fco-21-194-internal-political-situation-in-hong-kong-disturbances-and-communist-agitation — Page 16

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this stage confine himself to saying that his

instructions are that an NCNA representative

will be allowed to accompany the employer in

each case. If the Chinese continue to press

this point, we would then consider with you

and decide whether it was better handled in

Bookieef Hans, Hong.);

/(b)

Flag F

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

DA. 32855 EN GENNA

[8]

Flowey I

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) The bona fides of names on the Chinese list -

4.

and a decision on this must in the final

instance rest with you in Hong Kong -

Your paragraph 4

We fully share your wish to minimise the

propaganda opportunities for the Chinese, and

we hope that the substitution proposed in

paragraph 1(a) above helps to meet your point.

5.

As this has become so involved, m.i.f.t.

sets out the plan of action for Hopson in

telegram No. 324 revised in accordance with this

telegram. Hopson is being instructed to approach

the Chinese as soon as you have confirmed that

you have no objections to the changes.

Висока.

28

Departmental dist

CONFIDENTIAL

Mon to

ape

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Copies also on F413/8 (157 and FD 13/882

Enter.

305

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31)

28 FEB 1968

FDI

-

Kr. Samuel

ACCESS TO COLUNIST PRISONERS IN HONG KONG AND

TC MR. GREY

Problem

The Governor bas suggested some modifications to our

proposals about how the matter of access to prisoners should

be handled in Hong Kong and Peking; but he also takes the

opportunity to repeat his warning that the concessions and

arrangements may run us into dangerous repercussions in Hong

Kong. His suggestions involve a rather more precise statement

in Peking of the conditions under which we are prepared to

allow visits to prisoners in Hong Kong, but they do not radically

alter the substance of our approach. The Chargé d'Affaires in

Peking has proposed one modification

and ourselves

-

-

acceptable to the Governor

and has pressed for early instructions. The crux

of the matter remains whether the importance we attach to

obtaining access to Mr. Grey justifies the risks involved in

the concessions we would be making to the Chinese over access

to prisoners in Hong Kong.

Recommendation

2.

I recommend that

(a) we accept the Governor's proposed modifications,

particularly since they seem to go some way towards

reducing the risks in Hong Kong to which he has

drawn attention;

(b) subject to the Governor's final concurrence, we now

instruct Sir Donald Hopson to take action with the

CONFIDENTIAL

/Chinese.

CONFIDENTIAL

2.

Flag M FC13/8 (156

Flags H, I,

J

296

2297

304

Flag K

301

Chinese.

I attach draft telegrams to Hong Kong and Feking. Commonwealth

Office have already concurred.

Background and Argument

3.

The background is set out in my submission of 22 February.

Our proposals, on which the Governor has now commented, are

in C.0. telegrams 323, 324 and 325 to Hong Kong.

4. The Governor has from the start been most reluctant to

allow N.C.N.A. access to non-N.C.N.A. journalists in prison.

He has, however, already accepted (as he acknowledges in

paragraph 1 of his telegram No. 241) that access to Mr. Grey

is a compelling reason for special treatment of the latter

category. The points at issue in telegram No. 241 are therefore

not of principle (though he takes the occasion to remind us

strongly that he conceded the issue of principle only reluctantly),

but a matter of tactics. The Governor has from the outset been

anxious that we should spell out in detail to the Chinese in

Peking the conditions under which we were prepared to allow

visits. His concern was that if we did not do so and there

were subsequently difficulties over detail in Hong Kong, we

would be charged by the Chinese with bad faith. Sir Donald

Hopson has thought that detailed points were better dealt with

Flag G (299) in Hong Kong (paragraph of Peking telegram No. 133). Pre-

Flag J

304

sumably he has been concerned lest the whole exercise might

founder on an argument over detail in Peking. For reasons set

out in paragraph 3 of Commonwealth Office telegram No. 325,

the Commonwealth Office and ourselves decided on balance that

/it

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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Flag_L

300

it would be better that discussion of detailed arrangements

should take place in Hong Kong. However the arguments advanced

in paragraph 2 of Hong Kong telegram No. 241 about the risks

of substantive discussion in Hong Kong are impressive. I

think therefore that we should be prepared to meet the Governor

over this; in particular I think he is right in stressing that

we should avoid entering into any commitment with the Chinese

about more than a single visit to each prisoner until we have

achieved the quid pro quo in respect of Mr. Grey.

