would have made his early release out of the question. LI continued that
the Chinese side was aware of the difficulties involved in releasing the
prisoners in Hong Kong: for their part, the releasing of Grey was
equally
difficult. 'LI then asked particularly that the British side should be
informed that Peking had no intention of making propaganda should the
news-
paper workers be released and there would be no talk of a victory. The
onus was now upon the Hong Kong Government to find some suitable formula
for their release.
5.
On 27th January the intermediary was asked to tell LI that the
Hong Kong Government was willing to consider releasing the prisoners to
China and, by his own account, he did this the following day. He
reported that LI received the proposal without enthusiasm and was
reluctant to pass it on to Peking, remarking that a similar proposal had
been made in (the then Foreign Secretary) Mr. George Brown's letter to
CHEN I of 30th August, 1967, and rejected. In spite of this cool
reception, LI asked his contact
for clarification of one or two points, which was given.
6.
On 5th February the intermediary reported having had an urgent
meeting with LI the previous day at the latter's request. According to
the
intermediary, LI stated that he had received a letter from Peking on the
evening of 3rd February, saying unequivocally that Grey would be freed
if
he 11 newspaper workers in prison in Hong Kong were released. The
intermediary quoted LI as saying that this was the first time that
Peking had
been quite specific about the exchange, without any qualifications. The
intermediary gave it as his opinion, that the corollary, i.e. that
unless
TOP SECRET
13.
TOP SECRET
+
-3-
the 11 were released Grey would remain incarcerated, was not implied,
and therefore, even if they were not released, it was still possible
that Grey
would be let out on some other terus.
7.
Next day, however, the intermediary stated that LI had just heard from
Peking that the latest British proposal was unacceptable. He reported
that LI was under instructions to give no reasons for the rejection but
had admitted to him that, although it was the Chinese intention to take
the 11 prisoners back to China on their release anyway, they had little
control over them and were not certain of how they would react. For this
reason, the C.P.G. was unwilling to risk the potential embarrassment of
their refusing to go back to China. LI wished it to be known,
nevertheless, that the door was not completely closed and that the
dialogue might continue.
8.
On 12th February, the intermediary claimed that he himself had
received a message from the Premier's office rejecting the Rong Kong
Government's proposal of 27th January (see para. 5). At the same time,
ho said he had spoken to LI again, who had given it as his opinion that,
had the proposal been put forward by the British in early November, it
would have been acceptable. But something had happened in the meantime
which had changed Chinese thinking.
9.
The dialogue was resumed on 20th February, 1969 when the intermediary
claimed he had received another message, directly from CHOU En Lai,
repeating the promise to guarantee no publicity or propaganda about a
victory having been gained if the prisoners were released in Hong Kong.
CHOU is also alleged to have said that if the Hong Kong Government so
wished, it could overcome any difficulties, legal or otherwise, involved
in the release of the newsworkers an early solution to the problem was
needed.
10.
A completely reliable and delicate source reported independently on a
conversation between LI and the intermediary on 26th February, in the
course of which LI instructed the latter to inform the Hong Kong
Government that news that these covert talks were taking place had
leaked out. The intermediary was also told to tell the British that
their latest proposals (to release the prisoners outside Hong Kong
territory) were
14.
TOP SECRET
+
TOP SECRET
"unworkable" and "hopeless".
He reported to this effect the next day.
This report of the conversation with LI provided the first independent
confirmation that the intermediary is actually receiving directions from
him and, in this case, at least, transmitted them in generally faithful
terms.
P
11.
Another completely reliable and delicate source reported in
early February that LEUNG Bai Lan, Director of the N.C.N.A., Hong Kong
and FAI I Man, Publisher of the Ta Kung Pao, were discussing the
possibility
of opening up unofficial discussions with the Hong Kong Government,
using
a former Chinese member of the Executive Council as the channel. Shortly
afterwards FAI is known to have met this person and arranged a
subsequent meeting with LEUNG.
12.
About the same time a European journalist in Hong Kong, who was formerly
the Regional Information Officer (R.1.0.), received proposals,
allegedly emanating from FAI, regarding yet another possible channel for
unofficial talks between the communists and the Hong Kong Government,
These proposals showed clearly that FAI, or those claiming to represent
him, had some knowledge of the talks already taking place between LI Cho
Chih and the intermediary and of the proposals made by the Hong Kong
Government regarding possible conditional release of the journalists.
