to:-
[Codeword-if any]..................
Addressed to
YOVERNOR telegram No..
ONG KONG
No Nổ.
(Date)
And to:-
-----11 ---
repeated for information to
Metod sada juda manga spojky
CHONG KONG 7
(date)
RECEIV...) IN
T доро
28 JUL 1969
FEL
Repeat to:-
Saving to:---
Distribution:- As from
No cafus quad.
Copies to:-
Saving to......
P
Personal for Governor from Murray.
Your telegram No. 566 of 18 July 7: Brooke
and Grey cases.
Strictly for your own information it is now
practically certain that Brooke will arrive in this
country on the morning of 24 July and that the
of State Foreign-and-Gemmonwealth Secretary will make a
Full account statement immediately thereafter. (far Bastern
was taken of the argument Department and Hong Kong Department argued
strongly)
that it would be best from the point of view of the
Grey case if nothing were said about Brooke and the
Kroggers until Grey had been released; but it was
decided that other considerations were overriding).
2. It was very helpful to have your preliminary
ideas about publicity. We shall be letting you
have our comments as soon as possible.
Jul 21 July
TOP SECRET
1800721/72
PEC 130/1
TOP SECRET
24/7
พา
22 July, 1969.
1997
We were interested by Contact's remarka to Cater on 19 Jume regarding
the significance of 1997 (Your Telegram No. 497 of 21 June, paragraph
4). What importance if any do you attach to Contact's remarks? We
naturally wondered whether he was indulging in personal speculation or
dropping a hint on instructions.
A. F. Maddocks, Esq.,
HONG KONG,
TOP SECRET
(James Murray)
Desbabled 2412
AWR.
898
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
WEL SE-7406
x/2
тор
SECRET
AF Mallocks Esq
Hong Kong
1997
from Mr Meanary
We were finterested
èrestia by
Contact's remarks are neare
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19 June repanding персидия
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Amand
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M.
[
MR MURRAY
5.
A very interesting
conversation.
Jower
Yumay, 3 Isla
With the Compliments of the
M. Rycon los 317
The Cat 4/7 Political Adviser
Me With
The Bayt. T3x-4/68.
Hong Kong
эн. Димова.
Political Adviser
SECRET
897
/this
On Wednesday, 18th June Mr. K.C. Jay telephoned asking to see me soon in
order that he might pass on a message:
he uggested that we might meet next day (19th June) and accordingly
arranged to see him at his house (19th June being a public holiday) at
11.30 a.m. I had a two-hour discussion with Jay and then a long luncheon
session with his family: four of his sons were present (just returned
from university in North America), also his wife and his mistress.
2.
Jay was in a confident, almost boisterous mood:
be was anxious to pass to me a message from Prime Minister CHOU En-lai
which Jay described as being "very good". In reply to the report which
Jay had submitted recently (please see my report of 13th June), CHOU
allegedly had replied that previously it had been his intention that
directly negotiations with the H.K.G. over the newsworkers had been
completed, Anthony Grey and other Britons held in China should be
released: however, in view of the failure of these negotiations it was
not possible for the Chinese to proceed with this action. Referring to
Jay's recommendation that consideration be given to releasing Grey
before the release of the 11 nevsvorkers, CHOU had given the assurance
that Grey would now "only be kept as long as necessary On saying this,
Jay positively beamed with pleasure and said that was very good news
indeed. I apologised For being rather slow to recognise good news and
asked him whether he would interpret these words in a little more detail
as,on the surface, the message meant very little to me. Jay then
explained that by using the phrase "only as long as necessary" he
believed that CHOU was saying that, once Peking was convinced that the
newsworkers would in fact be released, then there would no longer be any
need to detain Anthony Grey. Jay then went on to say that he had passed
to LI Cho-chih and to Paking a photostat copy of the list I had given
him on 11th June showing earliest dates of release of the 11
newsworkers: Jay was fairly confident that once it was understood in
Peking that the dates given on this list were definite "and legal", the
release of Grey would become more likely. I took this opportunity of
again pointing out to Jay that the dates of release shown on the list
were "the earliest dates of release" and that, should any of the
prisoners misbehave themselves, it was possible that the date of release
could be put back. Jay said he appreciated this point but assured me
that none of these 11, now that their date for release vas such a short
time away, would cause trouble.
3.
Jay then went on to say that he had replied to CHOU, both directly and
indirectly through LI Cho-chik, to the effect that be vas pleased and
encouraged by the Prime Minister's message and had assumed that "as
necessary" meant as soon as it is certain that the 11 will be released":
he thought that such action would be favourably commented upon not only
by Europeans and senior people in Hong Kong but also by the world press.