5. The Governor's proposals meet the only point of substance

which Sir D. Hopson raised (in Peking telegram No. 147) on

our original proposals. I sent a personal message to Sir D.

Hopson that we would get instructions to him as soon as possible,

but that they could not arrive in time for action on 27 February.

6. The risks which the proposed concessions and arrangements

involve are discussed in paragraph 9 of my submission of

22 February, to which I have nothing to add. In view of the

importance of obtaining access to Kr. Grey, I think it is right to
accept them. As I see it, the purpose of the Governor in

his latest telegram has not been to call in question the decision

that the of principle, but to remind us and Sir D. Hopson

difficulties he has been making are not merely obstructiveness

on his part.

Copies to:

Sir D. Allen

Mr. Carter

-

June вить гламу

(James Kurray)

27 February, 1968

Incuased with To Rodgers who appurzae Інстал draft Abs.

CONFIDENTIAL

Вязать

SFB.

the

Copier also on

Fer312 153 FD131800

pa

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO HONG KONG

CYPHER/CAT, A

RIORITY

TELNO. 325

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.31

28 FEB 1968

西小

23 FEBRUARY 1968 (H.K.D. & F.D.)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO GOVERNOR HONG KONG TEL NO 325 OF 23/2 REPEATED FOR

INFORMATION TO PEKING,

FOLLOWING FROM GALSWORTHY.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 234: PRISON VISITS.

YOUR TELEGRAM WAS RECEIVED AFTER OUR TELEGRAMS NOS 323 AND 324

HAD BEEN APPROVED.

2. WE AND FOREIGN OFFICE FULLY ACCEPT POINT IN LAST SENTENCE OF
PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. YOU WILL SEE THAT THIS IS
REFLECTED IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF OUR TELEGRAM NO 323.

3. WE REALISE THAT YOU WOULD PREFER THAT NOTIFICATION OF CONDITIONS (1)
TO (V) SHOULD FIRST BE MADE TO CHINESE IN PEKING (PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR
TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE). WE AND FOREIGN OFFICE HOWEVER STILL FEEL ON
BALANCE THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER THAT THE DISCUSSION OF DETAILED
ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN HONG KONG. WE RECOGNISE THAT WHEREVER
THE NOTIFICATION IS MADE THERE IS RISK OF FURTHER ARGUMENT ABOUT THE
CONDITIONS, AND ALSO OF CONFUSION BY THE CHINESE IN TRANSMISSION BETWEEN
PEKING AND N CNA. BUT OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT ON THE WHOLE THE BEST
CHANCE OF SETTLING THIS ASPECT OF THE MATTER LIES IN DIRECT EXCHANGES
WITH N CNA IN HONG KONG, WE TAKE POINT IN LAST SENTENCE OF YOUR
PARAGRAPH 3. WE SUGGEST THAT HOPSON SHOULD ADD (PARAGRAPH 1(A) OF OUR
TELEGRAM NO 324) THAT THE SPECIAL VISITS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO
SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT ON ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS BETWEEN THE POLITICAL
ADVISER AND N CNA. A PHRASE OF THIS SORT WOULD GIVE SOME PROTECTION
AGAINST CHARGES OF BAD FAITH IF THE CHINESE PRODUCED A LIST OF SUCH
LENGTH THAT IT COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED IN TOTO AND THE WHOLE ARRANGEMENT
BROKE DOWN IN CONSEQUENCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

14.

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 325 TO HONG KONG

4.

2.

YOUR PARAGRAPH 4. WOULD WE NECESSARILY WANT TO REFER AT THIS

STAGE TO A SINGLE VISIT? CLEARLY IT WOULD HAVE TO BE UNDERSTOOD

THAT THERE COULD ONLY BE ONE SET OF CHINESE VISITS IN EXCHANGE

FOR ONE VISIT TO GREY. BUT IF WE ACHIEVE A VISIT TO GREY ON THE BASIS
NOW SUGGESTED, WE MIGHT WELL WANT TO TRY TO REPEAT THE PATTERN

ON A FUTURE OCCASION OR OCCASIONS. WE FEEL THEREFORE THAT IN

ENDEAVOURING TO MOUNT THIS OPERATION WE SHOULD USE LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD
IMPLY NEITHER THAT WE WERE THINKING PURELY AND SIMPLY IN TERMS OF A ONCE
FOR ALL OPERATION, NOR THAT WE WERE INTENDING IT NECESSARILY TO BE A
PRECURSOR OF OTHERS TO FOLLOW.

