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RM 117
113
Cypher
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (81r D. Trench)
D. 4 June, 1967. R. 4
IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL No. 770
For
09
0650Z
Addressed to Commonwealth Office
Repeated
Ħ
Peking No.302,
悼 P.A. Singapore No.156,
=
Washington No.163
DE FLE
FO //!!
(Commonwealth office please pass to all)
My telegram No. 767.
81trep 041200.
The police operation mounted between 3 a.m. and 5 a.. this morning to
remove posters on buses, the Star Ferry and other selected buildings,
has been completed without incident and there has so far been no
subsequent reactions.
2.
A telegram addressed to me by the director of the Hong Kong branch of
the N.C.N.A. was delivered to Government House. Text follows my
immediately following telegram.
[FDI/643
3.
I shall let you know by this evening what response if any I propose to
make.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 5 June, 1967
R. 5
***VES No.3:
JUN 1967
FD 1/1
10402
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ซึ่ง
alv.
1122)
IMMEDIATE SECRET No. 776
Addressed to Commonwealth office
Repeated to Peking No. 311 (Commonwealth Office please
忡
Washington_(by bag) at request of
My telegram No. 714.
pass)
Far Eastern Dept., Foreign Office
(90
Our assessment of the situation as at 1200 hours on
5 June is as follows.
1.
The principal features of the Communist confrontation with the
Government during the last ten days have been:-
(a)
Token Strikes. These were a major feature at the beginning of the period
but now appear to be on the wane. Until today when 1000 maintenance
workers in the Kowloon Motor Bus Company stopped work, there had been
none since 30th May.
(b) Trouble at the Government slipway, operated by
the Marine Department. This originated as a protest against the removal
of inflammatory posters, but now seems to be on the decline apparently
as a result of Government's firm action in suspending many of the
trouble makers.
(c) Posters and newspapers, containing inflammatory
material, are still displayed by a number of concerns under direct
C.P.G. control, although the majority have been removed either by the
owners themselves or by the police. Today a few new slogans were painted
on buses in Kowloon.
(d) The publication of a special joint edition of the Ta Kung Pao
(T.K.P.) and Wen Wel Pao (W.W.P.) reproducing the editorial of the
People's Daily of 3 June (Peking telegram No. 421).
FD1/6/35
(e) The cable to me despatched by the local office of
the New China News Agency (N.C.N.A.) on the instructions of the Peking
Office protesting against police action following the publication by
/Government
SECRET
SECRET
Government of regulations against inflammatory and seditious material
and calling on the
itish authorities to desist. (Hy telegram No. 774 refers).
(f) A sustained anti-government propaganda campaig
which has sought to counter the colony-wide
support of Government by allegations that much of this support is
fabricated and that the majority of the people are opposed to
Government's measures in opposition to the confrontation. The basic
appeal is to the Chinese patriotic sentiment; and a great deal is being
made of the support given by China to the 4/5 demands. The principal
Government target continues to be the police force.
(g) The issue of a bi-weekly English language edition of the T.K.P.
which reiterates articles from N.C.N.A., People's Daily and the Chinese
language edition of T.K.P. It appears that this publication is designed
for overseas circulation as well as for the local foreign community. Its
circulation is dropping as is that of both T.K.P. and W.W.P. the two
main procommunist Chinese language papers. The scattering of
anti-Government leaflets around the town has been another innovation,
although, so far, this particular medium for propaganda has not been
sustained.
(h) The advice to all employees of Communist concerns
and members of Communiat organisations to stockpile food and other
essential commodities, for as long as three months, in preparation for a
further escalation of confrontation, should this be started by the
Communists or (in their eyes) by Government. (1) Talk in the unions and
rumours of violent strike
action. These were rife during last week but have died down, The terms
of the People's Daily editorial has contributed to the reduction of
emphasis on violence. Intimidation continues but remains on a fairly low
key.
(j) A deterioration of morale in a number of Communist
organisations particularly in the commercial
sphere, where, hotheads apart, there is evidence of a marked desire to
continue with "business as usual".
