AVES No.31
¡ 12 MAR 1968
Fami
PRIORITY
CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NUMBER 302
TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
11 HARCH 1968
CONF1DGENTI AL
sent to
Dog-
ADVANCE COPY
Hd.. Hong Kong Hal FE Dapor
ADDRESSED CO TELNO 382 OF 17TH MARCH RFI PEKING.
YOUR TELEGRAM 427 ↑ PRISON VISITS.
IN PRINCIPLE, I AGREE THAT IF THE NONA TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN
RAISING THE QUESTION OF VISITS WITH US WE SHOULD GO AHEAD WITH
ARRANGEMENTS AS IF NOTHING HAD HAPPENED,
2.
ON THE WHOLE, HOWEVER, I WOULD PREFER NOT TO TAKE THE INITIAT-
I'VE JUST YET IN STIRRING UP NONA ABOUT THE MATTER. WE ARE JUST IN
THE NIDDLE OF ANOTHER INITIATIVE ABOUT PILN STARS AND THE ARGUMENT
OVER GIFT RICE CONTINUES. I THINK IT MAY BE BETTER NOT TO PRESS THE
CHINESE ON TOO MANY PROBLEMS SIMULTANEOUSLY. IF ALL GOES WELL.
HOWEVER, I WOULD HOPE THAT HE COULD IF DESIRED RAISE THE QUESTION
OF PRISON VISITS TOWARDS THE END OF THIS WEEK,
PO PLEASE PASS PRIORITY PEKING TELHO 96,
GOVERNOR
we agree.
* I home tow M, Carry we
mu
BENT AT 11/11132 MARCH
RECO AT 11/15915 MARCH
"}}
Re
Mr. En parliamo
NNNN
ZCZC EPB 686
YY CCC UKP
1310: ATROCITIES:
Mr. Deyson.
again in Rekring
HONG KONG MARCH 7. REUTER-THE NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY ACCUSED THE BRITISH
AUTHORITIES IN HONG KONG TODAY OF HAVING
PERPETRATED NEW ATROCITIES IN THEIR PERSECUTION OF PATRIOTIC MINESE
NATIONALS.
han this den not: sour heup
Jensan
313
gy has?
8!
3.
Mr Marsam
IN A HONG KONG REPORT. THE AGENCY ALLEGED THAT THE AUTHORITIES CALLED
OUT RIOT POLICE TO ATTACK A CROWD LAST TUESDAY AND UNREASONABLY
ARRESSTED EIGHT CHINESE FOLLOWING A DEMONSTRATION BY 200 MINI-BUS
DRIVERS.
CRIOTING ERUPTED IN THE INDUSTRIAL TOWNSHIP OF
KJUN TONG IN KOWLOON AFTER TWO POLICEMEN ORDERED A GROUP OF MINI-VAN
DRIVERS, WHO WERE TRYING TO PICK UP PASSENGERS AT 4 BUS STOP. TO MOVE
ON).
THE AGENCY SĄ IEMMZCZC EPB 680
YY CCC UKP
1310: ATROCITIES:
Alas.
HONG KONG MARCH 7. REUTER-THE NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY ACCUSED THE BRITISH
AUTHORITIES IN HONG KONG TODAY OF HAVING
PERPETRATED NEW ATROCITIES IN THEIR PERSECUTION OF PATRIOTIC CHINESE
NATIONALS.
the
IN A HONG KONG REPORT. THE AGENCY ALLEGED THAT THE AUTHORITIES CALLED
OUT RIOT POLICE TO ATTACK A CROWD LAST TUESDAY AND UNREASONABLY
ARRESSTED EIGHT CHINESE FOLLOWING A DEMONSTRATION BY 200 MINI-BUS
DRIVERS.
CRIOTING ERUPTED IN THE INDUSTRIAL TOWNSHIP OF
KJUN TONG IN KOWLOON AFTER TWO POLICEMEN ORDERED A GROUP OF MINI-VAN
DRIVERS, WHO WERE TRYING TO PICK UP PASSENGERS AT 4 BUS STOP. TO MOVE
ON).