This approach to the former R.1.0. provided an opportunity for
Government
to make the intermediary aware of FAI's activities and to request the
Chinese side to avoid this multiplicity of channels. The intermediary
subsequently reported that LI had evinced surprise that FAI had taken
these stopa, adding that he was already in bad odour with Peking. LI
promised to investigate further and, for whatever reason, no moves by
FAI or LEUNG Wai Lam have subsequently come to notice.
LOCAL COMMUNIST COMMENT ON THE DETENTION OF GREY
13.
A completely reliable and delicate source reported that on 7th March,
1969 the senior Communist official in local publishing circles
gave a lengthy exposition of current communist policies in Hong Kong to
his immediate subordinates, in the course of which he dealt with the
TOP SECRET
15.......
+
TOP SECRET
+
- 5-
detention of Grey. It would appear that he was passing on the gist of
a Peking directive discussed at a previous meeting he had attended,
which
had been addressed by LEUNG Tai Lên,
14.
The official was at pains to show that, in the absence of physical
assistance from China for the Hong Kong communists, Grey's
detention had been a source of encouragement for the masses and had
demonstrated local communist unity (presumably between Hong Kong and
China). Claiming Grey's detention had been at the instigation of the
Hong Kong cadres, he declared 'Our request has been entertained by the
Mother
Country
an eye for an eye that's what we want", The British
-
had considered (wrongly) that Grey could be exchanged for a few of the
prisoners but before they released Grey, the Chinese would first insist
that all communists (journalists?) detained in Hong Kong were released,
"We will swap one of them for many of us. That will be our victory!"
15.
The speaker continued that Britain was anxious to improve
relations with China, but China was indifferent to such initiatives and
would make Britain "kow tow" now that she had lost her power and
influence,
The detention of Grey provided a lever by which China could force the
United Kingdom to apply pressure on the Hong Kong Government to change
its policy towards the local communists.
GENERAL POINTS
16.
From the start, the Chinese have, perhaps, by their own standards
at least, been consistent in equating Grey with whatever number of neve-
paper workers was held in Hong Kong at any given time, and attempts to
equate Grey with the eight in custody at the time he was seized, or with
HSUKH Ping, have been branded by them as mere equivocating. However, in
October 1968 there were clear indications that CHOU En Lai had directed
that communist opinion in Hong Kong should be prepared for Grey being
released. It is by no means clear what happened after early November
which caused the Chinese attitude to harden. The most likely explanation
seems to be that the wave of hostile publicity at that time was regarded
by the C.P.G. as an attempt to apply pressure. It was against this back-
ground that the next offer by the Hong Kong Government to release the
TOP SECRET
16.
+
TOP SECRET
- 6
prisoners, provided they left the Colony, was turned down by the
Chinese, who, it would seem, felt unable to allow themselves to be seen
to give vay. It also seems likely that they have seriously considered
the Hong Kong Government's proposals to release the prisoners outside
the Colony as being no advance on Kr. Brown's offer of August 1967, when
he said that, if the newspapermen and News Agency personnel posed a
problem, "I may be able to arrange their departure for China". This last
proposal was unanswered by the Chinese at the time, but was rejected out
of hand by 10 Kuei Po, a Deputy Minister, in April 1968 at an interview
at the M.F.A. Peking with the British Charge d'Affaires.
17.
It seems possible the Chinese are in something of a dilemus over
releasing Grey. On the one hand, there is some evidence of an apparent
inclination to normalize relations with Britain and to present a better
image internationally at a time when several nations are about to
recognize the Peking Government. On the other hand, the Chinese are
clearly intent on deriving the maximum profit from their position and
are under no humanitarian pressures to make concessions. By holding Grey
they can demonstrate their support for the Hong Kong Communists and, at
the same time, hope to drive a wedge between Britain and the Hong Kong
Government.
CONCLUSIONS
18.
