by the case of Antheny Grey. It was possible to
conduct with Peking a form of flexible
hegotiation over Grey (albeit unsuccessful)
which could not be done through more orthodox
channels, for fear of the consequences for
public confidence in Hong Kong.
Disadvantages
5. The disadvantages of the Jay channel are,
however, considerable.
however,
First, like many such
(bibunt (6)
go-betweens, he has a tendency to be all things
to all men. Not content with passing messages
to us from between-burasives and the Chinese authorities,
he is unable to refrain from embellishing them
with personal philosophy and advice and it is
Stromit
often difficult to disentangle the twol. second functional disadvantage
is his refuent
to work to one master alone on the Chinese side.
ma
Tay works in the first instance to the Manager
of the Bank of China in Hong Kong, who is known
to be a competent and responsible official
This
However, he also claima to carry on a personal
correspondence with Chou En-lai's private
TOP SECRET
/secretary.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
WIEL $1-7406
sometimes look libu
playlocks of arces wate
by Witum Chumaantulin
Светоса
and chillygaller
carrsagwantly liable to be wristeaching; came
hind Somantrasting Station
And and expensue of Tony gree boch some grans, ham in the past found
buna
frenchs, where
to be
a whole content
AN
what
domy; me
Amma controm bi
If the Chumse atharp! to set a price (in turmas.
of the release of presume), in Hong Kong) on the Butish subject, othe
them To Sing, still in defination in China, was mory be place of Jay's
survtime, if why to hug to have the Comers off.
897
The sumpty detailer refu
tant mothy, sume ever happen witho
thony Fifor mynd contents Temp Medias by the coming
self-govemment, ander punong for is
in Peking
Secretary.
TOP SECRET
Based on this latter correspondence
he produces assessments of the balance of forces
among the leaders in Peking (on the lines of
extremista" verwe imperts") which
misleading and at worst designed deliberately
to make our flesh creep and hurry us into
concessions.
The Balance
Views of the Governor of Hong Kong
This Hawa wamel the
16. While I myself have the reservations about
Houthalens the reliability of this channel, set out
above, That year
we
know from earlier discussions that the Governor
Some
of Hong Kong has (considerable) faith in Jay. I
favour R
usef
myself see no great harm in continuing to use
Jay's
the channel provided we treat his messages from
Large
a/pinch
China with a pinch of salt and set out the
back
messages we wish to have conveyed/in a form
entirety
MiL Rent Exchang that is short and unambiguousMeanwhile the
continuing conversations between Jay and
Mr. Jack Cater of the Hong Kong Trade and-
Development Counei-l provide a certain useful.
insight into the thoughts and neuroses of the
Chinese leadership vis-à-vis Hong Kong.
18.
good examples of they thinking.
Mr. Cater's report of 20 June provides
Marlins
In this con-
prpati ti
versation Jay expresses/preoccupations about the
next incumbent of the governorship of Hong Kong
and about the next Colonial Secretary.
-
This
simply confirms yet again the khơh anxiety of
of whith me huyu always keen onvaw the Chinese/that these posts should
not fall
into other than British hands. Jay then goes
on to make in a roundabout way the centralfadox
Jovering
ind emotimaliser ströma) point" zubat the communist attitude to Hong
Kong,
+
e
that the communists have no love at all for the captabil economer on
such edononte practices in Hong Kong and would dearly Hay Kuny
in practiu
love to undermine the administration, but that
TOP SECRET
/they
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
WEEL SI-2406
and that thing
and
Huy Kay
TOP SECRET
they find too valuable in its present form,
both economically and politically, to upset
the applecart,)
Toy
e comments interestingly that
the date of 1997, when our lease on the New
less Whery of chory Territories expires, "really means nothing".
their mind if they
Man
we jane preponed bit
N
fumers to keep the apple upright.
We have already written to the Political
Adviser in Hong Kong asking for an exegesis
of this phrase.
In particular, we have asked
for an opinion as to whether Jay was speaking
out smph
on instructions
rather-than venturing a
Menuruthile
personal opinion. At this point we cannot be
ep spinto
sure of the significance of -Jayla words.