THE AGENCY SAID THE MINI-BUS DRIVERS LODGED A PROTEST WITH THE
AUTHORITIES AND PRESENTED A THREE-POINT DEMAND FOR COMPENSATION AFTER A
DRIVER WAS ARRESTED BY TWO POLICEMEN WHO INTERFERED WITH HIS WORK AND
BEAT HIM UP.
MORE RGC/CM 1322
NNNN
ZCZC EPB 687
YY CCC UKP
1315: ATROCITIES 2 HONG KONG:
! RECEIVED IN ¦archives No.31
: 1 MAR 18
FDITI.
REJECTING OUT-OF-HAND THE JUST DEMANDS OF THE
DRIVERS. THE BARBAROUS BRITISH HONG KONG AUTHORITIES CALLED OUT ABOUT
100 'RIOT POLICE' AND INSTRUCTED THEM TO ATTACK
THE DRIVERS AND AN ASSEMBLED CROWD WITH TEAR GAS BOMBS,
BOMBS. BATONS AND SHIELDS, THE AGENCY SAID.
THE POLICE UNREASONABLY ARRESTED EIGHT PATRIOTIC CHINESE ON A CONCOCTED
CHARGE OF 'ILLEGAL ASSEMBLY'.
REUTER RGC/CH 1324
8 Rund
Ente
пре
(PD 1/1)
جك
(312)
CONFIDENTIAL,
FOREIGN OPPICE, S.V.1.
AG1
8/3
8 Karch, 1968.
308
Thank you for your letter HWB 13/7 of 28 February enclosing a copy of
the Governor of Hong Kong's despatch No. 239 reporting the principal
developments in the Colony sinos June last year.
2. We think that the report is admirable. I agree with you that printing
it with your reply should give the Governor any assurance he wanted that
Ministers are aware that, although the danger of violence has apparently
passed, the longer-term Chinese threat remains and we may expect local
communiste to work away to erode our position and try to create a
"Nadao- type" situation.
3. The account of the build-up of the communist campaign last year, the
degree and manner of support from the Chinese Central Government, and in
particular the way the incident of 8 July at Sha Tau Kok sparked off the
subsequent campaign of violence confirm our view that the confrontation
was an overspill of the Cultural Revolution in China which among other
things resulted in a weakening of the channel of control to local Hong
Kong communiste. But for the admirably firm and patient policy of the
Hong Kong Government, Peking might have been tempted or obliged to give
full support to the local attempt to disturb the status quo and
undermine authority.
We would not dissent from the Governor's conclusions in paragraph 35
about internal developments in China, but we doubt whether Kao and the
extremists would be allowed by the more moderate elements and by the
army to mount another campaign on the 1966/67 model, even if they wished
to do so. The present disturbances, which contime in some areas of
China, including Kwangtung Provinos, seen to be less violent than those
which took place during last year, though they do suggest that it may be
some considerable time before order and stability can be completely
restored. They are not, however, likely to influence Chinese policy
adversely from the Hong Kong point of view.
ра
(James kurray)
W. S. Carter, Beq., C.Y.O.,
Hong Kong Department,
Commonwealth Office.
CONFIDING LAL
COPY ALSION!-FC3/3
25+
(309)
Cypher/Cat A
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN ¡ARCHIVES No.31
311
- 8 MAR 1968-
FD1/1.
PRIORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Talno 168 7 March 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 168 of 7 March Repeated for
information to Hong Kong
My telegram No. 152: Prison visits.
If there has been no approach from NCNA (Hong Kong) to Political Adviser
by end of this week I suggest that Political Adviser might make contact
with them, reference my conversation with Ministry of Foreign Affairs on
1 March, enquiring when they are likely to be able to provide detailed
information on basis of which visits can be arranged. My reasons for
suggesting are:
(a) NCNA (Hong Kong) may through some misunderstanding be expecting
Political Adviser to approach them rather than vice versa;
(b) Or they may insist first move come from him;
(c) We shall get some idea of NCNA (Hong Kong's) attitude,
which may enable us to go back to Ministry of Foreign Affairs here to
iron out any difficulties.