This paper cannot disagree with the conclusions reached previously,
namely that the C.P.G. will release Grey when they consider it to be to
the advantage of their overall foreign policy to do so. There are,
however, several new factors; the Chinese have now made it fairly
explicit that Grey will be released if the Hong Kong prisoners are
freed - an offer which they would find it very difficult not to honour.
Also, the British side has shown clearly that the release of the
prisoners is a possibility, although under conditions which appear not
to be acceptable to the C.P.G.. The Chinese apparently believe that if
sufficient pressure is applied, particularly to the U.K. Government, the
Hong Kong Government's conditions can be modified.
TOP SECRET
17..
H
TOP SECRET
19.
-
7-
The time-scale factor has also changed in that ten of the eleven
newspaper workers at present imprisoned in Hong Kong can be expected to
be released by September 1969. After September, therefore, the exchange
would be reduced to a one-for-one basis. If the Chinese wish to make a
'victory' of the exchange, as a local communist has claimed, there is
some inducement for them to act well before the ten are due for release.
They may, on the other hand, feel that time is more on their side than
ours; by holding Grey until the last journalist is released they can
retain a means of exerting some pressure on the U.K. and Hong Kong
Governments, and at least claim to their local supporters that they have
stuck by their original statement, unless, of course, in the meanwhile
they find some overriding political reason for releasing him.
TOP SECRET
I
100
о
TOP COPY
721
CYPHER/CAT A
TOP SECRET
HONG KONG TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
0 391
OP
SECRET
15 MAY 1969
RECEIVES N
REGISTRYA, 30
1969
FEC 170
TOP SECRET ADDRESSED FCO TELEGRAM 391 OF 15 MAY RFI PEKING MY TELEGRAM
347: WONG CHAK ET AL.
ON THE MORNING OF 9 MAY CATER SPOKE TO MTS CONTACT ON THE LINES OF
PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, AFTER MENTIONING THE
IMPENDING RELEASE OF THE LAST DETAINEE AND THE POSSIBLE WITHDRAVAL
SOON OF EMERGENCY REGULATION 31 FROM EFFECT.
2. CONTACT PASSED ON THE MESSAGE THE SAME DAY TO LI CHO-CHIH WHO WAS
IN CANTON.
3. CONTACT'S ONLY IMMEDIATE COMMENT WAS THAT HE FELT WE WERE TOO
EASILY GIVING UP BARGAINING POINTS AND HE WONDERED HOW WE KNEW THAT
THIS WAS THE RIGHT PRICE FOR GREY, CATER EXPLAINED ONCE AGAIN OUR
VIEW OF THE REDUCTION OF WONG CHAK'S SENTENCE,
4. CONTACT'S REACTION WAS PARTLY INFLUENCED BY HIS FEELINGS THAT HE
HAD BEEN GIVEN TOO LITTLE NOTICE AND HIS BELIEF THAT IF THIS SECRET
CHANNEL IS TO BE KEPT GOING IT IS NECESSARY TO PASS MORE MATTERS OF
SUBSTANCE THROUGH IT, IN FACT, OF COURSE, WE HAVE NOTHING MORE OF
SUBSTANCE TO PASS.
FOO PLEASE PASS ROUTINE TO PEKING.
SIR D. TRENCH
TILE 3
HD. F.D.D.
H.Z.D.
SIR J. JUMISTON
KR. VORETON
SIR A. GALSWORTHY
HD. P.U.S.D.
P.S.
FFFNE
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
TOP SECRET
Yea!