I
would only venture the remark that reassuring
words about/1997 from the communists are not
necessarily an accurate guide to their
intentions.
mat
For one thing, they will no doubt
ما
Content digje prostog to weigh up
ssess the balance of gain and loss that we
Mita Limavade,
accrue from a takeover of the Colony, and the
at any one time in army asof wills.. balance of forces involved neered
the time; haur
tou
Second, there is no interest theazer taking
over a bankrupt Colony and the only way to
as līku untenm
Konglis
preserve prosperity in Hong Kong is for them
›mmendaba to let
it be thought that they hate
Makwe over ·
no intention of interfering ith the stetue
Finally, Jay refers to the possible
repercussions for Hong Kong of recognition of
China by the United States. Here we are up
against a hypothetical situation, Factors that
would modify Jay's warning are the question of
physical facilities| (i.e. whether the Chinese
can develop Shanghal as a viable alternative ta
the splendid port of Hong Kong) and whether or
not United States big business decides to
continue to use Hong Kong as its base for the
or ki almtent-
China trade I do not think we need let our-
When sinks Jom?
selves be too alarmed by this/predictions
Acs TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
M7/23/usi
Sir S. Tomlinson Tomlinson
911
Flag A
Flag B
PROBLEM
THE GREY AND BROOKE CASES
The arrival in this country of Mr. Gerald Brooke
tomorrow will inevitably have repercussions for our handling
While we shall try to
of the case of Mr. Anthony Grey.
discourage comparison between the two cases it seems unlikely
that we can hope to escape questioning, particularly by the
press, on why we have apparently not been prepared to do as
much for Mr. Grey (by prematurely releasing the newsworkers)
as for Mr. Brooke. Moreover there may well be suggestions
from relatives of other prisoners detained in China that we
should offer to exchange them for other "confrontation"
prisoners in Hong Kong. The Governor has given us his
preliminary ideas on the line to be taken once the arrangement
over Brooke becomes public knowledge (Hong Kong telegram No. 566),
and the Chargé d'Affaires in Peking has commented (Peking
telegram No. 424). There is also the linked question of what
might be said to the Chinese through the covert channel in
Hong Kong.
RECOMMENDATION
2. I recommend that we proceed along the lines set out in
the attached draft telegram to Hong Kong. Hong Kong Department
and East European and Soviet Department concur.
(The Governor
TOP SECRET
1
TOP SECRET
was informed on 21 July strictly for his own information
that Mr. Brooke would almost certainly be out on 24 July.)
ARGUMENT AND BACKGROUND
3. In defence of our handling of the Grey case there are
three main points that can be made publicly.
(a) Objections to an Exchange. The solution of the Grey
case by means of our exchanging him for one or several
of the newsworkers in Hong Kong was not open to us. It
became clear at an early stage that a solution of this
type was unacceptable to the Chinese.
(b) Humanitarian Concern. We have no less concern for the
welfare of Mr. Grey than for that of Mr. Brooke.
However,
in the case of Mr. Grey it now seems unlikely that the
Chinese will delay his release once the newsworkera have
completed their sentences by early October; and unlike
Mr. Brooke he is known to be in reasonably good health
and spirits.
(c) Repercussions for Hong Kong. The premature release of
the newsworkers would have involved interference with the
judicial process which might have undermined local
confidence in Hong Kong.
4. These three arguments have been attached as defensive
speaking notes to a draft statement submitted by E.E.S.D. for
use by the Secretary of State when announcing the return of
Mr. Brooke in the House of Commons. If any of the Members of
Parliament especially interested in other British subjects in
TOP SECRET
- 2 -
TOP SECRET
in China
detention/raise the question of an exchange of prisoners in
Hong Kong for them, the reply might simply be that the Chinese
have consistently taken the line that in their view these
persons have offended against Chinese laws and regulations
and that their cases are being dealt with on their merits.
5. We are likely to have further queries from the press about
our dealings with the Chinese in the matter of an exchange.
What more can be said? The relevant facts are these. In his
letter to the Chinese Foreign Minister at the end of August 1967,
Flag C
at Mr. George Brown spoke of the possibility of arranging the
Flag
on FC 3
return to China of the newsworkers in prison in Hong Kong if
British subjects, including Mr. Grey, who wished to leave China,
were free to do so. The Chinese never took this up. On
7 February 1968 Mr. Cradock formally put forward a proposal
(previously made informally by Mr. Hopson) for an exchange of
Mr. Grey for Haueh P'ing, the leading New China News Agency
newsworker in prison in Hong Kong. Again there was no reaction.
Subsequent offers through covert channels in Hong Kong towards
the end of 1968 to exchange Mr. Grey for one or at the most two
of the more prominent newsworkers were rejected by the Chinese.
Finally, in early 1969, a more favourable bargain was offered
to the Chinese. They were informed that the Governor was
prepared to contemplate the early release to China of all
eleven newsworkers remaining in prison in exchange for the
release of Mr. Grey; the newsworkers could also go to Macao
if they preferred; and it was also implied that they could
TOP
SECRET
- 3-
TOP SECRET
return to Hong Kong at the time their sentences would have
expired. In reply the Chinese insisted that an exchange of
this kind was impossible and that the newsworkers must be
released prematurely in Hong Kong itself. This we could not
accept.
