and
thalt-
17
Governor's
proposals in para
12
abere for
making use
9
nch lamited
opportunities
as may arise,
on a
bases free from fracial discrimination,
should be accepted
19.
A
de
on
1have
lines
does
however
tr
demean
Haben
FURTHER ACTION
の
State
th 1950
involve
reversal of
by the Secretary
(Mr. Griffithe); after Coinctions
bus colle
it
comed
if and
When
Chinese
against
have
domestic
Hong tieng
inipfications for H.M. Government-
Accordingly if the
that time.
Secretary of
of state
is disposed to
accept
our recommendation
he may
(16098) W) 42132-8537 50m 1/64 V.B. Gp 791
C
Mr.
Highan
Mr...
Mr.
Mr.
Sir
TOP SECRET
File No. FED. 528/400/01
Permt. U.S. of S.
Blue
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
Your Reference.....
Date
DRAFT SUBMISSION TO MINISTERS
Note
HONG KONG
(a)
Evacuation of Civilians in Wartime
by the then feasting offate & hiffet,
(12) on
14521/15 of 1950
FURTHER ACTION
eg. in the Volunteer Fa
The courant resin the tham some 8 years)
old (then DIGIT)
(b) Assumption of Government by Commander
British Forces in Grave Emergency
(a)
给
At the time of the Korean War/Governor of Hong Kong was instructed to
prepare plans for the
evacuation of civilians. He was told/that
while every effort must be made to avoid racial
discrimination, in the last resort, public opinion here would expect
H.M.G. to ensure that no British women and children were unavoidably
left behind. It was eventually agreed that
plans should be on the basis that preferential treatment should be given
to those who, if left behind, would be in danger of special
discrimination or mistreatment and were least
able to bear such treatment.
By this yardstick
top priority would be given to the dependents of service personnel,
European women and children and the dependents of Hong Kong Chinese who
had actively assisted Government/ Numbers involved were expected to be
some 10,000, with a further 10 20,000 in lower priority categories, such
as neutral men and women of friendlynthies
and wives and families of British Chinese on a
"first come first served" basis,
foto
saque of an Ham
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ofte garon; hat die then
(then BITING)
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abandard sove yours ago -
(06096) W42332-8537 50m 1/64 V.L. Gp 791
/These
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2. These plans were drawn up when there was a large garrison in
Hong Kong (20 major units in 1951), when a prolonged and even a
successful resistance was contemplated,/when Singapore was available as
a staging post for evacuees. Even then 4 days' notice
would have been required to provide shipping for
10,000, and 10 days' notice for 16,000 refugees.
100
J. by 1960 the Garernor and the military authorities
in the Far Bast recommended that circumstances had
changed so radically şince 1951 that existing plans
were revitund
for evacuation shoull be abandoned,
With the 8 major
units then at his disposal (the garrison has since
been reduced to 6
Forces expressed the view that he could not cover
evacuation after the outbreak of hostilities.
major units) the Commander British
falt adored
With the Porces available/he might be able to hold
the rim of the harbour area for up to 3 days and to
contain internal disorder, but he could not at the
same time deploy the substantial forces that would
Gva, au Concurs til
be necessary to protect evacuees,
As the Airport would have been made unusable
and when Love was move possibility of firsborg Hemnet Lowe for Mills
in tuitre when Britt
at an early stage or an
attack
evacuation by air would be impossible. Organise
and movement in the harbour would not be possible and,
Sibollurg
with the Chinese patrolling by artillery, air and
naval units all the approaches to Hong Kong, any
major movement in or out of the Colony could not be
contemplated. For any shipping that got away there
would still be the hazards of a 640 mile journey to
Manilla, the nearest reception port.
4.Given this new military appreciation it is
obvious that shipping for evacuation could not be
brought in from outside. Reliance would have to be
placed on shipping already available, and this could
very
take only a small proportion of those eligible for
evacuation
the
J
bekist
remany
and be recommended in 1962 At Existing Hans for wowration should be
awarded.
and at lead to days would be required t asseuble additand siffing for
Singappe and chehere,
TOP SECRET
Labt #
S The Governor considers that indications
that we were organising the evacuation of a wasthing Aganger.
favoured group, consisting largely of
European women and children, and the diversion
"white" British manpower
was being divorted
-
military and
civil /to do it would tend to accelerate the
breakdown of law and order, seriously
affecting in particular the morale of the Chinese Jobic rank and file,
and thus increase
the risk of attack on "foreigners". Any
evacuation could include only small numbers
of the European women and children, and sett
Chinese loyalists who had to be left behind
ine
would be at greater risk because of the
evacuation attempt.
backed by the
6. The Governor's conclusions that any planned evacuation after
hostilities have
de
started quite impracticable, He rejecte
the idea of any attempt to organise an
evacuation before the start of hostilities.