Even if reason for NCNA's inaction is simply slowness of Chinese machine
I do not think that such an approach would do harm.
Foreign Office pass Priority Hong Kong 108.
Sir D. Hopson
[Repeated as requested]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.O. F.E.D.
C.0. Hong Kong Dept.
S.A.D.
314
CONFIDENTIAL
庶
новой
ape.
Su KK tu
312 to C.O.
"/3
·
■ +
Cher/Cat. A
LAST
REL.
309
NEXT
REF.
Copies also on F21318 (159) FD13/2
OP JOB10
CONFIDENTIAL
Pa
IMMEDIATE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 153
CONFIDENTIAL
1 March, 1968
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.3!
- 1 MAR 1968
FD!!!
Вос
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 153 of 1 March, Repeated for
information to Hong Kong.
My immediately preceding telegram.
After discussing prison visits I raised with Hsueh our porposal to swap
Hsuch P'ing for Grey. I reminded him that this proposal had now been
made on an official basis and asked if he had had any reply for me. He
said he had noted our proposal, but today he had no news.
F.O. pass immediate Hong Kong 100.
Sir D. Hopson
[Repeated as requested]
ADVANCE COPIES SENT
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.0.
F.E.D.
Consular Dept.
P.C.D.
D.D. & P.U.S.D.
J.I.R.D.
News Dept.
D.S.A.0. Personnel Degt.
0.0.
H.K.D.
News Dept.
O.L.A.
CONFIDENTIAL
FOREIGN OFFICE
TC
RECEIVED IN {ARCHIVES No.3t
-
4 MAR 1968
(.. (309
сору
Cypher/Cat A
also on FC 3/3 (250) Fc
CONFIDENTI AL
IMMEDIATE PERKING
TO
no 152
1 March 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
P
همه
FDI
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 152 of 1 March, repeated for
information to Hong Kong.
Your telegram No. 193: Prison Visits.
I failed to obtain an interview with Mr. Hsueh, Deputy Chinese Minister
Western Europe yesterday afternoon but saw him this morning when I spoke
according to instructions in your telegram No. 347 to Hong Kong.
2. In reply Hsueh at first complained that original Chinese request had
been made for Spring Festival and expressed dissatisfaction at delay. He
then said that he agreed that detailed arrangements for visits should be
made between New China News Agency and Political Adviser in Hong Kong.
Only mattersof principle could be discussed in Peking. In reply to my
question as to how many "patriotic journalists" would be involved he
said he did not (repeat not) know but this would be no problem. He asked
me to clarify our proposal for visits to "patriotic journalists". I had
said that visits could be made either by employer plus one other
official of the newspaper or by employer and an official of New China
News Agency. Were arrangements mainly for NCNA or for employer? I
side-stepped this question by repeating that visits could be carried out
either by employer plus another official of newspaper or by employer
plus an NCNA representative, whichever the Chinese preferred. Hsuch then
asked whether this meant two visitors for each prisoner and I confirmed
that this was 30.
3. He went on to say that Bank of China in Hong Kong had reported when
making visit to some of their employees in prison they had met with
"cruel treatment and obstruction". When I asked hi to explain this he
said that Bank officials had brought some fruit and candies with them
but were not allowed to hand them over to the prisonera. The prison
officials said that they would store them until prisoners' release.
Obviously fruit would go bad. In any case, the prisoners diet was
inadequate and so was their clothing. The Bank officials had also
brought some extra clothing for prisoners, but prison officials had once
more said that this could only be stored until prisoners' release. I
remonstrated at this and said that I knew both diet and clothing were
adequate in Hong Kong prisons, most prisoners gained weight and so on.
Hsuch then said he hoped when NONA officials made their visits they
would not meet with similar badtreatment and unreasonable obstruction. I
replied naturally rules of the prison must be observed.