6. The text of Mr. Brown's letter has never been made public
but Reuters and others directly concerned with the case of
Mr. Grey are aware that it contained an offer of an exchange.
I doubt therefore if it would be right with, for example,
Reuters to take the line suggested by the Governor at the end
Flag & ( of paragraph 4 of his telegram No. 566: that "how we might
or might not have actually responded
to a Chinese request that
the prisoners be permitted to return to China 7 was an
academic question". I would prefer that reference be made
to Mr. George Brown'a communication and subsequent démarches
in Peking. (There must of course be no reference to the
covert discussions in Hong Kong, since the Governor is rightly
anxious that the use and existence of this channel should not
become public knowledge.) Reference to Mr. Brown's letter
would have the advantage of demonstrating that our efforts had
not been concentrated solely on Mr. Grey, but had extended to
other British subjects. We might take the line that as early
as August 1967 Mr. Brown indicated to the Chinese Foreign
Minister his readiness to try to arrange the release to China
of the newsworkers in return for an undertaking that Mr. Grey
and other British subjects would be free to proceed to the U.K.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
Flag B
Flag A
This was a justifiable use of the prerogative.
The Chinese,
however, had never taken up the offer. Moreover in the
dealings which our Mission in Peking had with them subsequently
it was made quite clear that nothing less than the unconditional
release of the prisoners in Hong Kong would satisfy the Chinese.
This would help to meet the point in paragraph 2 of Peking
telegram No. 424. I think, however, that we must give the
Governor the opportunity to comment. He has frequently taken
the line in consultation with us that he would be ready to use
his prerogative to release any number of the "confrontation"
prisoners on condition that they returned (an in effect were
deported) to China. But I am not sure how publicly he would
wish to say this, and in consequence how he would regard
specific public mention of Mr. Brown's letter with its implied
reference to the use of prerogative.
The use of the Covert Channel
7. We should certainly not take the initiative in raising
this matter with the Chinese through the covert channel.
But
if, as seems likely, our contact makes to Mr. Cater the reproach
that we have been prepared to settle the case of Mr. Brooke
with the Russians on the kind of terms that we told the Chinese
were unacceptable in the case of Mr. Grey, Mr. Cater can simply
point out that the Chinese were offered the release of all
eleven newsworkers to China in exchange for the release of
Mr. Grey and that it was they, not us, who declined to settle
the question in this manner (paragraph 3 of Hong Kong telegram
No. 566 refers).
Jane blmay.
The poses
TOP SECRET
(James Murray) 23 July, 1969
/Copies:
C
TOP SECRET
Copies to: Private Secretary (ref. para 4)
Mr. Godden
Mr. Baker
Sir L. Monson
Sir T. Brimelow
Mr. Carter
Mr. Giffard
TOP
SECRET
- 6 -
CYPHER/CAT A
CONFIDENTIAL
ikker to Mi
Boyce.
Jay
Cleve
MEDIATE
FOREIGN OFFICE
TO U.K. MISSION NEW YORK
英
TEINO 4487
30 AUGUST 1967
(FED)
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDSD TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO. 4487 OF 30/8 AND TO NAIROBI
KHARTOUM KINSHASA AND ADDIS ABABA.
M.I.P.T.
TEXT OF LETTER FROM FOREIGN SECRETARY TO CH'EN YI AS FOLLOWS.
BEGINS.
YOUR EXCELLENCY,
THE PRESENT STATE OF ANGLO-CHINESE RELATIONS REQUIRES THAT YOU AND I, AS
THE MINISTERS IN OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERN- MENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR OUR MUTUAL
RELATIONS, SHOULD DISCUSS THESE RELATIONS FRANKLY AND DISPASSIONATELY, I
HOPE THAT YOU WILL TAKE THIS MESSAGE AS A BASIS FOR SUCH DISCUSSION.
OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN PEKING, MR. HOPSON, WAS SUMMONED TO SEE YOUR VICE
MINISTER, MR.LO KUEI-PO, ON 30 AUGUST, THE VICE MINISTER ANNOUNCED THE
IMPOSITION OF FURTHER RESTRICTIONS UPON THE STAFF OF THE BRITISH MISSION
IN PEKING. BUT, STATING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF YOUR
GOVERNMENT, HE ASKED: QUOTE WHERE DO YOU WANT TO PUSH SINO-BRITISH
RELATIONS ? UNQUOTE. I WOULD LIKE TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION.
