Eventually, a battalion of the Gurkhas and some armoured vehicles of the
Life Guards wore called in to relieve the Police, who by then had
suffered five dead and eleven injured.
12.
These events received wide publicity and attracted a number of alarmist
and exagerated reports in the overseas press, It was a most serious and
tragic incident, but it was not an attempt at an armed invasion of the
Colony. The Peoples Liberation Army certainly did not take part, the
affair being purely local: that is, it was or anised by villagers in the
border area; it was probably not co-ordinated with the activities of the
urban communists; and all the evidence su costs that it came as a
complete surprise to the C.P.G.
13.
This did not, however, revunt the communist press in Hong Kong from
interpreting the incident as militant C.P.G. support. Fla için;
communist morale rose, and moderate counsels were overborne. For the
next four days there was a succession of incidents, with militant
communist ;roups attackin;; trams and buscs, ambushing Folice units, and
generally lookin; for trouble. Durin: this period one roliceman and
seven rioters lost their lives.
14. The 12th July marked a turning point in this phase and indeed in the
whole carraim of confrontation. On that day the acting Colonial
Secretary announced in the Legislative Council that the Government was
determined to
rasp and maintain the initiativo, and pressure was at once put on the
communiste. Strong parties of Police, backed up by army unite carryin.
out cordon duties, mounted a succession of raids against Communist
centres, which included trade union promises, schools and department
tores. In the course of those raids they scized a considerable quantity
of home-made woa, ons and explosives, as well as inflammatory posters
and pamphlots, and they took into custody many communists already wanted
for various offences. They also provided the Police with much useful
documentary material for intelligence purposes. As a historical note,
and one perhaps of some interest to readers militarily inclined, it is
believed that the problem of assaulting; a modern multi-storey building
was first tackled in the course of these operations when a combined
force of British infantry and (mostly Chinese) Police landed on the roof
of a 27-storey buildin, from Royal Naval helicopters and carried it from
the roof downwards. This operation was a remarkable example of
inter-service co-operation executed at short notice, and one for which
every Constable in the Bay Vlow Police Division volunteered,
15. Theau counter attacks had a considerable adverse effect on communist
morale and on its leadership and planning. At the same time they had a
tonic effect on the morale of the Police and on the public generally.
Tho initial Police raids were fiercely resisted and resulted in
communist casual- ties, but thereafter there was little resistance and,
with the constant threat of police action, communist leaders abandoned
their usual mcotin:: places and were stondily driven under round.
Sporadic violence continued during July but showed an increasing lack of
direction and was more the work of individual extremist groups.
16. The communist prcas, however, continued unabated its virulent
campaign of abuse, threats and calls for armed insurrection. In August
it became Reconnary to suppress three newspapers and to prosecuto their
uditors for sedition. This action, together with the arrest for criminal
activities of minor employees of the New China News Agency, brought
about a violent
14..
CONFIDENTIAL
G.F. 111
CONFIDENTIAL
4
reaction from Peking. In July the Reuters correspondent in Peking had
been rut under house arrest in retaliation for the arrest of an N.C.N.A.
roporter. In August a strong protest was made to London demanding the
release of all N. A. employees arrested, and the withdrawal of action
against the newspapers and their editors within forty-eight hours. The
protest was rejected and the C.P.G. retaliated, not against Hong Kong,
but by setting a mob on the Office of the British Charge d' Affaires in
Peking...1
17. Since the middle of July, with the continuing police raids on
centres of subversion, the cause of confrontation steadily deteriorated.
With the growin; realisation that they must stand on their own feet, the
communists began to talk increasingly of 'a long hard struggle', In
August they threatened a wave of terrorism by publishing lists of
prominent persons in the Colony who were marked for assassination. There
had in fact been only ono victim, a prominent Chinese commentator on the
Commercial wireless programme who specialised in ridiculin the communist
caUBE. But the manner of his death was particularly vicious: he and his
cousin were stopped while driving to work, drenched in petrol and burned
to death - an action which aroused much public indirantion and contoupt,
18.
From assassination they turned to boats, sometimes specifically directed
against the Police and other targets but more usually placed at random
in busy thorou;hfares. These bombs' varied in dogrev. Most of them were
harmless imitations; many of the explosive ones contained only gunpowser
extracted from firoworks and consequently were more noisy than
dangerous; some were deadly. There was no way of distinguishing; one
from another and the same precautions, with consequent frustratin;
disruptions of traffic in the vicinity, had to be applied to all. They
came to be accepted as an additional hazard of life and they had little
effect on this bustling and energetic community; indood, people who
would have been horrified at the thought of bombs six months ago, now
calmly drove round them. But the casualties that they caused, which
included children and other innocent passers-by, reduced still further
the support for the perpetrators, and popular demands were made for more
severe punishment to be inflicted on those responsible.