This would be interpreted both in Hong Kong
and in China not as clearing the decks for
action but as an admission of defeat and an
open invitation to a Chinese attack. As an
attack could be mounted at very short notice) we the wall be
should have no certainty of being able to
the additional tommage required by for a
successful evacuationútu Hong Kong ang out befrie
in the time at our disposal.
Ccomplete
an evacuation in time.
/From
TOP SECRET
(30) on 14521
/15 1950.'
TOP SECRET
Discriminatam in favor of European
From the very outset of evacuation planning successive Governors of Hong
Kong have expressed the strongest objection to any evacuation plan
In 1949 based on racial discrimination.
Sir Alexander Grantham said that he was certain
that his Execuative Council. if they were consulted, would insist that
equal opportunities to leave must
be available to all, irrespective of race.
It
was thought that the numbers of non-Europeans
wishing to avail themselves of evacuation
+
opportunities would be limited thought it was recognised that any
estimate of numbers must be
highly conjectural, At that time it was thought that àtotal of some
30,000 (including Europeans)
might wish to leave.
4. Subsequently, when it became clear that
shipping could not possibly be made available for numbers of
this order, and on the basis of the rulingquoted in paragraph/above, the
Governor agreed to
the scheme described in paragraph
above
and felt that this," while being "beyond justifiable
criticism" would in fact enable the highest
priority to be granted to European women and
children since it could scarcely be denied that
they are the most vulnerable group of all.
At a later stage still however the view has been
taken in Hong Kong that even this scheme is
politically most objectionable in that it would be
obvious that its practical effect would be to
give preference to Europeans. The more categories
have to be pared down because of the very small
totals that can be catered for compared with those
envisaged in 1950, the more racially discriminatory
the scheme becomes.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
q
When Sir Robert Black put forward his recommendation
that the present evacuation scheme should be
scrapped (in 1962) he expressed the very strong
opinion that, even were evacuation feasible,
it would be morally and politically wrong that any
scheme should favour, or appear to favour,
Europeans as against those Chinese, Indians, etc.
which might wish to leave. He considered that an
evacuation scheme of this kind might would deal a
severe blow to our international prestige,
particularly in Asia and Africa and in the new
Commonwealth; and that it would, for example.
cause doubts to arise in Malaysia about whether,
under direct attack, British troops might not be
employed for the evacuation of British subjects
rather than for the defence of Malaysia.
Sir Robert expressed the view that European women
and children would not be in greater peril then
non-Europeans in the event of a Chinese attack,
that the Chinese might be expected to deal far
more harshly with those of their own racewhom they
held to be "collaborators" with the British, or to
be committed anti-communists; that the large
number of European internees yould be an embarrassment to the
Chinese/Government who would
wish to get rid of them eventually; and that the
greatest danger to the European community would
arise not from Chinese Government troops but from
mob violence before the Communist authorities had established
themselves/which would be certain to
occur if the breakdown of law and order were
Berkes
precipitated by the diversion of British troops to
cover an evacuation, under the worst possible
circumstances,
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
lo Speculation on the likely behaviour of the
Chinese Government towards its troops must
necessarily be of an uncertain nature. To some
extent this attitude would be conditioned by the
circumstances under which Hong Kong were taken
over.
If our Forces had done little more than
"identify aggression" and had thereafter been
content to fight a delaying action without
exposing the Colony to all the horrors of a
resistance a outrance it is to be expected that
the Chinese Government's desire to avoid
unnecessary adverse publicity by illtreating
-
the local inhabitants Asian or European
would prevail. On the other hand, in the
unlikely event of nuclear weapons being used
against the Chinese mainland as part of the
defence of Hong Kong, it could well be that the
Chinese Government Forces would do little to
protect their enemies from the wrath of the mob.
It is not to be denied however that in either
eventuality a comparatively small number of
Chinese loyalists and their dependents would be
at greater risk than even Europeans and their
families.
//. Had it been possible to implement an
evacuation scheme under which a considerable
proportion of those categories included in the original plan (see para.
1 above) would have
had a reasonable prospect of safe removal, it is
not thought that the Governor's objections to
an arrangement which in effect would have led to
a preference for Europeans need to have been
regarded as overriding. If, however, the military
argument is accepted that any large-scale
evacuation is impossible, then a decision of this
/question
1
TOP SECRET
question of principle raised by the Governor
A decision would however be
is not required.
required if there was any question of;(a) an
organised evacuation before the outbreak of hostilities, (b) if it were
decided that plans
should be held in readiness in case American
military support and shipping were available to
an extent which greatly improved the prospects of
wratin
a successful operation, and (c) if it were decided
that outline plans shoud be in readiness in case
the military situation were not as desperate as
assumed in this paper.
