Hr. C.P. Rawlings
Kajor Koe
1.0.2.
Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
Mr. T.K. Critchley
Mr. K. MacLellan
Department
Ministry of Defence
Rm. 7365)
Mr. Henn
帅
H
Rm. 7163)
幛
RE. 5131)
Board of Trade
Australia House (Senior External
Affairs Rep.)
Canada House (Counsellor)
-
SECRET
108
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
Cypher
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 1 June, 1967.
Áð
R. 1
11352.
pa kifavi
RE ARC.
- 2 JUN 1967
F011
IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL
No. 755.
Addressed to Commonwealth office.
Repeated
H
H
"Peking No. 294.
"P.A. Singapore No. 150.
"Washington No. 158. (5. of s.
please pass all).
SITREP as at 01/1800 June.
My telegram No. 745.
107
The stoppage over the removal of Communist posters at the Government
dockyard continued until 1700. 90% of the Marine Department's launches
were tied up as a result. The strikers, who included most of the crews
and key maintenance workers, barricaded themselves into the dockyard and
prevented four Europeans as well as loyal staff members from leaving.
They refused to accept anything less than the replacement of their
posters. (The Government posters which has been put up instead drew
attention to the disciplinary penalties applicable in cases of absence
without leave). Despite occasional chanting and attempts to foment
violence by a small number, they all dispersed at 1700 on receiving a
guarantee that they would not be arrested when leaving. They promised a
repetition tomorrow if their posters were not put back.
An announcement is to be made tonight over radio and television and
tomorrow in the press that the participants have been indicted (1.e.
suspended) and disciplinary action will be taken against them. This may
possibly provide the pretext for a major confrontation with the
Communiata.
There were no other incidents or stoppages today. There are indications
that one of the ferry companies may stop work tomorrow.
(Passed as requested)
(Advance copies also sent to D.S.A.0. for Messrs. de la Mare, Bolland,
and Wilson Far East Dept. and for P.8. to Commonwealth Secretary)
CONFIDENTIAL
/Distribution
CONFIDENTIAL
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J.I.C. External Distribution
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
Copies also sent to:-
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H
#
H
#
H
H
H
·D.I.O., J.I.R. P.S. to Mr. Rodgers Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Denson
Treasury
Export Credits Guarantee
Department
Ministry of Defence Rm. 7365)
Rm. 7163)
Rm. 5131)
Board of Trade
Australia House (Senior External
Canada Rouse (Counsellor)
Mr. Foggon
Mr. D. Hawkins
Mr. C.P. Rawlings
Mr. Hern Major Koe
M.0.2.
Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
Affairs Rep.)- Mr. T. Critchley Mr. K. MacLellan
CONFIDENTIAL
fir
107
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM MONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Cypher
D. 1st June 1967 R. 1st
02452
IMMEDIATE SECRET
No.745
Repeated
pc. envi
рс
-CEIVED IN
HIVES No.31
2 JUN 1967
FD1/
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.)
#
H
"Peking No.292
"POLAD Singapore No.149 "Washington No.157
(S. of S. please pass PRIORITY to all)
Sitrep as at 01/0900 houpa
My telegram No.738.
97
There is evidence that a major confrontation on the industrial side is
being prepared. 1st June was the original target date but this may now
have been postponed until 3 or 4 June, It is, however, by no means
certain that the pro- Communist faction have sufficient support for such
action. Planning may be designed to maintain morale rather than an
expression of firm intent. Small acale stoppages are expected to
continue. Textile factories and the telephone company may be affected
today. The latter has only a very small pro-Communist element.
2. Employees of the Marine Department are refusing to work until the
Communist posters which were removed on the night 30/31 May and replaced
by Government posters are put back. Since we are today taking action to
declare inflammatory posters illegal, this could be the beginning of a
trial of strength.
(Passed to D.S.A.0. for repetition as requested)
(Advance copy for Messrs. Wilson, Bolland, de la Ware
Far Eastern Dept. and for Private office,
Secretary of State and for Resident Clerk)
Distribution
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DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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/Foreign
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===
tt
H
= = =
++
=
זי
-
-
P.S. to Mr. Rodgers
Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
Mr. Wilson
Hr. Denson
Mr. Foggon
Treasury
-
Export Credits Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Rm.7365)
H
Mr. D. Hawkins
H
"
Rm. 7163) Rm. 51 31)
Board of Trade
Australia House
"
-
-
Mr. C.P. Rawlings Mr. Henn
Major Koe
M.0.2
Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
Senior External Affairs
Representative)
Canada House (Counsellor)
-
-
Mr. T. Critchley
Mr. K. MacLellan
SECRET
सात R1117 (10
106
Cypher
PRIORITY SECRET No. 744.