J
WITHOUT REVIEWING ANGLO-CHINESE RELATIONS IN DETAIL I CAN TELL YOU, AS I
AM SURE YOU ALREADY KNOW, THAT I PERSONALLY, AS WELL AS THE GOVERNMENT
OF WHICH I AM A MEMBER, HAVE ALWAYS SOUGHT GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN YOUR
GOVERNMENT AND OURSELVES, AND IN PARTICULAR WE HAVE ADVOCATED YOUR
MEMBERSHIP OF THE UNITED NATIONS. WE WANT TO CONTINUE THAT SUPPORT BUT I
MUST MAKE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT THE ACTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN CHINA
IN THE LAST MONTHS AGAINST BRITISH SUBJECTS THERE, INCLUDING OUR
DIPLOMATIC MISSION, ARE MAKING OUR TASK EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. WE HAVE
INDEED COME TO THE POINT WHEN MANY PEOPLE IN THIS COUNTRY ARE ASKING WHY
WE CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH YOU AT ALL.
IF I JUDGE THE SENTIMENT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT ARIGHT I THINK THAT YOU TOO
WISH US TO REMAIN IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. ON THIS
/ASSUMPTION
CONFIDENTIAL
+
CONFIDENTIAL
FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 4487 TO U.K. MISSION NEW YORK
-2-
ASSUMPTION I SET OUT BELOW WHAT I THINK WE SHOULD DO TO PRESERVE
THEM.
I WILL NOT REHEARSE IN DETAIL THE TREATMENT RECENTLY METED OUT TO OUR
DIPLOMATIC STAFF AND PROPERTY AND TO OTHER BRITISH SUBJECTS IN CHINA. I
SIMPLY REMIND YOU THAT OUR MISSION AND STAFF BOTH IN SHANGHAI AND PEKING
HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO TREATMENT WHICH WOULD FULLY JUSTIFY OUR RUPTURE
OF RELATIONS WITH YOU. THE SACKING OF OUR MISSION IN PEKING HAS
COMPELLED US TO IMPOSE CERTAIN RESTRICT- IONS ON YOUR STAFF AND OTHER
OFFICIALS. THESE RESTRICTIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN AND ARE NOT NOW AS
STRINGENT AS THOSE YOU HAVE FOR A LONG TIME PLACED UPON OUR
REPRESENTATIVES. IT WAS, FOR INSTANCE, ONLY AFTER THE EVENTS IN PEKING
OF 22 AUGUST AND THE STEPS TAKEN BY YOUR GOVERNMENT TO PREVENT MEMBERS
OF OUR STAFF FROM LEAVING CHINA THAT WE PLACED ANY RESTRICTION AT ALL
UPON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF YOUR DIPLOMATS AND OFFICIALS INTO AND OUT OF
THIS COUNTRY. IT IS BEING REPRESENTED THAT YOUR STAFF IN LONDON HAVE
BEEN SUBJECTED TO INTOLERABLE HARASSMENT. I DO NOT ASK YOU SIMPLY TO
BELIEVE ME WHEN I TELL YOU THAT THIS IS NOT SO: PLEASE SEEK THE VIEWS OF
ANY
IMPARTIAL OBSERVER IN LONDON DURING THIS LAST WEEK.
I NOW SEEK YOUR COOPERATION TO BRING THE SITUATION BACK TO NORMAL AND TO
SET US BOTH ON A BETTER COURSE IN OUR RELATIONS. YOU MAY THINK THAT
THESE WOULD BE BEST SERVED IF, WHILE MAINTAINING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS,
BOTH SIDES WITHDREW THEIR MISSION AND PERSON- NEL FROM EACH OTHER'S
CAPITAL FOR THE TIME BEING. IF YOU THOUGHT THIS WOULD HELP I WOULD BE
PREPARED TO ALLOW ALL MEMBERS OF YOUR DIPLOMATIC MISSION AND OTHER
OFFICIAL ORGANISATIONS WITH THEIR DEPENDENTS AND STAFF AND ANY OTHER
CITIZENS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE UNITED KINGDOM WHO
WISHED TO LEAVE THIS COUNTRY TO DO SO, ON THE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT
YOU WOULD ALLOW ALL BRITISH SUBJECTS IN CHINA, DIPLOMATIC, OFFICIAL OR
OTHERS, WHO WISHED TO LEAVE TO DO SO AT THE SAME TIME, THIS WOULD
INCLUDE, AMONG OTHERS, MR. GREY, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF REUTERS IN
PEKING,
/WHOM
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 4487 TO U.K. MISSION NEW YORK
-3-
WHOM YOU NOW HOLD UNDER HOUSE ARREST. IF YOU GIVE ME YOUR ASSURANCE THAT
YOU AGREE TO THIS, BUT THE CHINESE NEWSPAPERMEN AND NEWS AGENCY
PERSONNEL RECENTLY SENTENCED IN HONG KONG POSE A PROBLEM FOR YOU, I MAY
BE ABLE TO ARRANGE THEIR DEPARTURE FROM HONG KONG FOR CHINA.