5. YOUR PARAGRAPH 5. WE THINK THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY FOR THE VISITS
ALL TO TAKE PLACE WITHIN A REASONABLY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, SINCE THE
CHINESE MAY REFUSE ACCESS TO GREY UNTIL THE VISITS HAVE ALL BEEN MADE OR
AT ANY RATE ARRANGED. WE FEEL THAT YOUR POINT SHOULD NOT BE MADE TO THE
CHINESE UNTIL WE KNOW WHETHER OR NOT THE NUMBERS INVOLVED MAKE SPACING A
NECESSARY STIPULATION.

CROSEC

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

C.0.

H.K.D.

F.0. F.E.D.

SSSSS

CONFIDENTIAL

copies also on

Fe-13/8 (154)

CYPHER/CAT A

+ FD 13 1322 R.

CONSIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE HONG KONG TO COMMONWNAUTH OFFICE

30

TELEGRAM NUMBER 212

FIDENTIAL

19 FEBRUARY 1968

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

28 FEB 1968

ADDRESSED CO TELNO 212 OF 19 FEBRUARY RFI PEKING.

FDI/I

PEKING TELEGRAM TO FO 129: PRISONERS.

IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HE TO TRY TO CLARIFY JUST WHAT IT IS

I AM BEING ASKED TO CONCEDE FOR GREY'S SAKE.

2. THIS DOES NOT APPEAR TO ME TO BE AN ARGUMENT ABOUT THE

GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF VISITING BUT ABOUT CA) WHAT IS OR IS NOT

A ''FORMAL'' VISIT SEMICOLON AND (B) TO HOW MANY PEOPLE ''FORMAL''

VISITS CAN BE MADE.

3. THE RULES ABOUT VISITING WERE SUMMARISED IN PARAGRAPH 2(A) OF MY
TELEGRAM 1908 OF 23RD DECEMBER. THIS TELEGRAM PERHAPS ERRS IN NOT MAKING
IT CLEAR HOW LIBERALLY THE RULES ARE NORMALLY

INTERPRETED. IN DETAIL:

(A) ALL PRISONERS ARE, OR CAN BE, VISITED REGULARLY ONCE A MONTH. MORE
OR LESS ANYBODY WITHIN THE CATEGORY OF RELATIVES AND FRIENDS CAN BE LET
IN TO SEE THEM ON THESE VISITS PROVIDED THEY DECLARE WHO THEY ARE, WHICH
IS A SIMPLE SECURITY PRECAUTION ON THE ONE HAND AND A PROTECTION FOR THE
PRISONER ON THE OTHER. THE PRISONER MUST ALSO AGREE TO SEE THEM
SEMICOLON OBVIOUSLY PRISONERS CANNOT BE FORCED TO SEE PEOPLE THEY DON'T
WANT TO SEE. (B) EXTRA VISITS TO INDIVIDUAL PRISONERS CAN BE APPROVED
FOR REASONABLE CAUSE AT THE PRISONER'S REQUEST. AGAIN, ANYBODY WANTING
TO SEE A PRISONER FOR ANY SPECIAL REASONS IS OF COURSE FREE TO ASK TO
VISIT HIM SEMICOLON IF THE REASONS ARE COMPELLING, THE VISIT CAN BE
ALLOWED AGAIN SUBJECT TO THE PRISONER'S

=

AGREEMENT. A PARTICULARLY RELEVANT EXAMPLE IS THAT AN EMPLOYER IS
USUALLY GRANTED ONE VISIT TO AN EMPLOYEE. THUS, ON 14 FEBRUARY WHEN THE
MANAGER OF THE COMMUNIST YIEN YIEH COMMERCIAL BANK ASKED TO SEE SIX
EMPLOYEES HE WAS ALLOWED CACCOMPANIED BY TWO OTHERS FROM THE BANKS ONE
VISIT TO EACH OF THEM (UNDERLINE NEXT WORD) INDIVID- UALLY.

CONFIDENTIAL

/(u) TO

+

CONFIDENTIAL

HONG KONG TElbbrük NO. 212 TU COMMUNALAIHH OFFICE

2

(C) TO COMPLETE THE BACKGROUND, OR RULES GIVE ANY PRISCI

RIGHT OF ADESS TO HIS CONSULAR REPRESENTATIVE AT ANY TIME:

BUT THIS A COURSE REr'ano Tu a FORMAL REPRESENTATIVE.