19.
-
The phase of boab attacks came to a climax in October and November, when
the disposal teams were quite seriously stretched, and to an end in
December the last explosivu bomb bein; found on Christmas Day. Since the
campaign began the Police and Armed Services bomb disposal teams dealt
with 8,074 suspected bombs of which 1,167 were genuine. There were 253
uncontrolled bomb explosions which caused the death of 15 people of whom
two were policemen and one an army screant. Four men died through the
explosion of bombs that they themselves were carryin;. The total
casualties from confrontation at this date were 51 dead, of whom 10 were
policemen, and 832 injured, of whom 212 were also policemen.
Their
20. A later disquieting feature was the increasing employment of
children in confrontation activities including; holding noisy
demonstrations, distribution inflammatory literature, and carryin; and
planting bombs. truculent attitudes gave an impression of strength far
beyond their actual number, which is about 18,000 pupils or some 2% of
the total school population. Comunist schools have been used as centrus
for communist activitics and Police raids on them have unearthed stocks
of inflammatory literature as well as bombs, both simulated and real. On
27th November a youth was seriously injured by an explosion at one of
those schools while trying to manufacture explosive material for bombe,
and the school wan clonod. This nction led to a protest by the C.P.G.,
which affected to bulieve that the closure mounted to persecution of
those who wished to study Mao's Thoughts an activity which has in fact
throughout remained legal and permissablo. communist schools present a
difficult and sensitive problem but there aro indications that this
incident had some effect in restraining their excessos.
15...
The
CONFIDENTIAL
•
Ꮀ
G.F. 123
CONFIDENTIAL
л
-
21 After the Sha Tau Kok affair the border area remained unsettled and
te was a succession of minor incidents, mostly arising from the passage
of villagers across the border at the road bridge at Man Kam To and at
other places. At the end of September two Police constables who had
inadvertently crossed the border while off duty wero detained by the
Chinese authoritics. In mid October a Senior Police Inspector was seized
by a group of villagora near the border at Man Kam To and was hustled
gross to Chinese territory. After this latter incident the bridge at Man
Kam To was closed by us, for the second time. This inevitably led to
protests as before from theo Chinese side, which claimed that villagers
had the right to cross at this point nt any time they chose to cultivate
their land on the British side.
I andy red 22
22. At the suggestion of the Ministry of Foreign affairs at Peking, a
series of discussions was held in November with Chinese border
officials. Those discussions dealt with tho closure of the Man Kam To
bridge, the release of the policemen detained and other border matters,
after prolonged negotiations, it was agreed that the bridge would be
re-opened and an ox gratia award of some $75,000 paid to the Chinese
farmers who had been unable to cultivate their fields in British
Territory because of the closure; and that the three policemen would be
exchanged for five Chinose nationals who had been arrested for various
offences in British territory. The Inspector in fact contrived to
escape, after bein; detained for 36 days, and succeeded in makin; his
way back to the Colony. The exchange of the other two police- mon was
duly effected.
23. In China conditions steadily deteriorated during; the su mcr.
In many areas the bitter struggles for power amon; rival factions led to
conditions of near chros. During July and Lupust, when the battle
between the warring factions was at its height, the rail service between
Canton and the border was constantly interrupted, with a serious effect
on the Colony's food supplies. A reluced quantity of pigs and vegetables
continued to arrive at irregular intervals by road and by ava, but there
was a general scarcity and prices rese significantly.
24.
The situation did not improve until September, when conditions in China
generally started to turn for the better. In Centon the rival combatanta
wore ordered to stop their internecine war to allow the Canton Fair to
cjun on 15th October; the opening nevertheless had to be postponed until
15th November. When the fair was over, and national prestigo no longer
at stake, there was some renewal of disorders, which still continue in
this aren.
25. Durin; this period no attempt was made to put pressure on the Colony
by withholding supplies of food, In spite of the difficulties, such sup
livs as could be made available continued to arrive; and as soon as
comparative urder was rustored in Kwangtung the volume of imports
quickly returned to долг погоni.