4.
For the rest of the interview Jay was in an expansive mood and for the
first time spoke very freely of his views on Hong Kong and China, the
future of Hong Kong and also his understanding of Peking's policy and
attitude to these matters.
SECRET
/contd....
Las
SECRET
2
II. 5.
Jay enquired in a rather jocular fashion whether I was prepared to
comment on rumours going round communist circles as to the future
Governor of Hong Kong: I said that I was prepared to comment to the best
of my ability but my knowledge of this subject was of course very
limited. Jay said that, although
ven the communists felt this was "nonsense", nevertheless in the last
two or three veeks there had been rumours to the effect that Hr. John
Keswick vas probably going to be the next Governor of Hong Kong: I said
that I had seen a similar statement in the China Mail some months ago
but that this obviously vas a question of "newspaper fishing": that it
was highly unlikely that a man of Mr. Keswick's age would be appointed
Governor, nor did I think it likely that the next Governor would be a
man from the British business community: to date, Governors of Hong Kong
had tended to be professional administrators/civil servants. Jay then
said that the other rumour was to the effect that the new Governor was
going to be sir sik-nin CHAU: I again said that I thought this very
unlikely indeed and gave similar reasons as for Keswick. It was here
that I realised that Jay was leading, rather obviously and not too
cleverly, on to a matter of policy: mention of Sir Sik-nin CHAU led Jay
to ask whether it was likely that the British Government would ever
appoint a Chinese as Governor of Hong Kong. Without giving me any time
to reply, he immediately said "because this, I am quite sure, would be a
serious mistake": rather jokingly he said "you know the communist
Chinese they would think you were trying to set up a 3rd China".
Expanding on this a little, Jay said that he thought it most important
that Hong Kong should never have a Chinese Governor nor even a Chinese
who was "à sort of Governor" - I asked what he meant by this and he said
that obviously if the Governor vere away then the next senior man would
become temporary Governor. I explained that usually in these
circumstances, if the Governor were away on leave then the Colonial
Secretary would become either Acting Governor or, in the past, Officer
Administering the Government. Jay said that this was precisely what he
was getting at; as it would probably not be advisable to have a Chinese
Governor it would not be advisable to have a Chinese Colonial Secretary
just in case from time to time he was required to act as Governor.
-
Jay then went on to give his views of the future relationship of Hong
Kong to China and in a long and very diffuse discussion made some major
points: he emphasised that these views vere his own:-
(1) No matter what approaches China may make to Hong Kong
or to Britain, it must be remembered that they are communists and will
always regard the economic practices in Hong Kong, Britain and the
western world generally with great distaste: "we are the enemy of
communism and we must never forget it".
(2)
Repeatedly throughout this part of the discussion Jay emphasised that in
all our relations with China we must stand firm on what we as a
Government felt was right for Hong Kong, for example maintenance of law
and order must be paramount. "You must never put your- selves in the
position of Macau, where the authorities are dictated to by the
communists:.
**/contd..
III. 7.
SECKE!
-
(3) Bearing in mind the point made at (2) above, Jay thought that Hong
Kong's policy should always be ained at maintaining and, wherever
possible, improving its value to China. Hong Kong's value to China vas
manifold! it was not just a question of dollars and cents but also "of
political advantage" Jay explained this by saying that just as the vest
had China Watchers in Hong Kong so China had South East Asian Watchers
and Western World Vatchers in Hong Kong. But of greatest importance, in
Jay's opinion (and somewhat naturally in view of his main means of
livelihood) was the fact that China could easily and readily obtain
foreign exchange in or though Hong Kong *if it were not for Hong Kong
China would find it very difficult to obtain funds for its intelligence
agents overseas". Goting #HOU, Jay said that Hong Kong has nothing to
rear provided it remains of value to China. I pointed out that this was
perhaps all very well and a reasonable comment to make in the short
terx, but it was my experience, talking to young people in Hong Kong,
that they were concerned, perhaps over-concerned, about what the
position would be in 1997. Jay countered this in robust fashion, saying
that too much emphasis vas
(4)
(1)
-
-
placed on 1997 "it really means nothing": provided Hong Kong remains of
considerable value to China there is good reason for China to want to
see Hong Kong continue. Jay thought that it would be positively
embarrassing for China to try and absorb Hong Kong "and certainly they
would find it a liability rather than a very great asset",
It was Jay's opinion that the danger, so far as the Puture was
concerned, was not to be found in the relationship between Hong Kong and
China or Britain and China but rather between China and the U.S.A. If
the U.S.A. were ever to recognise China, if China were to hold its
reserves in U.S. dollars rather than sterling, if trade were to develop
in a big way between China and the U.S.A., then, according to Jay, the
value of Hong Kong would be very much reduced. Because of this (and here
Jay asked that I should keep this information only to myself) Jay had
for some years past done whatever he could to keep the Chinese from
becoming too interested in trade with the U.S.A. or dealing in U.S.