THE QUESTION 18 mislila akdawunkinfo run THIS "FORMAL"

VISITS REQUESTED BY THE CHINESE CAK BE MADE "ITHIN THIS FRAMBJURA

OF THE NONKAL VISITING PATTERN GET OUT ABOVE. I mm NUT AT Alda

CLEAN "ARMISHE CHINESE INTEND THE WORD "ru than" Tu kre: DELİ-

COLON BUT TRUE QÜR PULT of view THÊue and TWO POINTS THAT IT is

ESSENTIm To Avoid coNUMDİNG:

L

(A) ANY ADLIšsium or a ruRNAL RIGHT or REPRESENTATIVES OF COILUNIST
URGanISATIONS TO VISIT FRISCHERS, PARTICULARLY WIDE AND

ILL-DEFINED CATEGORIES or PhiSukERS ON GROUPS OF FRISONERS

TOGETHER SEMICOLON AND

(B) THE IMPLIED ADMISSION or Suke PURE OF QUASI-CONSULAR STATUS

FÜR NGA A

ALAHOUGH WE MAY HAVE USED & F u URGAND AS CHANNELS FOR COMUNICATION FROM
TIME TO Tike, I Stila PEEL HE NEED TU DE

VERY CAREFUL IN THE LANGTERM İNTEREST OF HONG KONG ABOUT CONCEDING

QUASI-CONSULAR STATUS TO THEM. THE CONCESSION THẬT WE HAVE ALREADY

kavĒ, UF ukaoTlm Að a NA VISIT TO NOMA'S OWN EMPLOYEES

CAN BE JUSTIFIED UNDER OUR EXISTING RULES.

5.

ON RECONSIDERING THE LATIÊM NOW, IT DEELS TU ME THAT IT MIGHT

BE POSSIBLE FOR US TU wand a hún raUPUSAL TO THE CHINESE THAT WOULD

GU SULE MAI TorniDS KhelING THEIR REQUEST "ITHOUT CONCEDING EITHER

OF THE LU PRIVIPLES ABOVE. 1 #OULD SUgvEST TELLING THEM THAT IN

THINKING FURTHER ABOUT BILIK REQUEST PUR VISITS TU JOURNALISTS
(Pakaurach 1(A) or Pining Indobrak 84) IT OCCURRED TO US THAT THERE

MIGHT HÄVE DEEN A MISUNDERSTmulaG. TWO POINTS WERE NUT CLEAN TỤ

US:-

(1) WHAT THEY MEAST BY " 'Furkal' viSIT AND

(11) TU FugvuSELY "HIGH INDIVIDUALS THEY "JSHED THE VISITS TO BE

PAID.

WE WERE ALWAYS READY TUO APILY QUR MULES FUR PRISON VISITS IN A

REASONABLE MÄNNER. Ir dieY WOULD SUPPLY US WITH THE NAMES OF THE

ADDITIONAL JOURNALISTS [?r. OMITED] WESTION, HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO
CONSIDER PLAKUSTING SINGLE VIŠTIS TO BÁCH OF THEM

INDIVIDUALLY BY :IS EMPLOYER AND/UR A RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL OF THE

ORGANISATION REPLOYING HIM, SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:-

THE PRISONER LUST "UT UBJEJT,

(11) EACH VISIT MUST BE TO A PiiSuned iNDIVIDUALLY,

CONFIDENTLÁL

/(111)THE

CONFIDENTIAL

HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 212 Tu COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

-3-

1) THE NUMBER OF VISITORS TO EACH PRISONER AT ANY ONE TIME MUST

BREASONABLY RESTRICTED, 1.E. TO TWO OR THREE VISITORS.

(17) THE TIMING MUST BE CONVENIENT TO THE PRISON AUTHORITIES.

(7) VISITS SHOULD NOT NORMALLY LAST MORE THAN 15 MINUTES EXCEPT WITH

GOOD REASON (THIS LIMIT IS APPLIED GENERALLY TO PRISON VISITS IN THE

INTERESTS OF VISITORS SINCE INTERVEWING FACILITIES ARE NOT

UNLIMITED AND LONGER VISITS WOULD OFTEN MEAN VISITORS WAITING LONGER)

6. VISITS ON THES BASIS (WHICH BIN CHARGE COULD MAKE OUT WERE RATHER

SPECIAL CONDITIONS IF THIS WOULD HELP) WOULD NOT BE AN EMBARRASSMENT.