4. No more was said on this subject but from what Hsuch said I think we
may assume NCNA will now approach Political Adviser in Hong Kong to
arrange visits. I stressed to Hsueh that "journalists"
CONFIDENTIAL
/must
CONFIDENTI AL
-
2-
must be bona fide and his remark that number should be no prob is
encouraging. I understand prison regulations must be observed but I hope
it will be possible to introduce some flexibility in the matter of
parcels as this will persumably determine what we are allowed to take to
Grey if we are accorded a visit.
5. I should be grateful if Hong Kong would keep us urgently informed of
further developments.
Foreign Office pass Immediate Hong Kong 99.
Sir D. Hopson
[Repeated as requested)
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.O. F.B.D.
C.O. H.K.D.
S.A.D.
NNNNN
CONFIDENTI AL
ADVANCE COPIES SENT
1
+
י
1
1
•
HB 13/7
Dear James,
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
- 4 MAR 1968
FDI/1.
Commonwealth Office
SW.1
28 February, 1968
Pl. liten have draft comments
W 3308
(308)
308
Entel &
Submit with
pps soon.
मू
11/3
M29
Mar Fab.
Meason. Dings to Mr. Carver
I am enclosing a copy of despatch No.239 of 13 February from the
Governor of Hong Kong reporting on the principal develoments in the
Colony since June, 1967. We are arranging
for the despatch to be printed.
We shall be glad to know if you have any comments for inclusion in our
reply to the Governor. Our only comments
at this stage are to observe that the despatch makes (somewhat
predictably) rather a meal of devaluation and that paragraph 27 contains
some information about the water supplies
from China which is news to us.
Sea
473
FD7/1
You spoke to me about your recent discussion with the Governor in Hong
Kong and his fear that Ministers in charge of departments other than our
own might think that the danger was past in Hong Kong. You suggested
that he was looking for some assurance on this point. Our reply to this
despatch is the peg on which we could hang that assurance and
circulation of the two despatches in printed form will ensure wide
currency
in Whitehall.
J. Hurray, Esq., CKO.,
Far Eastern Department, Poreign Office.
Yours
Bunny
(.s. Carter)
un
#E:
312
EX
P.a. Su 312
CONFIDENTIAL
Summary
FD1/1 (30B
西川
1. The communists are still continuing their campaign of opposition to
the
Government though the phase of violence now appears to be over.
2.
In June the removal by the Administration of inflammatory posters caused
rous incidents and stoppages of work.
3. The communists declared a 'eneral strike' on the 24th June.
This was
entirely a political manoeuvre and did not arise from industrial
disputes.
It had some success particularly among the transport companies but it
did
not succeed in causing serious disruption.
4. The general strike' was followed by a four-day 'food stoppage' at the
and of June and a boycott of the port on 17th July. No major disruptions
resulted from either.
Five
5. On 8th July a mob attacked a Police post near the border with China.
Police officers were killed and eleven injured. The post was relieved by
army
units. Encouraged by this incident, which was interpreted as military
support
for confrontation by the C.P.G. (which it was not) the communists staged
widespread demonstrations and violence in the streets of Victoria and
Kowloon.
From the 12th July onwards the Police mounted successive raids on
communist centres, seizing stocks of weapons and subversive literature
and
disorganising communist leadership. As a result communist action
noticeably
decreased and was virtually confined to the planting of bombs. On
Christmas
Day bomb attacks also ceased.
6.
7. Children from communist schools in the Colony were increasingly
employed
in confrontation. A school that was being used as a centre for
manufacturing
bombe was closed in November.
8. There was a severe drought during the summer. Water up; lied from
China
by agreement was turned on at the due date (1st October) but there was a
possibility that it might be cut off. Given average rainfall the
Colony's
own resources are sufficient to continue to provide an adequate, though
rationed, supply.
9. The C.P.G. continued to issue protests following confrontation
incidents.
In August the British Embassy was sacked in retaliation for the arrest
in
Hong Kong of N.C.N.A. reporters and the suppression of pro-communist
newspapers.
It was, however, increasingly plain that the C.P.G. was not prepared to
intervene directly in Hong Kong.
