(33) Lver. Wht.
Curculation of your paper
J.P. (61) S7 (A) (Draft) of 2nd November,
1962.
S
Q
Sorry
That
Le
have
fo
Greally delayed consideration
FURTHER ACTION
of this matter.
2.
As
how
understand the position
after further discussion
and
correspondence with the Governor,
remains
1Zume
but-
one
paint
at issue
and
The
(66096) WI 42332-8517 50m 1/64 V.B. Gp 791
between BD CC (F.E.)
The Governor considers
Garemor.
1201
3.
practical
-
political grounds,
lange
scale
evacuation of non- Chmere
elements
of the population cannara
Take place
under
chat- 6012 before and after
any circumstances
the
;
~ both Chimere
-
Chinese
(29A)
Live Mps.
(3)
cm freu fyft.
dike
·25A).
hostilities only verwy
стови
will be ala
outbreak
д
humber
izsin
and
one
category
to Chiese retaliation)
to leave
;
and
Imiled
}
to leave anot
12ome vulnern
should be assisted
that, for there purposes,
any jorm of outline evacuation plan a Superfluous and would in
is
Jack be
A
misnomer. BDCC (F.E.)
Ow
other hand appear to mamtain
that
The view
some outline planning for the evacuation of much wider categories
(particularly of
non-Chiere elements)
in
سلام به
Stination
to be
Cen
to take advantage of
which
the retamed
should
a
military
in the event,
maight hoo
12am envisaged
unfavourable
(Annex to C.0.5. (62) 379).
not entirely clear to
to wo
exactly
draft J.P.S. report (annexed to
SI-
4.
Where
12
J.P. (61) 5+ (A) (Draft)) stands
in this verject-
When it concludes
that BDCC (F.E.)
should
a se
Their report" as
G
basci for future
J
planminą
-1.e. Whethe
such pulanning
towards
to be directed
Myectwas recommended by the
(and accepted by BD CC (FE))
preparation of a much more ambition's scheme.
The very
limited
Governor
To live
But we have assumere that it bears
The latter The recommendation in 3DCC(FB)'s
Deir origmal report
any
since f
Con làm clien (C.0.5. (61) 130 (Renned)), which they did not find boo
need to modify
remation in their final report to be unconcatent mix the Govenor
enuraged
outline plan which would
Jaranable circumstances
Brink women
The retention of
at least ensure in
all
The evacuation
and children.
Mr.
File No.........
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Sir
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
Date
Your Reference
DRAFT
5.
think
That
from
the
purely
pragmatic angle
Governor is right in rejectingh
rejecting a large-
the
any
scale
evacuation
and
any planning
The
Case,
See lit,
set out-
That-end.
for accepting his views in
The attached
decision
forumarily
considerations.
memoran olun in,
turns
(however
on poblical
H.M. G.
en
What to dress up plans
The
Firstly
Pahe a
assemmend
will
need
に
Governor's
poblical
view
on the
(in Hong Kong and elsewhere)
window of any
off the
Lazopa
Scalef
dvicromaristory
to
weigh
12 in
balance
attempt at large scale
and secondly,
/ evacuation;
FURTHER ACTION
in
the
(E6098) WI 42332-8537 50m 1/64 V., Gp 791
assenment of
against their own
(a) the libaly judą ment
public opinion
if it was
seen
엉
This comm
comntay
that ho
effent-
was made (more especially,
That no plans existed) to
evacuate
British
and children, and
(b) the probability that public criticisin
could be reasonably met by expected statement that, as anticopr
The actual circumstances
made evacuation imposible.
Political comiderations such an there
the ministerial instruction
A
in Hong Kong
led to
mi 1950
12at plans
children
for the evacuation of Bookish women
should be prepared,
に
after strong advice
had been tendered by
the contrary
then
the / Governor.
6.
his feel that there
are
two possible
Contes
(i)
reconside
12
J.P.S. draft-
(i)
report in the light of the arguments
inn the enclosed
Comed
Serve
memorandum (which
A
Colonial office paper)
To let the report go forward to the
Amanter of Defence (subject to
confirmation of amendments
discussed)
exchanged
mention
17
Ceveren
50
Jar
but to
minute
( Annex I to I,?? (61) 50 (A) (Draft)) the
difference of guinion with
17
need for
the Governor
an outline, plan
ん
(particularly
197
a much wider and aware of
Hendral evacuation
Covering the
"than he recommends
hon - Chiese elements)
that
G
and
doasion here turns
than inchtary comderations
Wineh
The fact
on other
about
The Colonial Secretary will be
は
The Nemnly of Defences will then draft-
Consulting, taxi
a minute for
Minister to send
to the Prime Minister and
/ or Munter
of Defence
and
to any other of his
Mr.