THEY WOULD ALLOW 'PATRIOTIC JOURNALISTS' TO BE VISITED BY THE

ECITORS OR MANAGERS OF THEIR PAPERS COR SOMEONE SIMILAR) BUT NOT BY

THE N.C.N.A. PER SE. IF HOWEVER THE CHINESE MAINTAIN THAT 'FORMAL'

VISITS MEAN SOMETHING MORE, I SHOULD HAVE TO RECONSIDER WHEN THEIR

EXTRA REQUIREMENTS WERE KNOWN.

7. ON THE OTHER HAND IF, BEFORE MAKING AN APPROACH, H.M. CHARGE WOULD

VISH ANY FURTHER CLARIFICATION, OR ANY MODIFICATIONS WITHIN THIS

FRAMEWORK, I WOULD OF COURSE BE GLAD TO TRY TO MEET HIM.

POSSIBILITIES ARE :-

CA) TO HINT THAT AN N.C.N.A. OFFICIAL COULD ACCOMPANY THE EMPLOYER

AND

(B) TO ARRANGE THAT INTERVIEWS TAKE PLACE IN THE ROOM WHERE LAWYERS

SEE PRISONER CLIENTS, WHICH IS SOMEWHAT MORE COMFORTABLE THAN THE

NORMAL ARRANGEMENTS AND MIGHT BE THOUGHT MORE 'FORMAL

I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE IT CLEAR HOVEVER THAT I WOULD PREFER NOT TO

MAKE THESE CONCESSIONS WHICH WOULD RATHER TOO GREATLY DISTINGUISH

THESE PEOPLE FROM ORDINARY PRISONERS AND I WOULD WISH TO CONSIDER

BEFORE FINALLY AGREEING.

8. THE OPPORTUNITY MIGHT ALSO BE TAKEN TO ENQUIRE FURTHER ABOUT THE

PROPOSED HSUEH PING/GREY EXCHANGE.

F& PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE PEKING. AS MYTEL 69.

SIR D. TRENCH

(KEPETITION TO PEKING,

KËFERHED FÜR DEPARTMENTAL DELISION]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION G.. H.A. DEPT. F.U. F.E.D.

NEWS DEPT. 0.L.A.

PPPPP

CONSULAR DEPT. F.U.D

D.D. & P.U.S.D.

ADVANCE COUPLES SENT

J.I.M.D.

NEWS DEPT.

D.S.A.0. PERSONNEL DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

FDI/1

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat. A

110 EDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO PEKING

Telno 189

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP CC

26 February, 1968

(F)

Зод

300

Personal for Hopson from Murray.

Noi

Your telegram No. 147 [of 26 February]:

Prisoners.

You will now have seen Hong Kong telegram No. 76 of 26 February. We are
trying to obtain authority for you to go ahead as soon as possible, but
we very much regret that we shall not be able to get instructions to you
in time for action on 27 February.

30S FA

DEPARTHENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.E.D.

XXXXX

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

DEPARTMENT

FD/I

FAR FASTEIN

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

(Date)

Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted Unclassified

Emergency Immediate,

Routine

En Clair.

Code Cypher

Draft Telegrin to:-

PEKINS

No

189

(Date)

And to:-

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should

reach addresson(s)

26/468

Security classification -If any

CONFIDENTIAL.

[Codeword-if any]

Addressed to

telegram No.........

And to......

26/2

repeated for information to

Saving to

Repeat to:-

Saving to:-

Distribution:-

Sefentantal FE.D.

Copies to:-

181??4/22

9/22

..(date)

P

....... זו חוו--וו-ו.יו

1.

TILLI'II

IMEI

PERSONAL for HOPSON fine MURRAY

Your tel No 147 [1/26 feb ]: Prisoners.

You will now have seen Hong Kong tel. No 76 of 26 February.

We are

trying to oftami authority for you

+

Al-

go abead

مه

Sain

مين

possible, but we

very much regul

that

Sunc

shall not

be able

to

get instructions to

you

in time for action

on 27 Feb.

Jul 26

26 Fut.

[

CYPHER CAT A

Copies also

IMMEDIATE HONG KON

TELEGRAM NO 241

IDENTIAL.