2. There were indications last week that Peking is embarrassed by the
extent to which local communist leaders have become involved in a
confrontation with the Hong Kong Government. The emphasis of the C.P.G.
editorial appearing in the People's Daily of 3 June was on the need for
the local hierarchy to plan for a long struggle and to build up the
necessary organisation, It is possibly of some significance that no
mention was made in it of the five demands nor was there any direct
threat of intervention by the C.P.G. The Hong Kong working class were
named as the spearhead or the struggle and there was a definite
implication that the local Communiste cannot expect active support,
other than by way of propaganda,
/from
SECRET
1
SECRET
И
from China. This is borne out by a meeting of the all circles
Anti-Suppression Committee, Propaganda Section, held on 4 June, at which
it was stated that the "struggle" would be carried on by means of
'economic, political and propaganda pressure'. On the other hand, the
editorial is likely to be interpreted by the militants as being an
encouragement to further struggle to the rank and file Communists, and
may make it increasingly difficult for the more moderate of the local
Communist leaders to exercise restraint.
3. We expect, therefore, that the main force of the struggle will
continue to be directed through the propaganda field though it is
possible that more extensive and widespread simultaneous strike action
will be taken. In contrast, the suspension of employees of the Marine
Department following their participation in illegal strike action, may
serve as a warning to potential strikers, particularly if local
employers follow Government's lead.
4. In order to maintain the initiative, legal action against selected
C.P.G. concerns still displaying inflammatory material is under
consideration and it is to be hoped that this will cause the others to
remove the inflammatory material of their own volition. If it is taken,
the protest by the N-C-N.A. may indicate that there would probably be
resistance, possibly physical.
5. In the final analysis, Peking holds the key to the present unsettled
situation. But during the past ten days has only given propaganda
support to the local Communists and it is, perhaps, significant that no
new demands have been made bf the Hong Kong Government. Accounts of
disorder approaching anarchy in China multiply, however, and it may be
more difficult for Peking now to exercise firm control over local
Communist hot-heads, either in Hong Kong or Kwantung, and there is
always a possibility that extremist groups in Kwangtung might try to
come to the aid of their fellow Chinese here. However, military control
of the border remaina firm,
(Passed as requested)
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Kr. Bolland
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Denson
Mr. Foggon Mr. D. Hawkins
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Export Credits Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Rm. 7365)
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Mr. C.P. Rawlings
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Mr.J.A.B. Darlington
SECRET
J
ཤ
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Cypher
D. 3 June, 1967.
R.
性 09252.
33
[FD1/I]
lll
PRIORITY STORET No. 769.
Addressed to Commonwealth office.
Repeated
slui
"Peking No. 301. (8. of S. please pass).
My telegram No. 714.
90)
Ho Yin came to Hong Kong on 1 June and yesterday held discussions with
members of the local Communist hierarchy
Later he reported the gist of these discussions to Q.W. Lee who in turn
passed the information on to Cater. Apparently Ho came to Hong Kong on
his own initiative and not at the request of the local Communist
hierarchy.
2. Ho reportedly said that the local Communist hierarchy were of the
opinion that this was not the time to hold discussions with the Hong
Kong Government; that they were confident of final victory. Local
Communists held the opinion that in time pressure from the public, and
particularly from business people, would force the Hong Kong Government
to accede to the four demands. They accepted that this may take a long
time, some months, or even two or three years, but nevertheless victory
for them in the long term was certain. A problem which was exercising
the hierarchy at the moment was the support for the police education
fund: they were taking steps to ensure that their own fighting fund
would grow rapidly and overtake that of the police fund thus giving them
an opportunity of claiming a big victory.
3.
(1)
Q.W. Lee's assessment of the above was as follows:
Communist hierarchy still genuinely do not know what to do and are
probably still awaiting instructions from China.
(ii) They are beginning to have doubts as to the type
and amount of support they could expect from China, hence the emphasis
on the willingness of local Communista to prepare for a long struggle.
4.