26. In supplying water the Kwangtung authorities have been more
equivocal. The rainfall in late 1966 and the early summer rains of 1967
were the lowest on record, and by the ond of June, although we had drawn
our full quota of Chinese water and an agrced addition of 1,800 million
allons, our reservoirs were dangerously low, In May we had asked for a
further 2,000 millión galluns for the month of July but, although so far
as we were aware it could well be spired, we hal n. reply. Subsequent
requests in June and July were also unrnoworod and the general ration
had to be reduced to four hours overy fourth day. Fortunately it rained
in time to retrieve the situation, and we were able to rovert to a four
hour daily supply for the rest of the summer.
29. Somewhat to our relief the supply from China was reintroduced on its
Que date of 1st October, but broad hints were dropped that wo were
expected
16.
CONFIDENTIAL
G.F. 224
CONFIDENTIAL
+
- 6-
revert to a 24 hour supply. This wo have done; but as a prudent
precaution have added to the supply saline water from Plover Cove, our
newest and Dirgest, reservoir constructed from an arm of the sea, in
which the water Enclosed still has a high salinity. The resulting
mixture is salty to the taste (though well below the maximum acceptable
to the World Health Organ- isation) and the local communiste have worked
up a campaign to stop this 'contamination', claiming that it is
injuricus to health. Their motives are clearly to force us to use up cur
own resources so that we become dependent on further supplies from China
on their terms; and, as a further move in
←
this direction they have, without offering any explanation, reduced the
maximum daily draw-off from 62.5 to 55 million gallons. They have also
80 far refused to accept payment for the water drawn in November,
December and January because we have refused to risk sending a foreman
into Chinese territory over the Man Kam To Bridge, (as we used to do,
but are under no obligation to du) to reconcile accounts. There remains
the possibility that they may cut off supplies completely. In that event
and given normal rainfall next summer we can hope to get by, with
rationing, until the salinity in Plover Cove is sufficiently reduced by
the inflow of fresh water to allow it to be used without dilution,
28.
In the economie fiell, the Colony's productive performance has remained
substantially unimpaired. Exports of domestically produced gools in 1967
were up by 16.9% on 1966, This is the highest annual increase this
decade, books for 1968 deliveries are also reported to be in z
satisfactory state,
Orler but on the other hand, profit margins generally may, have been
materially reduced. Impcrts only execeded the 1966 leval by 3.5% for
three reasons: namely, the interruption of food supplies from China
during the summer months; the running down of manufacturers' and
traders' inventuries; and the continuing depression in the building and
construction industries. Recently, however, the China trade has shown
sins of recovery. This has had a beneficial effect un food prices which
are now almost back to their pre-May levels. Probably the most
si,nificant development recently, however, was the boginning pf a
restoration of confidence: after falling in May, June July and August
bank deposits have increased and the currency in circulation his
declined now for four successive months. The net amount of money
estimated to have been transferred out of the Colony over the year had
declined to 3165 million by the end of October, compared with the peak
of 1450 million at the end of July.' By the end of November the position
had further improved: a net amount of $140 million had been transferred
in,
29.
Generally, then, our economic and fin¬ncial situation had begun to take
a more favourable turn and it was highly unfortunate that a further
severe shock had to be absorbed as a rosult of the devaluation of the
round sterling by 14.%. The Colony's official reserves and those of the
banking systom are at prosent, largely ne a ecnsequence of our culonial
status, maintained wholly in sterling. Indeed, Hong Kong is one of the
world's largest holders of sterling, with between £350 million and £400
million held in that currency. Moreover, the greater part of the trading
and financial relationships of both the business world and the private
eitizon are based on sterling and wero, until now, predicated on the
assumption of a constant rate of exchange between sterling and the Hong
Kong dollar.
30. The devaluation of sterling imposed an immediate and unavoidablu
1098 on the Colony which any be estimated at £60 million. The Hong Kong
dollar was itself in no way under-valued in terms of international
exchanges and, as we rely almost wholly on imported supplius, internal
prices are peculiarly susceptible to changes in exchange rates. We were
faced, therefore, with the dilemn of either, on the one hand, following
storlin; down, thereby impcoin; an immediate increnso in costs (almost
to the full extent of devaluation) and a consequential reduction in our
hardly won standard of living; as well as, in the field of commerce, an
immediate, fairly severe and totally unnecessary worsoning of the torme
of trade; or, on the other
17..