dollars. Nowadays, of course, this was not too difficult a problem but,
according to Jay, some 12 years ago there vere definite moves on the
part of both China and the U.S.A. to come to terms and be had done his
best to frustrate these moVES
Local Hong Kong problems
Communist schools. Jay said that in recent weeks sone members of the
teaching profession had shown signs of anxiety and frustration and had
talked of heating up the confrontation again. Jay had recently had a
long
SECTET
/contd..
ا نصاب بان
(2)
talk with LI Cho-chih on this matter and advised that everything
possible should be done to calm the teachers down and to channel their
efforts into becoming simply good teachers. LI had allegedly agreed with
Jay and said that he would do what he could to ensure that there was no
trouble from the communist schools:
that undoubtedly parents of students vere anxious that the schools
should provide education and not political indoctrination.
Referring to the recent theft in a communist bank, Jay said that there
vas a strong rumour amongst communist bankers that this had been à
put-up job by the Hong Kong Police: on being informed of this, Jay had
said that this vas absolute nonsense and had even been supported in this
line by LI Cho-chih. Nevertheless LI had recently asked Jay whether he
would pass on a message asking whether the Police would pursue enquiries
into the theft as energetically as possible. Jay said that he
appreciated that clearly the Police vere doing all they could in this
matter but that in view of his promise to LI he thought it advisable to
mention the natter to me.
20th June, 1969.
جعف
(J. Cater)
SECTET
SECRET
Political Adviser
As requested by you, I made arrangements to see kr. I.C. Jay during the
morning of Saturday, 14h June in order to pass to him the names and
brief details of the three confrontation risoners the sentences of whom
had been recommended for reduction to three years by the long-term Board
of Review: the prisoner's in question being LING Mus-yau, 10 Boi-chung
and CHING Chi-keung.
2.
Jay had little to say in return but went over some of the ground covered
in my previous zeeting with him on 11 June. He was hopeful that his
message to CHU In-lai would be well received. He had been a little
alarmed when speaking to LI Cho- chih and POON Ching-on that the latter
had been quite militant in his views about future relations with the
H.L.G. and had advocated violent action if necessary in view of the
H.X.G.'s refusal to negotiate over the newsworkers and other matters
outstanding from 1967. Jay hoped that his message to CHOU En-lai would
strengthen the hand of the more moderate factions in Peking.
3.
Jay, reverting to a conversation of some time ago, said that there was a
great deal of dissatisfaction among local communists with the way
affairs were being handled and that they had their own "trouble makerS":
just recently two members of the Bank of China had been dismissed -
CHENG Chih-jui and LI T'ien-yan.
201 June, 1969
elp.
(J. Cater)
SECRET
i
Reference............
1997
The most interesting Thing about Tel No 497 is the hint at x I wonder if
contact was speaking on instinctions?
Mr wrilans 122016
Thr Thunay
Чак
ANG
Jorrono a/s
ab
HK Dep. (M. (ammara)
PUSD (Fur West) MW 15/2
"W15/2
Very interesting. It might be worth arding
Alibrand Advant how much sugingwarme
lave experts
authard to it.
MATI
27
Jum
the
the
du
22 July
[
CYPHER CAT A
PRIORITY HONG KONG
840
TOP COPY
2
COPY NO.
TOP SECRET
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 497
21 JUNE 1969; R.GI
IN
J
pako 21/2
23 JUN 1969
FC IJC
TOP SECRET ADDRESSED FCO TELEGRAM 497 OF 21 JUNE RFI PEKING.
721 MY TELEGRAM 391 ■ GREY AND POLICY IN HONG KONG.
ON 19 JUNE CATER HAD A LONG SESSION WITH HIS CONTACT.