Yen fr3. 19/5
ル
TOP SECRET
Reply sent
$
CYPHER/CAT A
1 COPY NO. Gr=
PRIORITY HONG KONG TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICER
PELKO 347
TOP SECRET
2 MAY 1969
ADDRESSED FCO AS MYTEL NO. 347 OF MY TELEGRAM NO. 325 PARAGRAPH 2:
PRISONERS,
R
2ND MAY RFI PEKING. FEC 1341
WONG CHAK AND OTHER CONFRONTATION
TS
1 PROPOSE TO PROCEED AS FOLLOWS. I SHALL SIGN THE WAR! REDUCING THE
SENTENCES OF THE DOZEN OR SO PRISONERS CONCERNED ON THE SAME DAY AS THE
PRISONERS THEMSELVES ARE INFORMED AND A PUBLIC ANNOUTICE" ENT MADE. "'Y
FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS CONTAIN THE DRAFT PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT AND MATERIAL
FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE. WE WOULD DENY THAT THERE IS ANYTHING ABNORMAL
IN THE OPERATION OR THAT IT IS CONNECTED WITH THE PLICHT OF ANTHONY GREY
AND WE SHALL REFUSE TO BE DRAWN IF THE NEWSPAPERS SPECULATE ON THE
SECOND POINT. 2. CATER WILL MENTION THE DECISION TO HIS CONTACT 24 HOURS
ONLY REFORE IT BECOMES PUBLIC, TO VIBRISE RISK OF EARLY DISCLOSURE. HE,
TOO, WOULD SPEAK ON THE LINES OF THE DRAFT IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING
TELEGRA, THOUGH HE COULD PERHAPS CO A LITTLE FURTHER. 1 WOULD NOT
HOWEVER WISH HIN TO SAY THAT VE HAD MADE A CONCESSION IN THE HOPE OF
OBTAINING GREY'S RELEASE ONLY THAT MY ACTION IN REQUESTING THE BOARD OF
REVIEW TO CONSIDER ALL SENTENCES, AND IN REDUCING SENTENCES IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE BOARD'S RECOM'ENDATIONS, WAS ANOTHER INDICATION OF
THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENTS DESIRE THAT RELATIONS RETURN TO NORMAL. HE
COULD ADD THAT WE HOPE THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WOULD ALSO MAKE THEIR
CONTRIBUTION TO THE RESTORATION OF NORMALITY, FOR EXAMPLE BY
RECONSIDERING THE POSITION OF BRITISH SUBJECTS DETAINED IN CHINA.
3. I PROPOSE THAT THE DAY FOR THE ACTION DESCRIBED IN PARA. 1
PE 15 MAY,
4. 1 SHOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW WHETHER THESE ARRANGEMENTS AND THE PROPOSED
DATE ARE AGREEABLE TO YOU.
FCO PLEASE PASS ROUTINE PÉKING.
SIR D. TRENCH
FILES
HEAD F. 2.D.
HEAD H.K.D.
SIR J. JOHNSTON
MK MORETON
SIR A. GALSWORTHY
HEAD P.U.S.D.
P.S.
AAAAA
(REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
TOP SECRET
MR. MURRAY
dond
Тор
TOP SECRET
5 do not well With the Compliments of
seeing full refints of February
Col.
meetings.
сы
Political Adviser
There the setzet
8/4/69
Hong rộng
424
12 Moxlam
6/4
the 17. Grater i sty
Ma The With 4 14/4 717. Buyer as
70. Auxman 2114
lef. T3x. +/68
II.
TOP SECRET
Political Adviser
RECE RG.
21 APR 1YDY
FEC 130F
He
I saw Mr. I.C. Jay on the evening of 20th March. had asked to see me
because that day he had seen in the local English press a statement to
the effect that, despite many -- applications to the Chinese
authorities, Mrs. Johnston had been refused an exit visa. This, Mr. Jay
said, was incorrect: be had specific information from Peking that Mrs.
Johnston's exit visa had been approved the day before. I said that this
was known but that the press comment in London had obviously been made
just ahead of news being received of Mrs. Johnston's exit visa being
approved.
2.
Jay commented on various items:-
(1) He was more than ever convinced that Mr. Pullen of the Chartered
Bank had acted most unwisely in insisting on seeing the Manager of the
Bank of China and in his unnecessarily anxious activities to obtain
information concerning Johnston. He thought that if anything,
undoubtedly Johnston would suffer because of this anxiety on the part of
Pullen.
(2) Anthony @rey. Jay was positive that Grey's living conditions were
being improved and again referred to the fact that the Chinese were
becoming a little concerned at the probability that Grey, on release
from China, would write at length and in very critical terms of the
conditions in which he was detained.
(3) Other Britons held in China. Commenting on the general tone of
communications from Peking, Jay said that the climate of opinion had
improved and that he thought it would not be very long before we had
good news of the grant of exit visas for other detained Britons.