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 1 June, 1967.
R. 1
paragraph 4.
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES N.. *
- 2 JUN 1967
02452
+
FD
ра
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.) Repeated Routine to Peking
No.291
Ħ
H
ח
to P.A. Singapore No. 148
Washington No.156
(S. of S. please pase all)
My telegrama No.726 paragraph 2 and No.738
Disturbances.
After consulting Executive Council, I intend to start taking action
within the next few days against the many inflammatory posters which are
still appearing on buildings, vehicles and harbour vessels and are
causing public concern. Emergency Regulations to enable this to be done
effectively are being published very shortly.
I hope
97
later today. A warning in general terms was issued last night.
2.
No action against the press is yet contemplated, except in so far as
individual copies of newspapers are stuck up and used as posters.
3.
There is some danger that pro-Communist bus and ferry workers in
particular may attempt to counter by fomenting further stoppages but I
am sure we must take this risk. We shall of course proceed with caution.
(Passed as requested)
(Advance copy for Hessrs. Wilson, Bolland, De la Mare, Far Eastern
Dept., and for Private Office Secretary
of State and Resident Clerk)
Distribution
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DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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/Copies also sent to:
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Copies also sent to:-
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Cabinet Office
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H
D.I.O., J.I.R.
P.S. to Mr. Rodgers
- Kr. de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
Mr. Wilson
忖
Mr. Denson
Ir. Foggon
Treasury
Mr. D. Hawkine
Export Credits Guarantee Department
Ministry of Defence (Room 7365)
H
H
#
H
Room 7163) Room 5131)
-
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Mr. C.P. Rawlings
Mr. Henn
Major Koe
M.0.2
Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
SECRET
SECRET
(105)
+
1 RECEIVED IN
F.E.
ARCHIVES No.31 - 1 JUN 1967
TO SI"
BY
amber 230 May
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROHERTY OF HER BRITANIC M.JESTY'S GOVERNMENT)
| Fot/+
UFD(67)39
24th May, 1967
C..BINET
6
COTY NO.
DEFENCE .ND OVERJE.. LOLICY COMMITTEE
HONG KONG
عم
bi
1.
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth "ffairs
But
We have always known that Hong Kong wris vulnerable, it is valuable to
Ching nd we had casumed th: t 11 we in her interests to maintain the
status quo. Indeed there has been evidence in the rest thrt the Central
Government have controlled and restrained the Communists in the
territory.
2. The scene hrs now chanced, arising cut cf labour troubles a mejor
campaign has been mounted in Hong Kong itself linked with hostile
demonatrations in Shanghai and Peking and with the expulsion of our
representative in Shanghai.
summery of recent developments is rt innex). loc sening of control by
mainland China of the Communists in Hong Kong has resulted from recent
developments in the Cultural Revolution, The first mass demonstrations
in Hong Kong were probably promoted independently by the Communists
there, in an opportunist desire to make the most of genuine labcur
unrest. Mainland China had to reset to the aitution, nnd chose to give
support to the communista in Hong Kong.
3.
The unknown factor in the present crisia ia how for mainland China has
now decided to go in bringing pressure on H.M.G., and how for there cre
different views there on future policy.
4.
The possible interpret: tions of the Chinese course of action, assuming
thrt she is new controlling events, appear to be these:-
(1) Chine has made no bosic policy change, but is trying to
achieve some propaganda victory as the price for calling- off the
disturbances. such a propagande gain could relate to the presence of
American ships and troops from Vietnam on leave in Hong Kong; or to
labour reforma; or to the release from prosecution or imprisonment of
the persons charged with or sentenced for their role in the riots.
5.
(11) Chinc h's decided to try to force us to accept a Macao
position in Hong Kong. If this is so, she will continue to escalate Hong
Kong disturbances to the point when, in order to remain in Hong Kong, we
must capitulate to whrtever demands are made, und, in effect, recept
Chinese domination of Hong Kong.