CONFIDENTIAL
G.F. au
CONFIDENTIAL
7
hand, maintaining our existing parity in terms of gold and thereby
imposing a substantial immediate loss on the official reserves, on the
banks, and to all others with sterling assets and existing or future
Hong Kong dollar 1bilities.
31. Our final solution was to devalue to the extent of 5.7% only, thus
revaluing aminst sterling by 10%. It was hoped that the effects on costs
and on terms of trade of devaluation of this magnitude would not be too
severe. But it was also necessary, both because of the non-availability
in the sterling area system of my cover against storling riska and in
order to prevent any loss of confidence in the banking systom, to
provide banks with a substantial degree of compensation from official
funds for their consequential losses. The total cost to official
resurves, both directly and indirectly by reason of this compensation,
is estimated at £30 million. These reserves now lost had been earmarked
to help to meet the cost of the substantial programmes of social (and,
to lesser extent, economic) development which aro in train; and their
loss is likely to result in some curtailment, or at least substantial
postponement, of some of these plans. Our partial devaluation, will,
therefore, also affect the living standards of the people; although not
au directly or immediately as would have a full devaluation. Quite apart
from the actual effects, aterling devaluation has put a most powerful
political propaganda wanpon in the hands of the communists and the caly
undeniably true political propapanda wanpn they have. It is one they are
still brandishing vigorously
months after the event,
Conclusion
32. On the home front it appears that, while the communist effort is fer
from over and it is certain that their aim remains to reduce the Hun:
Kong Government to a satisfactory degree of subservience, nevertheless
thu nesault on us has probably moved to a non-violent phase, with the
communists concentrating their efforts on increasin, their local support
by trying to find popular ";rievanços to exploit, Obviously this new
tactic could be very dangerous but the communists have lost much ground
and it will take them time to regain even the logrue of public support
they had before Hay last year.
L
33. Hong Kong has weathered the test of this summer's events mainly
because the public as a whole, frot, highest to lowest, openly declarod
by word and deed that the Hong Kon Government had its over-wholmin,;
confidence and support in preference to the communist minority who
sought to force us to kowtow, foolings wore in turn reflected throughout
the Public Service, whose members
Those responded with outstandin loyalty and efficiency to the calls made
upon them. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the response of the
Police Force, who performed their duties with the highest efficiency and
firmness coupled with vizirable restreint. They became public heroes,
and were in turn sustained by public confidence in them,
34. The present change of front in the ccnfrentation thus mainly
derives, first, from the countering of every preceding move by the
combined determination of Government and people and, secondly, from
pressure from Peking; to restore the economic damage caused in China.
These are solid and continuin; reasons militatin; against a recurrence
of last summer's violont offensive aminst us, and give г130 to enutious
optimism for the immediate future.
35. The signs now apparent of some return towards less chaotic
conditions in China can be enutiously welcomed. Some observers believe
that the cultural revolution has probably failed and will soon be
abandoned; but it is equally possible that Chairman Kno hra ande no more
than a tactical retreat. are, however, many indications that Chou En Lad
and the 'moderntos' in Poking
There are for the moment mining the upper hand; and it is to be hoped
that this will bring about a roturn to more rational relations - ab ut
the future actions of a country which gives every appearance of having
Although any prodictions one through an attack of domentin are obviously
rash. A stablo China, more- over, will not necessarily prove any loss
dangerous than a China in chaos; one can only hope that it might.
CONFIDENTIAL
18..
Gr. H
CONFIDENTIAL
36.
- 8.
The economy, after weathering the storms of riots and work stoppages, is
still sufficiently robust to accept the adjustments required by
devaluation and we can at least express a cautious optimism that
economic confidenco
the Colony will continue to be maintained.
37.
Public morale is good except perhaps amongst the educated young, to whom
1997 is a real date and a time when they expect to be in the prime of
life. The events of last year have undoubtedly aroused or re-aroused in
many of them a moat anxious and understandable questioning of what the
future may hold for them here. On this they seek answers with increasing
urgency from their elders and from the Government, but they find no
satisfaction.
¡
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
G. M. THOMSON, M.F.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient, humble servant,
+
GOVERNOR.
CONFIDENTIAL
FD!|!.
CONFIDENTI AL
PHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE
TO
PEKING
TELNO 193
28 FEBRUARY 1968 (F.E.D.)
CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 193 OF 28 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO HONG KONG,
306)
C.O. TELEGRAM NUMBER 346 TO HONG KONG: PRISON VISITS.