(4) South China Iron Works Land. Jay expressed concern about this and
asked whether early consideration to the Chinese request could be given.
I promised that I would see what I could do to hasten consideration.
(5) Jay then talked at some length on the Bino/Russian dispute. It was
his personal opinion that the dispute had been manufactured, or at least
exaggerated, in order either to cover up internal/problems within China
which might prevent the holding of the 9th People's Congress, or
conversely in an attempt to induce consolidation of the rival factions
in China in order that, if and when the Congress is held, there might be
some hope of achieving solidarity in the face of an external threat.
3.
On the evening of the 21st March, at the Cocktail Party given for the
University Grants Committee, Mr. Dick LɛE drev me to one side and said
rather enigmatically that he had recently lunched with LEUEG Vai-lan,
FRÏ Yi-ning and KHI Pung: that these gentlemen had asked after my health
and whereabouts. I was completely non-committal on this and LEE then
dropped the subject. I had the impression that be was hoping I would
have expressed interest in seeing some of these people but,in viev of my
lack of positive interest, decided not to press the matter.
TOP SECRET
/contd...
$10
III.
4.
Top SECRET
2
On Monday, 24th March, I.C. Jay telephoned to ask whether I had any
special message for Mr. LI Cho-chih. On my replying that I had not, Jay
pressed the matter and enquired whether I was quite sure about this as
LI was expecting some- thing special from me. I assured Jay that I had
no such special message and obviously would have contacted him at once
if I had received such instructions. Jay asked whether I would see him
the next day.
5.
I saw Jay in the afternoon of Tuesday, 25th March. In explanation of the
telephone call of the previous day, he said that LI had only recently
returned from Canton and had been quite positive that I would have a
special message for hia.
I reiterated that there was no such message for LI.
6.
Jay then went on to say that I had returned from Canton in a very
depressed state of mind: that LI's old confident air had disappeared and
LI felt himself under criticism by Peking. By way of explanation, Jay
said that LI had been given the impression in Canton that the Chinese
were disappointed at the lack of positive value coming from the channel
to the H.I.G.: that some people felt that the Chinese should have taken
a rather tougher line and perhaps have made contact with the H.I.G.
through others closely connected with Executive and Legislative
Councils. Jay said that from discussions with LI it seemed that the
people referred to vere P.C. WOO and Dick LEE, Jay again cautioned that
P.C. veo had close contacts with the comunists and to his knowledge had
been advising them in a way that could only be detrimental to the
interests of the H.I.G. Be thought it would be most unfortunate if P.C.
Woo were to receive information of a really confidential or secret
nature: in these circumstances he felt that there would be no doubt that
such information would be passed on to the local communists. As for Dick
LEE, he said that LEE vas very anxious to ingratiate himself with the
local commumists and by this might have led LEE to speak to the
communists in terms that they might wish to bear, i.e. a tougher line
might be more likely to achieve success. As for P.C. WOO, Jay felt that
voo had lost a great deal of prestige with the communists because of the
scandal of his mistresses and was hoping to regain some of this lost
prestige by providing information and giving tough-line advice.
7.
Jay said that he had been very concerned to learn from NIGEL of
Johnston, Stokes & Hasters that the reply on the South China Iron Works
land was most unsatisfactory. NIGEL had prosised to send Jay a note on
this subject and Jay said that he would like to see me soon after be had
received NIGEL's comments.
8.
As I was leaving the office, Jay said that LI had been so depressed
about matters generally and his own position in particular that be had
asked Jay to write personally to CHOU Ex Lại telling the Prime Minister
what Jay thought of things and hopefully-telling CHOU that LI was doing
a good job.
/contd...
3
Тор
Top SECRET
IV.
9.
Тор
Top SECRET
I saw K.C. Jay again in the afternoon of 28th March.
10.
Jay said that he had seen LI Cho-chik twice since our last meeting and
that he was pleased to see an improvement in LI's attitude. Jay had, as
requested by LI, written to CHOU En Lai explaining the situation and
commenting that he thought in the present circumstances matters vere
proceeding as veli as they possibly could.
11.