F213/1 (153) + FD12/9 (78

CONSUETIA

TO COMPA

L

TOP CU

Bo

RECEIVED

ARCHIVES NO Y

OFFICE

26 FEBRUARY 1968

27 FEB 1968

1

I

西

ADDRESSED SECRETARY OF STATE RFI PEKING MYTEL. NO. 76 DATE!)

26TH FEBRUARY.

1296

6292

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS. 323, 324. AND 325: PRISON VISITS.

I AM NOT ANXIOUS TO PROLONG THE DISCUSSION, BUT YOU NO DOUBT

APPRECIATE THAT THESE TELEGRAMS SUGGEST SIX ADDITIONAL CONCESSIONS
WHICH, IN VARYING DEGREE, WILL DISTINGUISH THESE PRISONERS AND WHICH I
AM ACCORDINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT MAKING- (I) THE INCLUSION OF N.C.N.A. IN
THE VISITS AT ALL, WHICH I HAVE HOWEVER ALREADY INDICATED I WOULD ACCEPT
IF NECESSARY:

USE OF THE SPECIAL ROOM, WHICH COULD WELL BE AWKWARD IF CONSIDERABLE
NUMBERS ARE INVOLVED WITHOUT ADEQUATE SPACING. HERE AGAIN, HOWEVER, I AM
PREPARED TO SO ARRANGE,

ALTHOUGH

I SEE LITTLE REASON TO VOLUNTEER THE PROPOSAL: C111) YOUR TELEGRAM NO.
323, PARAGRAPH 3. TO ALLOW VISITS

BY HOWA ALONE WOULD BE A FURTER MOVE AWAY FROM OUR CURRENT

PRISON PRACTICE AND IN THE DIRECTION OF GRANTING NCNĂ A SPECIAL

STATUS. I DO NOT MYSELF SEE WHY WE SHOULD THINK IT NECESSARY

TO CONCEDE THE POINT IN ADVANCE, LET ALONE TAKE THE INITIATIVE

IN PUTTING THE CONCESSION INTO THE MINDS OF THE CHINESE, SINCE

VE ARE PREPARED TO ALLOW A RESPONSIPLE OFFICER OF THE EMPLOYING

ORGANISATION TO BE SUBSTITUTED FOR THE EMPLOYER:

CIV) YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 323, PARAGRAPH 4. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES

PERHAPS IT WOULD BE BETTER TO SAY NOTHING INITIALLY ABOUT TIME

LIMITS, AND LEAVE IT TO THE CHINESE TO RAISE THE POINT:

NEVERTHELESS THIS IS UNLIKELY TO BE A PROBLEM UNLESS THE

NUMBERS ARE LARGE AND CANNOT BE CONVENIENTLY SPACED:

/(V) YOUR

CONFIDENTIAL

COKULENTI AL

HONG KONG TELEGIAL . PAL TO COMPONERAUTZI OFFICE

CV) YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 225, PARAGRAPH 4. OBVICUSLY THE MORE

OFTEN 'SPECIAL VISITS' ARE REPEATED, THE MORE WE DISCRIMINATE

IN FAVOUR OF COMMUNIST PRISONERS, AND THE GREATER RISK OF

EMBARRASSMENT HERE. I WOULD NOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY

OF LATER EXCHANGES OF VISITS IF THE FIRST SET WENT WELL AND WE

ACHIEVED THE QUID PRO QUO IN RESPECT OF GREY: BUT I WOULD

SUGGEST THAT WE ENTER INTO NO COMMITMENT ON THIS POINT IN

OUR FIRST APPROACH TO THE CHINESE:

CVI) YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 325, PARAGRAPH 5. 1 WOULD DO MY BEST

TO ARRANGE VISITS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, BUT THIS DEPENDS

ON NUMBERS AND WHETHER ANY ADVERSE INTEREST IN THESE VISITS

15 AROUSED PUBLICLY.

2 I WOULD STILL PREFER NOT TO CONDUCT THESE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH

NONA IN HONG KONG SEMICOLON BUT IF WE DO SO I WOULD STRONGLY ADVISE

THAT IT BE DONE BY EXCHANGES OF MESSAGES CAT LEAST AT FIRST) BECAUSE

CA) IF WE DISCUSS POINTS OF SUBSTANCE CAS OPPOSED TO PURELY ADI11N-

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