/2 ..
CONFIDENTIAL
G.F. 1994
CONFIDENTIAL
10. Conditions in many areas of China deteriorated during the summer.
Because of the resulting disruption of communications the import into
the
Colony of foodstuffs from China was severely affected between July and
ember
Comparative order has been restored in China by the Army though
the disorders in Kwangtung delayed the opening of the Canton Fair by one
month.
11. There is evidence that the influence of Chou En Lai and the
moderates
in Peking is increasing.
12. The Colony's economy has remained unimpaired.
Bank deposits increased
in each of the last four months of the year, and the value of exports
rose
by 16.9% over 1966. Imports on the other hand, recorded a slower growth
rate
of 3.5%. The effects of the devaluation of sterling; and the revaluation
of
the Hong Kong dollar, however, were severe.
13. The communist effort seems to have moved from violence to attempts
to
increase support by finding popular grievances to exploit. This could be
potentially dangerous, but the communists have much leaway to make up.
14.
There is reason to hope that confidence in the Colony will be
maintained.
Public morale is good, but educated young people in particular are
antiers
about their future.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Colonial Secretariat File: SCR 1/4841/55
DESP: 239
19FEB1968
ta
DIVISJOIL
FDHI
GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
HONG KONG,
13 February, 1968.
w.308
DUPLICATE
Sir,
I have the honour in this dispatch to attempt a review of the principal
developments that have taken place in Hong Kong since my last periodic
dispatch dated 23rd June, 1967.
山西小
2.
・FDI/l (157)
Events continued to be dominated by the communist confrontation which at
the time of writing is still with us, although the phase of general
violence, bombing and stoppages of work appears for the moment to be
over. Although they have had little or no real encouragement from Peking
and have succeeded in rousing the overwhelming majority of the people
against them, the communists, depleted as they are, have by no means
abandoned their campaim of opposition to the Government.
H
3. My last despatch took events up to 4th June, 1967; but perhaps I may
follow popular precedents by first providin; a brief recapitulation of
earlier events. The first wave of protests and token stoppages of work
in May was organised by the communists as a show of strength. It was
followed, in June, by a more or less spontaneous outbreak of stoppages
set off by the 'poster war*. On 1st June the law relating to the display
of inflammatory posters was strengthened by emergency regulations and
action was taken to remove the extensive crop that had appeared on
Government buildings, public vehicles and elsewhere. In the doctrine of
the cultural revolution strect posters are regarded as the visible
expression of the thought of the omnipotent 'masses' and must not be
tampered with. On this issue communist employees of the Star Ferry Co,
stopped work. A minority of the workers at the Tai Koo Dockyard and
Engineering Co, also downed tools and surrounded and detained the
General Manager and two senior European staff members for several hours.
Employeus of the Government Mechancial Workshops in Kowloon and of the
Hong Kon; and China Gas Co. armed themselves with iron bars and other
weapons, barricaded themselves in the buildings, and had to be forcibly
evicted by the Police. There were also similar stoppages of work at the
Marine Departmont and Water-
works.
4. In mid June it became apparent that the Communists would risk
antagonising the public by a major disruption of the life of the
community, and what was called a 'general strike' was proclaimed for
24th June. This decision no doubt reflected the views of the more
extreme communist faction, encouraged by the widespread reaction to the
removal of posters as well as by a commentary in the Peoples Daily of
the 10th June which advocated support by "workers, peasants, the
People's Liberation Army and the 'revolutionary masses1 in China for the
struggle in Hong Kong".
5. On the oVO of the proposed stoppage, communist morale must have been
shaken by an incident that occurred in Kowloon. After a small party of
Police were viciously attacked by a ring of men who subsequently
retreated into the premises of the Plastic Workers General Union, strong
Police reinforcemente were called up who, after meeting fierce
resistance and suffering some casualtios, forced an entry into the
buildin; and arrested over fifty people, This drastically brought home
the fact that union promises wore not, as the communists had supposed,
immune from attack; and the fact that four of those engaged in the fight
died from the injuries that they had sustained aust have had a
deprossing effect on communist spirits.