In commenting generally on the situation in Hong Kong and Peking, Jay
said that the communists in Hong Kong were definitely beginning to build
up support among the local
¡ population and, although they had failed so badly in the past,
they nevertheless had learned their lessons and were approaching the
matter more intelligently. It was clear that there would be a
concentration on the weak spots of the administration and in particular
he mentioned corruption, mini vans and hawkers. He also mentioned H.T.
villages where, increasingly, communists were beginning to make inroads.
Be felt that, unless effective action were taken by Government in these
various fields, the communists would gradually obtain the support of a
large section of the community. The consunist tactics vere to show that
they vere the people who really cared about the ordinary man in the
street and in the village: on the other hand, the communists were
depicting the H.K.G. as a part of a colonial power who really had only
the interests of the wealthy and the metropolitan country at heart.
12.
As for China, Jay said that the more militant groups were beginning to
become vocal again in Peking but that he personally had no doubt
whatsoever that CHOU remained in complete control of the situation. Be
expressed the view that CHOU aight even welcome a clash with the more
militant groups in the future in order to demonstrate his strength.
13.
Jay than showed me a letter which he had received from NIGEL (Johnston,
Stokes & Masters) concerning the letter from the District Officer, Tsuen
Wan, on the South China Iron Works land. At first Jay said that he would
give me a copy of the letter from #IGEL, but at the last moment, just
before handing it to me, be decided that this could put him and possibly
NIGEL into a difficult position if later the case came to court and it
were found that I had had access to the opinion given by the Bank of
China's legal advisers. Jay expressed grave concern that the letter from
Barnes, in which a specific offer was made in regard to the land
exchange, would cause nothing but trouble: he would prefer that the Bank
of China and the South China Iron Works should not know of this offer
lest they consider it a "trick". I said I would pass on these views to
H.E.. but explained to Jay that in such a complex matter as this land
exchange, in any event there would be some tidying up of certain aspects
necessary before Government could seriously consider making an offer for
the $.C.I.V. land at Tsuen Van. Later that day Jay telephoned to explain
yet again why he felt it necessary not to give me the copy of the letter
from NIGEL.
/contd.......
Top SEODET
V.
14.
Toe SECRET
I saw K.C. Jay on the morning of Wednesday, 2nd April, mainly to inform
his that LING Vang-yan was that day being released from detention,
15.
Jay, having noted this, then came back to the question of the S.C.I..
land. He was obviously very worried about this and, after some
discussion, agreed to give me a copy of NIGEL's letter (attached) on the
strict understanding that I would show it to nobody else except H.E.
Jay's position can be stated quite simply, although of course the matter
in itself is very complicated. Jay, on behalf of the Bank of China, is
asking that Goverment make an offer for the 8.C.I.. land as it stands at
Tsuen Wan. When he first made this suggestion to me some months ago I
asked why it was not possible for the Bank of China simply to sell the
land themselves or have it put up for auction: Jay's comment at that
time was that the Bank of China did not wish to do this in case either
at the first sale or a later sale an American concern might be
successful in obtaining the land. This, it was felt, would prove to be
an awkward situation and one which could make for very adverse
publicity. In the circumstances, they would auch prefer that the H.K.G.
should make an offer and take over the land. To reiterate, Jay said that
hopefully they were expecting an offer for the whole area of some
499,000 sq.ft. of sone HK$10 to 11 millions, I assured Jay that H.5.
vished to assist in this matter if at all possible and that I would let
him know directly a decision is made. Jay replied that from his point of
view he would prefer a straight 'no' to the proposition (perhaps with an
explanation that this would be against principle or policy) rather than
have the Barnes letter to deal vith. Jay said that for the time being he
had asked NIGEL to hold up the letter from Barnes in the hope that early
consideration would be given to the bigger proposition made by the Bank
of China three or four months ago. I assured Jay that I would inform
H.E. of the anxiety which Jay had in this latter,
16.
I took the opportunity at this meeting of informing Jay that probably I
would be going to Europe and the United States about the già April and
that I would be away for about three weeks.
17.