Bearing in mind that this information has been obtained at third-hand,
it is considered that Q.W. Lee's assessment is a reasonable appreciation
of the present circumstances.
(Passed as requested with advance copies
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SECRET
110
110
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Cypher
D. 3 June, 1967.
R. 3
07452
IVES NG3
. 1967
FD1/17
IMMEDIATE SECRET
No. 768.
Addressed to Commonwealth office.
Repeated
+
"Peking No. 300.
" POLAD Singapore No. "Washington No. 162.
155.
(8. of S. please
pass to all).
My telegram No. 744.
106
Disturbances.
Action against buses, ferries, etc. still exhibiting inflammatory
posters will be taken tonight (3 June) while vehicles or vessels are at
depots or wharves, if the companies themselves are unsuccessful in
getting the posters off by then. Any immediate stoppages will then come
on a Sunday when pressure on transport services is not quite so heavy.
2. We can certainly expect some difficulty in getting these posters
down, but there is little firm indication yet of how militant the
reaction will be.
3. Once the posters are reasonably under control, some action against
the Communist press for its continued gross scurrilities cannot be too
much longer avoided. Publie opinion will start to become even more
critical if nothing is done. Direct action against the newspapera and
printing works using emergency regulations would be the simplest course,
but the time is not right for this and I am still considering other
weapons which might be used.
4. One such weapon might be either:
(1)
(11)
to refuse to allow selected N.C.N.A. and newspaper officials now in
China (there are at present three such) to return;
or
to refuse to renew the visas of some of those here when they run out.
5. These two courses of action could be used also against other selected
extremist Communists in suitable circumstances.
6. To act in either of these ways would be a quite different and much
less criticizable a course from deportation,
All the senior N.C_NA. although it could have the same effect. staff are
considered as C.P.G. officials and have service passports
SECRET
/(except
SECRET
(except for the Director who has a diplomatic passport and whom we would
not want to touch at this stage). In addition, a number of the senior
officials of the Bank of China, China Resources Co., and press and
publishing circles also have service passports. Before even considering
using this procedure therefore, I would be glad to know:-
(1)
(11)
whether you agree that to act in this manner would be less objectionable
than to deport, and
whether there are considerations vis à vis N.C.NA. in London and Reuters
in Peking which must be taken into account.
7. The type of person against whom this action might be contemplated
would include:-
(1) the Managing Director of Wen Wei Pao (absent from
Hong Kong since 2 February) and
(11) the Editor-in-Chief N.C.N.A. (absent since 22 February).
8. A probable effect of taking such action would be to discourage others
from making short visits to China or from going to Shun Chun to
telephone Canton for instructions.
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SECRET
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Cypher
D.
R.
3
3 June, 1967.
03402
pa
L
109
5 .1967
FD 1/1 FD/
PRIORITY SECRET
No. 767.
Addressed to Commonwealth Office.
Repeated
#
"Peking No. 299.
" POLAD Singapore No. "Washington No. 161.
SITREP at 031000.
My telegram No. 745.
707
5lvi
154.
(S. of S. please
pass all).
After a rather anxious start, the Government dockyard resumed work with
nearly half its staff. 256 employees have been interdicted, but so far
only 17 have been given their letters of interdiction. The balance did
not report for work.
2. Rumours of major strike action over this weekend continue though hard
evidence is lacking. The very number of these reports tends to discredit
the likelihood of a planned offensive which we would expect to be set up
with greater regard to security. The expected stoppage in one ferry
company did not happen on 2 June but remains a possibility for 3 June.
In the other ferry company a pay claim is being presented. This could
provide the veneer of a straight labour dispute to industrial action
which has in fact political basis, thus complication any resort to legal
action by the Government.
3. There has been no increase in the number of postera displayed. It is
intended to watch the situation to see the effect of warnings given by
managements as a result of the new emergency regulations. If by tonight
there is a substantial reduction in the number of posters we will not
force the pace by police action. A decision on this will be made this
evening. As a precautionary measure the police, less auxiliaries, were
brought to a higher state of readiness from midnight on 2 June.
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