6.
Nevertheless, the stoppates of work began as schedulod, her ›lded by a
suitable fanfare from the People's Daily, and supported by the promise
of
CONFIDENTIAI
/2...
3.7. #!
CONFIDENTIAL
2
lavish payments by the communist unions, whose funds had been augmented
by n contribution of $10 million from the All China Federation of Trade
Unions. Despite wide-spread intimidation the answer to the strike call
was patchy
ANN
the effect of the stoppages limited. Those companies or organisations th
had boen affected by stoppages arising from the display of posters had
refused to re-engage or had dismissed the men responsible and they had
no further trouble. The transport companies had the most absentees, but
they managed to keep some services going; and the public contrived, with
their usual resilience, to carry on much as usual. Some delays occurred
in the working of ships because of intimidation of the crews of tus and
lighters but Hon Kong still continued to provide one of the fastest
turn-round of ships in the world, The utility companies were fully able
to operate effectively, while industry was barely affected.
7.
These stoppages were sheer political manoeuvres and bore no relation to
legal strikes arising from industrial disputes. Accordingly, from the
early days of the first stoppages Government servants and the employees
of many private companies had been warned that if they took part they
would bo liable to disciplinary action, Emergency Regulations to protect
workers against intimidation were promulgated. he a result of these
measures loyal and neutral employces quickly returned to work,
8. As a footnote to these events, the workers who wore dismissed for
walkin; out' are still claiming Istrike pay' from their unions and it is
believed that by the end of the year the communists had paid out more
than 320 million in this why. By then communist unions were donandin;
that the Government should find employment for 10,000 men whom they
alloged wore unemployed or semi-cmployed. In fact it is thought that the
great majority of the mon concerned have since found other jobs, There
are 4,000 vacancies in industry and another 1,000 vacancies in
non-industrial occupations, which indicates clearly that anyone
genuinely seeking work has a good chance of finding it.
9. & further attempt to disrupt life in Hong Kong took the form of a
four day food stoppage, At the end of June local communist importers
refused to handle foodstuffs (mainly pigs and vegetables) arriving from
China, though by an apparent lack of co-ordination some supplies
continued to arrive at the border, There was a scarcity in Hong Kong and
prices rose temporarily, but the public was not seriously affected.
10. By the beginning of July the iden of a general strike had been
treitly abandoned but efforts to paralyse the port persisted for many
weeks. A boycott was called on 17th July combined with a stoppa, o of
work by seen. In spite of widespread intimidation and strenuous efforts
by the communist Sonmen's Union to make the stoppage effective, a steady
flow of applicants for new berths continued; and although some men
walked off ships arriving in the port they were replaced without
difficulty. The boycott did have n sort of sour success in that Chinese
fargoes awaiting transhipment in the port were hold back by communist
shipping agents, to nobody's real disadvantage Uxcept the owners.
Foodstuffs continued to bo brought in by river boats, although no cargo
arrived from China in ocean-going ships. But the communists' claim that
the port was at a standstill was not only quite without foundation but
could be observed to be nonsensical by everyone in Hong Kong. During the
period from Hay to December the tonnage of cargo discharged at the port
was only 6% lower, and the tonnage of cargo loaded (which included
Chinese transhipmont cargoes) 35% lower, than the figures for the same
period in the previous year,
11.
The period of relative calm that followed the collapse of the *general
strike" was ended by an incident that took place at Sha Tau Kok on 8th
July. ShЯ Tau Kok is a village that lies astride the land frontier
CONFIDENTIAL
13..
C.F. 141
CONFIDENTIAL
3
On
with China; it is a sensitive area at the best of times; and, since
confrontation began, it has been the scene of a number of incidents. 8th
July, a mob which included members of the local Chinese militia and
which was armed not only with sticks and stones, but also with rifles
and li machine guns, attacked the Police post. For five hours the Police
1
convingent in the rost, as well as another Police company in the near-by
Rural Committee Office, were pinned down by machine gun fire.
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.