(111) China has decided to sacrifice the economic benefits
she derives from Hong Kong to Cultural Revolution "purity" of doctrine,
and to drive us out of Hong Kong completely.
le cannot resist determined attempt to force us cut altoṛether and we
could not tolerate the humiliation of remaining in Hong Kong without
effective control. I am convinced that a Xaçao solution would be
unacceptable. It would be damnging to cur international prestige (at a
time when Gibraltar and den are presenting several problems). It would
be intolerable for the Governor, and impossible in terms of my
responsibility for Hong Kong in rlicment. This being so, it fellows that
if China
/18
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1
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is embarking upon course (11), cur resistance to it might compel
er te resort to course (111).
But there is no need to cssume the worst and our immediate
responsibility is to meintein law and crder, retain morale and
confidence so that te economy een continue to flourish. Firm action is
required to do this but, at the same time we should avoid, as far as
possible, action which could be regarded by the C.1.G. as provocative.
we should avoid doing anything to "escalate the confrontation" to the
extent that we get involved in a situation from which there is no escape
except by abject surrender or a futile attempt to fight it out, leading
to the seme result. Our sters, therefore, must be directed to the needs
of the local security situation, while taking the wider implications
into account, and they need to be carefully measured and tiined.
7.
Recommendations
I accordingly ask my colleagues to endorse the views in paragraphs 5 and
6, and to agree to the following action:-
(1) Local Security
(a) We are already sending the Commando Carrier
BULW..RK to Hong Kong where she should arrive by the end of this week.
(b) The Governor has already been authorised to
neutralise several of the buildings from which the campaign is being
directed.
(c)
(a)
The Governor hes now naked for authority to pick up end, if possible,
deport (or failing that, detain) some of the known leaders of the
present campaign limited to 2 or 3 in the first instance, The disruption
of the lendership would be a distinct and positive goin and would be
seen by the majority of the population as firm action. On the other hand
it is unlikely that the Chinese Government would accept these lenders as
deportees and, if they were detained in Hong Kong, this would provide
Teking and the local Communists with a grievance.
The Governor haa
undertaken not to use this weapon lightly or unnecessarily and, on
balance, I recommend that he should be given authority to go ahead if
the situation requires it.
Motion against the principal Communist newspaper which is the official
0.i.G. orgen in Hong Kong.
The Governor acce; ts that prosecutions for sedition or inciting the
police to disaffection might have dangerous repercussions, and is
proposing instead to seek emergency powers to close down the printing
presa. But he would only take action after consulting me on each
individual case, I would propose to give him a general authority on this
understanding.
(11) Labour
Relations between employees and employers in Hong Kong have not been
good cnd we should do our best to improve matters. Less than 12% of the
total working force are declared members of trade unions and there are
100,000
SECRET
/membere
SECRET
members of the Communist Unions as opposed to 70,000 others. There is a
complete split between Communist and K.M.T. unions. The Communist Unions
are basically disinterested in genuine industrial issues. I have been
engaged in discussion with the Hong Kong Government, through the
Governor, about labour reforms. The employers, who have in the past
shown a considerable ancunt of resistance to reforms are at present very
anxious about the general situation and we could immediately carry
through extensive and long-overdue labour reforms.
I would like to
do this. It would be welcomed by the average worker in Hong Kong and
would give us a better moral position, but it would be unlikely to
satisfy China. Nevertheleas if the Chinese were to seek a lowering of
the temperature, this would give the C.i.G. a face-saving formula. I
recommend that we should press the Governor to go ahead vigorously with
improvements in the labour legislation including early steps to shorten
the hours of work of women and young persons.
(111) Other Matters
Facilities to the U.5.
In the background of our difficulties with the C.F.G. lies their
irritation at the facilities which the U.3. forces in Vietnam enjoy in
Hong Kong. tre hove latterly restricted visits of warships to the same
number as last year and more recently have suggested that larger ships
should not come. I do not recommend any further immediate ceticn since
any significant diminution would be claimed by the Chinese as a
propaganda victory. But I am sure that this is something that we should
keep under review in the longer term.
Commonwealth Office, B. .1.