The Lovemon's Past
7Z on (a) above the Governor's views are clear and are stated in
paragraph 6 above. He does
however agree that, before the outbreak of
hostilities, the Hong Kong Government should
ensure that, in the use of available sea and air
transport, such arrangements as are possible in the
situation at the time should be made to facilitate
the departure of those who wish to leave, with
priority for women, children and invalids and for
people particularly liable to retaliation by the Chinese. As far as
possible these arrangements
should be left in the hands of the shipping and
air companies and the Government itself should
take only the minimum action necessary to ensure
that orderly arrangements were made.
on (b) the Grand Riche but this witely tit to Arawing would inthara the
prospect of American interaction are inofficials fünf wanation Have she
loved
to pribitit.
de
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
L
On (c) the Governor's view is that shipping is
not likely to be available for anything approaching
large-scale evacuation. The furthest the Governor
believe we should go is that, assuming shipping
space were available and the risks at sea deemed acceptable, the ad hoc
organisation of the evacuation of Service families, on the grounds that
they could
be got together quickly and virtually without
planning or warning. For the rest, if the shipping
companies had space, the most that should be done
is to encourage them to make the best use of it,
women and children first, on a first come first served
basis. without racial discrimination.
A short list
of particularly vulnerable persons should however be
drawn up and advantage should be taken of any
evacuation opportunities either by commercialor
military transport.
Recommendations
I Further discussions will be necessary with
other Departments
-
notably the Ministry of Defence,
Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations Office -
before final recommendations can be made to Ministers.
It would however be helpful to have guidance f
Colonial Office Ministers before we embark on these.
It is suggested that our preliminary views should be
on the following lines:
(a) on the assumption that resistance to a Chinese
attack would be limited to what could be achieved
by the present garrison, it should be accepted that
any large-scale evacuation would be impracticable
and that the present plan should be abandoned;
(b) it should be accepted that there could be no
question of a planned evacuation before the outbreak
of hostilities;
TOP SECRET
(c)
i
TOP SECRET
Well we have Lotterys been rehstart to (despite the pahimming tables
with to Avevious some you ago) &initrite totho with the American aat
thing Kong it way
Mutishising Chicol
mcg. aufible and the
Than
eplacement
in the thinge hall islands sta sat of tag Kang
(c) the Governor's proposals for securing that
in a period of tension preceding the possible
werpective of roce. outbreak of hostilities priority/should be
1
given to women, children invalids, and people
particularly liable to retalliation by the
Chinese should be accepted;
/should
(d) that, after the start of hostilities, ad hoc
arrangements only should be made on the lines of
para. 12)above.
(e) that we should consider with the Foreign
Office and the Ministry of Defence whether it
would be opportune to seek discussions with the
Americans about the defence of Hong Kong.
including evacuation plans.
Ministerial
instructions would be sought before there was
any question of initiating such discussions.
in any case be necessary to inform the
terms Americans, who are aware in gheral plans of the
original evacuation plan, that we do not now
consider it to be feasible. so that they can if
Ensula te pritom of
necessery-make separate provision for evacuating
their own nationals. (The Australians and
Canadians who have also been given assurances
about evacuation may also have to be informed).
While it is thought unlikely that the Americans
would wish to intervene if the Chinese attack was
directed against Hong Kong in isolation,
intervention is much more likely if Hong Kong
was attacked as part of a general conflict.
If there seemed to be a likelihood of the Americans
being able to intervene in a manner which would
make an orderly evacuation scheme feasible then
the whole picture would change and it would then
be necessary to decide whether a scheme on the
lines of the present one (1.e. with a certain
:
/element
TOP SECRET
element of racial discrimination) should be
adopted despite the political and moral
objections, or whether a scheme should be based
on a "first come first served" basis,
14 Finally it should be stressed that this whole question is one which
is regarded by the
Hong Kong Government as an extremely sensitive hart
subject, because any leak that this subject was even being discussed
could be construed as
indicating an intention to abandon our position
which would be likely to have a serious effect
on public confidence. For this reason, knowledge
of the evacuation schemes has been kept to a
very limited circle in Hong Kong, and it has not
form
been possible to draw-up any completely
satisfactory estimates of numbers who might
wish to avail themselves of evacuation
opportunities.
15
A
B attested
TOP SECRET
тор
SECRET
Mr. N.S.
4.5. Carter 45 Mr. Higham
Mr..
Mr.
File No. FED 518/noc/or
Permt, U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Sir
Secretary of State
Your Reference.
DRAFT
Capt. 1.G. Mason, R.N.
Mui. or Defence
(2)
ร
жарат
to
your
latter
of the 7" November, 1963,
addremed
to
Alec Cumming - Bruce
about
The
Planning, Staff
exercise
on evacuation
from Hong Kong
which rest's
6-12
the
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