2. CONTACT SAID HE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM CHOU EN-LAI IN REPLY
TO HIS SUGGESTION THAT GREY SHOULD BE RELEASED BEFORE THE NEWSWORKERS
OME OUT IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER. CHOU ALLEGEDLY REPLIED THAT IT HAD
BEEN HIS INTENTION TO RELEASE GREY AND OTHER BRITISH SUBJECTS HELD
IN CHINA ONCE THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OVER
THE NEWSWORKERS HAD BEEN
COMPLETED BUT AS THOSE NEGOTIATIONS HAD FAILED IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE
FOR THE CHINESE TO PROCEED IN THAT WAY. REFERRING TO CONTACT'S
RECOMMENDATION IN FAVOUR OF AN EARLY RELEASE OF GREY, CHOU SAID THAT
GREY WOULD NOW ONLY BE KEPT AS LONG AS NECESSARY'. CONTACT
INTERPRETED THIS TO MEAN THAT GREY WOULD BE RELEASED ONCE PEKING WAS
CONVINCED THAT THE NEWSWORKERS WOULD IN FACT BE RELEASED. CATER
HAD GIVEN CONTACT ON 11 JUNE A LIST SHOWING THE 'EARLIEST DATES OF
RELEASE' OF THE 11 NEWSWORKERS. CONTACT HAD SENT A COPY OF THAT
LIST TO PEKING AND FELT CONFIDENT THAT PEKING WOULD NOW BELIEVE
THAT THE NEWSWORKERS WOULD COME OUT THEN, PROVIDED THEY CONTINUE TO
BEHAVE CORRECTLY.
/3. CONTACT
TOP SECRET
4
TOP SECRET
-2-
3. CONTACT THEN TURNED TO DISCUSS HONG KONG AFFAIRS AT SOME LENGTH
EMPHASISING THAT THE VIEWS EXPRESSED WERE HIS OWN. HE POINTED OUT
THE DANGERS OF APPOINTING A CHINESE TO BE GOVERNOR OR COLONIAL
SECRETARY. CATER ASSURED HIM THAT THESE DIFFICULTIES WERE WELL
UNDERSTOOD,
4. CONTACT SAID THAT IN PLANNING OUR LONG-TERM POLICY IN HONG KONG
WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WERE COMMUNISTS AND
WOULD ALWAYS REGARD THE ECONOMIC PRACTICES OF HONG KONG AND BRITAIN
WITH GREAT DISTASTE. THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO BE ENEMIES. HE STRESSED
REPEATER Y THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THEREFORE THAT THE HONG KONG
GOVERNMENT MUST STAND FIRM ON WHAT WE AS A GOVERNMENT THOUGHT
RIGHT FOR HONG KONG. FOR EXAMPLE THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER
MUST BE PARAMOUNT. WE MUST NEVER PUT OURSELVES IN THE POSITION OF
MACAU, SUBJECT TO THOSE CONSIDERATIONS HONG KONG'S POLICY SHOULD BE
TOWARDS MAINTAINING AND, IF POSSIBLE, IMPROVING ITS VALUE TO CHINA.
IT WAS NOT ONLY AN ECONOMIC QUESTION. IT WAS ALSO A QUESTION OF
PROVIDING A BASE FOR CHINA'S 'SOUTH EAST ASIA WATCHERS' AND
"WESTERN WORLD WATCHERS'. CONTACT
STRONGLY ARGUED THAT TOO MUCH EMPHASIS WAS PLACED ON 1997, A DATE
WHICH REALLY MEANT NOTHING PROVIDED HONG KONG REMAINED OF VALUE TO
CHINA. IT WOULD BE EMBARRASSING FOR CHINA TO TRY AND ABSORB HONG
KONG SINCE IT WOULD BE A LIABILITY RATHER THAN AN ASSET. ONE THREAT
TO HONG KONG'S USEFULNESS TO CHINA WOULD BE AN INCREASE IN TRADE
AND RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES. IF CHINA EARNED
AMERICAN DOLLARS BY DIRECT TRADE THERE WOULD BE LESS INTEREST IN
HONG KONG
5. FULL TEXT OF CATER'S REPORT FOLLOWS BY BAG.
FCO PLEASE PASS ROUTINE TO PEKING.
SIR D. TRENCH
FILE 3
HEAD F.E.D.
HEAD H.K.D.
SIR J. JOHNSTON
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
MR. MORETON
SIR A. GALSWORTHY
HEAD P.U.8.D.
P.S.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
TOP COPY
COPY NO..
126
CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY HONG KONG
LINO 478
TOP SECRET
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
13 JUNE 1969
YRTEL 341: GREY.
117
R.V
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