Jay said that recently the more militant local communists had begun
talking about the possibility of starting They had been prompted in this
view by the fact that large numbers of posters appear constantly all
over Hong Kong advertising various products, etc. etc. The communists
were aware that theoretically the putting up of any poster should first
have the approval of the S.ll.A, but they knew that in most cases such
approval was not obtained. In the circunstances, they felt that they
could start a poster campaign almost with impunity: that if indeed the
H.K.G. were to counter such action, the H.K.G. would be seen by all to
be singling out the communists for reprisals, whilst letting other
poster stickers operate without action being taken.
Тор
/contd..
Top SECRET
Jay said that the
TOPSECRET
10
communists would be sensible enough not to make the posters too
inflammatory and therefore to come within the special law against such
posters. Be advised that early consider- ation might be given to
ensuring that all complied with the law where appropriate, in that
S.H.A. approval should be sought before a poster is put up.
(J. Cater)
3rd April, 1969.
C.C.
Mr. James Murray (FCO) Hr. J.B. Denson (Peking) D.5.8.
H./A.R.G. B.5.5.
w/o enci.
TOP SECRET
RECEIVED IN
PERSONAL AND TOP SEC-BT
REGISTRY NO.50
17 APR 1969
Far Eastern Department
FEC 13C/1
pah2017/4
15 April, 1969
(561)
GREY
You asked me in your personal letter of 17 March whether there were any
new developments in the case of Anthony Grey.
2.
You asked first of all about the conditions of Grey's detention. The
most recent news is that the Chinese told John Delson on 8 March in
Peking (the latest occasion on which the cases of British subjects have
been raised with the Chinese) that Grey could now go upstairs to get his
books. This assurance was quite specific and we are prepared to believe
that it is true. It has not yet been confirmed in Grey's own.
sorrespondence.
3. On the other hand Gray has confirmed in correspondence which reached
here in February that he had received medical attention on three
ocossions for a throat complaint. On the last he was visited by quite a
delegation including a radiologist. The Chinese told him that he was
suffering only from laryngitis,
4. You will know of course about our past efforts to negotiate
acceptable conditions for Grey's release through a channel in Hong Long.
Recently acting upon a hint from the Chinese side, we resurrected the
proposal for an exchange. We told the Chinese that we were prepared to
release to China for the remainder of their sentences all eleven
remaining news workers in exchange for the release of Grey. The Chinese
response simply confirmed that even if they are interested in closing
the book on the Grey affair, they are more interested in securing the
overthrow of the prison sentences imposed on the eleven remaining news
workers. We regard these negotiations as having failed.
5. Ministers have agreed that we should now ain for Grey's release this
September, ly then ten of the eleven news workera will have completed
their sentences (with remission). The Governor has undertaken to review
the sentences of a certain aategory of long term confrontation prisoners
in such a way as to ensure a reduction in the sentence of the eleventh
news worker, Wong Chak, and his release no later than September.
Naturally our ability to carry through this plm will be subject to the
fluctuating pressures of public opinion, not to mention the health and
state of mind of the unfortunate
/Grey.
1.7. Davies, Esq.,
OTTAWA.
PERSONAL AND FOR SKØRET
PERSONAL AND FOR STORET
Grey. Needless to say, the information in both this and the preceding
paragraph are for your ears only.
6. I should mention one last development. In a recent letter dated 6
January, Grey expressed himself dissatisfied with our efforts to secure
his release, We believe the Chinese may have seen in this letter a
useful means of leverage towards the release of the eleven news workers
and for this purpose gave it unusually rapid passage, perhaps in their
diplomatic bag. I attach a copy of a telegram of guidance on this
subject which was sent to Rabat. Irs. Grey is now claiming that the
Chinese are holding up her letters to Grey, but we have no confirmation
that this is really the
7. Finally, Ministers have been subjected in the last week to a small
flood of letters from M.P.s following the publication in the "Church
Times" of a letter appealing for the release of the newa vorkers This
campaign" is likely to have received further stimulus from an article in
last Bunday's "People" throwing doubt on the legitimacy of some of the
sentences imposed on the news workers in 1967. attach (size you asked
for guidance on this point) a copy or a standard draft reply to the sort
of letter wo are now receiving.
8. A copy of this goes to Michael Wilford who will also wish to be up to
date.
(J.D.I. Boyd)
PERSONAL AND TOP BRORET
Mr. Murray (F.C.O)
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