AS SOON AS THE GOVERNOR OF HONG KONG HAS NOTIFIED YOU THAT HE HAS NO
OBJECTION, YOU SHOULD TAKE ACTION WITH THE CHINESE ON THE LINES OF C.O.
TELEGRAM NUMBER 347 TO HONG KONG.
SOSFA
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.O. F.E.D.
C.O. HONG KONG DEPT.
S.A.D.
NNNNN
IL
b
Not yet hard.
CONFIDENTIAL
10103
鸡市
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry No.
DEPARTMENT
FDY/1.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PRIORITY MARKINGS
* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s).
T
Top-Secret
i
Secret
Confidential
Immediate
Routine
Destriered
thickened
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
En Clair. Code
Cypher
Draft Telegram to:-
No.
PEKING
(Date)
And to:-
193
(Date).....
. --- . ➖➖➖
AN
app -------
CYPHER
[Security classification
if any
[ Privacy marking
any
[Codeword-if any]
Addressed to
telegram No.
And to
יח
on]
CONFIDENTIAL
1
Peking 19.3
(date)
28/2
र
2812 repeated for information to Hong Kong.
Immediate
Repeat/to HONG KONG
зна
Saving to:-
Distribution:-
DEPARTLENT AL
Copies to:-
Saving to
--[A]
Kanuumba k
0.0. telegram No.
зав
to Hong Kong: Prison
Visits.
As soon as the Governor of Hong Kong has
notified you that he has no objection, you should
take action with the Chinese on the lines of
C.C. telegram No.
to Hong Kong.
347
[B]
JM 20 46.
28
Departmental dist.
Coyalso on ED 1318188
CYPHER/CAT:
развит
IMMEDIATE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO
HONG KONG
TELNO 346
RELIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
29 FEB 1968
FD
Bob
ל ב
28 FEBRUARY 1968 (F.E.D.)
CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO 346 OF 28 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO PEKING,
(30)
YOUR TELEGRAM NO 2417 PRISON VISITO.
WE ACCEPT THE COURSE OF ACTION IN PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 6 OF YOUR TELEGRAM
UNDER REFERENCE SUBJECT TO TWO MODIFICATIONS:
(A) SUBSTITUTION IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF AN ADDITIONAL VISIT'' FOR
''A SPECIAL VISIT TO EACH INDIVIDUAL. (THIS WOULD ALSO INVOLVE THE
OMISSION OF THE WORDS AS A SPECIAL CONCESSION AND CONSEQUENTIAL
AMENDMENTS IN THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 1(A) OF OUR TELEGRAM 297
NO 324):.
L
(B) DELETION IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE WORDS AFTER AGREEMENT ON THE NUMBERS
IN PEKING''. SINCE WE ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO RESTRICTING THE
SCHEME TO BONA FIDE JOURNALISTS, WE DO NOT SEE HOW IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE
TO GET AGREEMENT ON NUMBERS IN PEKING BEFORE YOU HAVE
CONSIDERED LIST OF NAMES IN TIONS K-NG. WE A REE WITH YOU THAT WE MUST
NOT GIVE THE CHINESE IN PEKING THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO
ALLOW VISITS TO AN UNLIMITED NUMBER (PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER
REFERENCE) BUT WE WOULD HOPE THAT THIS IS
MET BY HAVING THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN PEKING STRESS THAT THE PEOPLE
CONCERNED MUST BE BONA FIDE JOURNALISTS,
2. YOUR PARAGRAPH 1.
THE FOREGOING TAKES CARE OF YOUR POINTS (111) AND (V). WE ENTIRELY
ACCEPT THAT YOUR POINTS (TI), (IV) AND (VI) ARE MATTERS FOR YOUR
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION IN THE LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES AS THEY DEVELOP.