THE TOTAL, BUT I HOPE TEMPORARY, EVACUATION OF OUR MUTUAL PERSONNEL
MIGHT BE THE BEST MEANS TO ENSURE THAT NO FURTHER INCIDENTS DEVELOP TO
MAKE A BREACH INEVITABLE. BUT IF I COULD GET YOUR PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL
ASSURANCE THAT A BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN PEKING WOULD BE PERMITTED
TO FUNCTION IN THE NORMAL WAY AND THAT THE SAFETY AND DIGNITY OF ITS
PERSONNEL WOULD BE RESPECTED I WOULD BE PREPARED TO REPLACE THE PRESENT
STAFF BY A NEW BUT SMALLER DIPLOMATIC MISSION TO YOU. IT NATURALLY
FOLLOWS THAT WE WOULD ACCEPT A CHINESE MISSION IN LONDON ON SIMILAR
TERMS AND WITH
SIMILAR GUARANTEES.
1 THINK THAT I FOR MY PART HAVE ANSWERED THE QUESTION WHICH YOUR VICE
MINISTER PUT TO MR. HOPSON, REPEAT THAT MY GOVERNMENT
1 WISH TO MAINTAIN FRIENDLY AND FRUITFUL RELATIONS WITH YOU. THERE IS NO
PROBLEM BETWEEN US WHICH IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO SETTLEMENT BETWEEN MEN OF
GOODWILL. MAY THEREFORE ASK YOU, IN THE SPIRIT IN WHICH I SEND THIS
MESSAGE, TO LET ME HAVE YOUR ANSWER TO THAT SAME QUESTION. IN PARTICULAR
I WOULD WELCOME YOUR REPLY TO THE ALTER- NATIVE SUGGESTIONS WHICH I HAVE
SET OUT ABOVE. IN THE MEANTIME YOU MAY REST ASSURED THAT ALL YOUR
OFFICIALS AND NATIONALS IN THIS COUNTRY ARE BEING GIVEN THE FULLEST
POSSIBLE PROTECTION.
SIGNED GEORGE BROWN
ENDS
SOSPA
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.0.
F.E.D.
W.C.A.D.
C.0.
N.E.A.D.
EASTERN DEPT.
ARABIAN DEPT.
E.A.D.
M.E.W.U.N.D W. & G.A.D.
ZAMBIA DEPT.
SENT 20052
20052 30 AUGUST
CONFIDENTIAL
The Witsan
AL
Grace
DISTRIBUTION
Private Secretary
Mr. Godden
Sir T. Brimelow
Sir E. Peck
Sir
Monson
Sir S. Tomlinson
Hong Kong Dept.
F.E.D.
E.E.S.D.
P.U.S.D.
GR/CAT A
ROUTINE HONG KONG.
TOP SECRET
COPY NO:
5
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE.
TELE AY NUMBER 566.
18 JULY 1969.
Reply send
7
I
TOP SECRET
ADDRESSED FCO AS MYTEL. 566 OF 16TH JULY RFI PEKING.
YOUR TEL. 444 PARA 5.
BROOKE AND GREY CASES.
IT MAY BE OF HELP IF I SET OUT SOME PRELIMINARY IDEAS ON LINE TO
BE TAKEN.
2. THERE ARE SEVERAL BASIC DIFFERENCES BET: EEN THE PRCOKE/KROGER
POSITION ON THE ONE HAND AND THE GREY/NEWSVORKERS POSITION ON THE
OTHER OF WHICH YOU ARE ALREADY AWARE AND HICH CAN, IF THE NECESSITY
ARISES, BE POINTED OUT TO THE PRESS AND IN OVERT OR COVERT ·
COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT: BUT FROM THE LATTER'S
PONT OF VIEW THERE IS ONE ESSENTIAL DIFFERE..CE DET EEN THE TWO
SETS OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN THAT WHEREAS CHINESE DEMAND WAS FOR
NEVSWORKERS TO REMAIN IS HONG KONG, IN THE BROOKE CASE THE
F
EXPECTATION PRESUMABLY IS THAT ALL PARTIES GULD BE DEPORTED FROM NU
THEIR COUNTRY OF DETENTION.
CAN BE USEFULLY EXPLOITED.
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.