File No.........
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Sir
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
Your Reference.............
Date
------------------------ ANNA.....................i
DRAFT
colleagues
he
Consult
may wash This matter.
7. We are
melined
Conce
Sunce
to favour the second whatever agreed conclusion
may
h
at offecil level,
it
on the point at-issue
be reached
further consultation's
will be furt
and foremost far
Minister to decide
12ad the Governor showed be crevaruled
alternatively,
That the
necessary
action should
the
Fahen
to initiate
consultation
his colleag
za with a
View
to
reversal
the
bohay laid down in
of British women
1950
on evacuation
An of
children.
-
9. We
should
be
FURTHER ACTION
grateful for your
Views
how
we might proceed
(E6096) WI 42332-8537 50m 1/64 V.B. Gp 791
Whichever course is pursued,
Care home of
propone at the same
time to take
the
question of verokamą the
1951 Dormant
Commmion seseof the mention) ing providing for the appointment- of the
Commander, British Forces
ar
Guvernar 22-26 of the memorandum).
in certain crcumstances (paras
TOP SECRET
File No. FED 528/400/01
Mr. T.S. Carter 5.
Mr...
Mr.
Mr......
Permt, U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Sir
Secretary of State
Your Reference.....
Date...
+
DRAFT
? Eurfeom
? Eufem
Biting has been cancelled -see (28) ~ 1960/62 file
(28)~
>
FH.
FURTHER ACTION
While I sms and children were the first finity.
Evacuation of Civilians
from Hong Kong
This is regarded by the Hong Kong Government as an
because any leak that his extremely sensitive subject;
any-public_reference-to-it Suluk Lim even buing durcumvent confil. would
be construed as indicating an intention to abandon
our position there and would be likely to have a serious
effect on public confidence 7.
Since 1951 there have been in existence plans for the
evacuation of women, children and elderly men from Hong Kong
(code-names "Incubate" and, subsequently, "Digit"), in the
event of an actual or imminent emergency i.e. an attack by
the Chinese on the Colony. And from 1953 there has been in
existence a plan ("Biting") for the evacuation of civilian
men if a general evacuation became necessary.
2.
These plans had their roots in circumstances that were
very different from today's (particularly in regard to China's
military strength). They were based on the S, of S's instruction
in 1950 that ".......public opinion here would expect H.M.G.
to ensure that no British women and children were avoidably
left behind". Their existence was justified on the grounds
that white women and children "would be considered to be in
greater potential danger than local people". The plans a
répared provided, as a second priority, for the evacuation
of other persons (including Asians or Eurasians) who would be
(Q2431) 57024/8314 2MP 1/62 ATBS. 763
/in
TOP SECRET
in special danger. The evacuation of some 20-30,000 persons
was envisaged; the number today would be of much the same
order.
3.
The preparation of evacuation plans on a basis of racial
discrimination was (and continues to be) repugnant to the Hong
Kong Government. From time to time doubts have been expressed
as to their practicability in view of (a) the availability of
transport and (b) reductions in the size of the garrison
affecting its ability to maintain resistance for the necessary
length of time (14 days) without strong and timely reinforcement
(which would only come from the Americans). The garrison
has since been progressively reduced in size.
Le In 1960 the Commander British Forces in Hong Kong expressed
the view that, in the face of air attack and under conditions of
serious internal disorder (which it must be assumed would
accompany a Chinese attack), he could not with the forces
available carry out the task (then included in his directive)
of covering an evacuation after the outbreak of hostilities. A
review of evacuation policy was accordingly undertaken by
BDCC (F.E.) in consultation with the C.B.F. and Governor,
Hong Kong.
Evacuation after the Outbreak of Hostilities
!
5. The resultant military assessment (with which the Governor
agrees) confirmed the C.B.F's view that any large-scale evacuation
after the outbreak of hostilities would be impracticable,
except conceivably in the event of immediate American assistance.
On this latter point the Governor considers that a decision must
be taken on the basis that there is (and will be) no firm American
commitment,
6. In covering an evacuation, British troops and the Police
Force would be deflected from their primary tasks of meeting
!
aggression and of maintaining law and order. People on
/unprotected
}
Mr..
Mr.
Mr.
Sir
File No......
Your Reference
DRAFT
FURTHER ACTION
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.