24th May, 1967
SECRET
H. B.
SECRET
ANNEX
Events in Kor loon
HONG KONG DISTURBANCES
The recent disturbances in Kowloon arise from an industrial
dispute in April between workers and their employers about wages
and conditions of employment involving 650 workers in two
factories producing artificial flowers, The injection moulding
sections of both factories were closed and the workers were
dismissed. The Labour Department of the Hong Kong Government
offered to help the parties to reach agreement but this was
rofused by 1oth partica.
2.
Disturbances broke out on the 6th May outside one of the
factories situated in Kowloon and as a result 21 persons were
arrosted.
3. On the 8th May the Rubber and Plastic Workers Union rut
forward four demands:
(a) immediate release of the workers arrested;
(b) punishment of the ovil doors and compensation; (c) guarantee of the
workers and personal safuty;
(a) no interference henceforth by the police in
labour disputes.
4. The pro-communist press endorsed these domande and
deliberately slanted its reporting to create the impression
of unnecessary brutality by the police who had in fact behaved with a
cmplary moderation. The pro-communist press also demanded
apologios by the Government.
5. Further disorders broke out in Kowloon on the 11th May and
continued for several days. The police were attacked, cars werc
set on fire and some property was damaged. Curfews had to be
declared in certain arons to help control the situation.
Chincac Government's Statement
6. On 15th May the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs isqued
/a statement
SECRET
SECRET
e statement castigating the Hong Kong authorities for "Facist
atrocities", hostility to the Chinese people and "collusion with
the United States Imperialists". The statement included a demand
that Her Majesty's Government should instruct the Hong Kong
Government to accept all the local pro-communist demands which
the Chinese ust have known to be unacceptable to the Hong Kong
Government. The statement was the strongest and most abusive
about Hong Kong for sɔmʊ years.
7. No direct reply was given to the Chinese Goverment statement
but on the 17th May a statement was released in London referring
to the industrial origin of the disturbances and stating that
"H.H.G. fully support the Hong Kong Govornment in fulfilling its
duty both in maintaining law and order and in the efforts it is
making to bring about a settlement of the industrial dispute".
8. From the 18th May the campaign switched from Kowloon to
Government House on Hong Kong island. At first the demonstratore
were noisy and abusive, Petitions were presented and Government
House was plastered with posters,
On the 20th May the demonstrations began to lose their
orderly and disciplined nature and the lemonstrators started to
resort to rowdiness and violence by molesting spectators and
blocking ronds, particularly in the area of Statue Square and the
Law Courts. Loudspeakers on the Bank of Chinn buildings adopted
an anti-British tune and included such slogans as "Kill Trench"
"British murderere", etc.
10. The Hong Kong Govɩmmont issued notices stating that
disorderly processions or unlawful gatherings would not be allowed
but the people would still be allowed to continue to exorciso
their right to petition the Governor in small, orderly groups
or by post.
11.
The situation deteriorated further and on the 22nd May the
Governor asked for permission:-
(a) to neutralize the buildings from which the campaign
SECRET
/is being
SECRET
is being directed the Bank of China and the
-
communist-controlled Federation of Trade Union H.Q.
and the Workers Club; and
(b) to bring the Commando Carrier "Bulwark" to
Hong Kong.
Both these requests were approved.
Attacks on our posts in ceno. Peking and Shanghai.
12. Soon after the disturbances began in Hong Kong, the British
Consulate in Macao was the target of repeated demonstrations and
the staff have been compelled to vacate their quarters for a
hotel.
13. After the Peking statement of 15th May similar demonstrations were
mounted against our offices in Poking and on the 16th May
the office in Shanghai was invaded by a mob and sacked. On the
22nd May the Cherge d'Affaires in Peking was informed that the
Chinese Government considered that the 1954 Agreement was annulled
and demanded that the Shanghai office should be closed within
24 hours.
The apparent parallel with Macso
14. There is an apparent perallel with events in Macao which
have been widely studied in pre-communist circles in Hong Kong-
Thero too the crisis began with a local dispute (in the case,
however, badly handled by the police) which led to "demands"
by local pro-communists which were endorsed later by the
Chinese authorities. The Portuguese reacted by trying to
appease the local pro-communists who only stopped up their
Comends. Internal and external pressure was applied, including
the implied threat of Chinese military action, until the
Portugucac backed down and accepted the Chinese demands in
full. The Chinese were entirely intransigent and seemed
determined to enforce their will and to demonstrate that the
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