3. YOUR PARAGRAPH 2.
WE SEE THE FORCE OF YOUR ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE RISKS OF SUBSTANTIVE
33) DISCUSSION IN HONG KONG. HOWEVER CONDITIONS (1) TO (IV) IN
PARAGRAPH 5 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO 212 WOULD NOW BE MADE IN PEKING UNDER
THE MODIFIED APPROACH IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE, AND YOU HAVE AGREED THAT
CONDITION (V) NEED NOT BE MADE SPECIFICALLY. THE ONLY POINTS NOW LEFT
OPEN, WHICH MIGHT HAVE TO BE HANDLED IN HONG KONG, ARE:
CONFIDENTIAL
/(A)
CONFIDENTIAL
(A) THE POSSIBILITY OF VISITS BY NONA ALONE. (IF THE CHINESE ASK SIR
DONALD HOPSON WHETHER VISITS BY NCNA ALONE ARE TO BE ALLOWED, HE COULD
AT THIS STAGE CONFINE HIMSELF TO SAYING THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS ARE THAT
AN NCNA REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE ALLOWED TO ACCOMPANY THE EMPLOYER IN EACH
CASE. IF THE CHINESE CONTINUE TO PRESS THIS POINT, WE WOULD THEN
CONSIDER WITH YOU AND DECIDE WHETHER IT WAS BETTER HANDLED IN PEKING OR
HONG KONG).:
(B) THE BONA FIDES OF NAMES ON THE CHINESE LIST ON THIS MUST IN THE
FINAL INSTANCE REST WITH YOU 4. YOUR PARAGRAPH 4.
-
AND A DECISION IN HONG KONG.
WE FULLY SHARE YOUR WISH TO MINIMISE THE PROPAGANDA OPPORTUNITIES FOR
THE CHINESE, AND WE HOPE THAT THE SUBSTITUTION PROPOSED IN PARAGRAPH
1(A) ABOVE HELPS TO MEET YOUR POINT.
5. AS THIS HAS BECOME SO INVOLVED, M.I.F.T. SETS OUT THE PLAN OF ACTION
FOR HOPSON IN TELEGRAM NO 324 REVISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS TELEGRAM.
HOPSON IS BEING INSTRUCTED TO APPROACH THE CHINESE AS SOON AS YOU HAVE
CONFIRMED THAT YOU HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE CHANGES.
CROSEC
297
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.O. F.E.D.
C.O. HONG KONG DEPT.
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ро
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
夢
10
ая
Registry No.
DEPARTMENT
FD1/1
FED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
-Top Secret
...Secret
Confidential
Pesericest Unclassified
PRIORITY MARKINGS
(Date).
Immediate
Priority> Roudne
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
En Chir? Gode Cypher
Draft Telegram to:-
HONG KONG No. BHb нь
(Date)
And to:-
[Sec
* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
Despatched
Security classification" -if any
[ Privacy any
Privacy marking
[Codeword-if any]
Addressed to
]
reach addressDC(1)..
28
ம
----------
GTM --------NAME-po
POTER
- Hong Kong
telegram No. 346.
And to...
P-TIPPL➖➖LL.
CONFIDENTIAL
➖➖➖ ➖ ➖..................➖➖JI-LILL
(date)
28/2
2812 repeated for information to
Immediate
Repeal to :----
PEKING |Q|
1/28/2
Saving to:-
Flay I
Distribution-
DEPARTMENTAL
Copies to:-
Saving to...
Your telegram No. 241 Prison Visits.
T
Pans Verk endapang pa
We accept the course of action in paragrapła 5
and 6 of your telegram under reference subject to
two modifications:
(a) Substitution in paragraph 5 of "an additional
visit" for "a special visit" to each individual.
(This would also involve the omission of the
amendments words "as a special concession" and cbnsequential
in the second sentence of paragraph 1(a) of
our telegram No. 324);
(b) Deletion in paragraph 6 of the words "after
agreement on the numbers in Peking".
Since
we attach importance to restricting the scheme
to bona fide journalists, we do not see how
it would be possible to get agreement on
numbers in Peking before you have considered
a list of names in Hong Kong.
We agree with
/you
2.
you that we must not give the Chinese in
Peking the impression that we are prepared
to allow visits to an unlimited number
(paragraph 3 of your telegram under reference)
but we would hope that this is met by having
the Chargé d'Affaires in Peking stress that
the people concerned must be bona fide
journalists.
Your paragraph 1
The foregoing takes care of your points (iii)
and (v). We entirely accept that your points (ii),
(iv) and (vi) are matters for your administrative
decision in the light of circumstances as they
develop.
3.
Your paragraph 2
We see the force of your arguments about the
risks of substantive discussion in Hong Kong.
However conditions (1) to (iv) in paragraph 5 of
your telegram No. 212 would now be made in Peking
under the modified approach in paragraph 1 above,
and you have agreed that condition (v) need not be
made specifically. The only points now left open,
which might have to be handled in Hong Kong, are:
(a) The possibility of visits by NCNA alone.
(If
the Chinese ask Sir Donald Hopson whether visits
by NCNA alone are to be allowed, he could at
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.