Date.
Concederations.
14
ی
The crux of the malter in whether a plan for the general evacuation
of Eusebeam non-Chiene element's of
the population
(5-
fo.
for use in a
situation.
showed be retained
favourable militains
In Jaronn of velaming
Whole
A
plan
id=_com_be_predthat failure to
arrange for the evacuation of all
European bes
Chiere
elements before the outbreak of
bostilities
caned be
a
schoone of
political embarrasment for
in this ceranting
H.M.G. of and when the Chimene
move againit Hong Kong:
it would
be
of
Напа капа
was
Bout
little arand after
to the existence of
evacuation plans if
they were
well
-
to point
(and
in the event;
shown to be patently
unrealistic and incapable of
execution. This would indeed be
(86098) W: 42332-8537 50m 1[64 V.L. Gp 791
the case if events
were to show that;
TOP
SECRET
on a
progur rappreciation
to be faced in Hong Kong,
12
selination
no effect
plans could
be
made
to divert the
besen any shipping
and arcraft
12a1
an erRenation
comed not the covered
With the
forces
available.
16.
Even if it
Was
militarily
and other winne
practicable
to consider putting suech a plan
into operation, itf
is the
Goreman's view
that the internal pohtical consequences
Smeto
fotopascent its
Completion by adding greatly to the
problems facing
The defence and
secuiirting
forces
world
frevent its
Successful
of it's
completion.
At the same time,
Selective application to non-Chiese
be conse
elements of the
poprelation
The plan
+
side-effects
might have embarraning
The Commonwealth
17. Our
conclusion is that, for a
combination of military
political
on H.M.G'S
relation with
and mohlical
reasons
ainer
Large-scale
evacuation of
hona Chinese elements
ရ
the population
either before
Oy
would be unifiracticable
after the outbreak of hostilities
1201-
the altempt to organise
An of
such an
evacuation, learing Cheniere Barkinh subjects
to their fate,
defend
world
be difficult to
With mi (or withant) the Commonwealth.
in-special-danger, The evacuation of same 20-30,000 persons
was envisaged; the number today would be of much the same
order.
with a large olemat 5. The preparation of evacuation plans on-s-basis-of
racial
ai
discrimination was (and contimes to be) repugnant to the Hong
A
Kong Government. From time to time doubts have been expressed
as to their practicability in view of (a) the availability of
transport and (b) reductions in the size of the garrison
Min 1951
for affecting its ability to maintain resistance for the necessary
length of time (14 days) without strong and timely reinforcement Tester
mothe
dirin (which would only come from the Americans). The garrison
has since been progressively reduced in size;
151
A magasunite.
6 the
L
(0.3.K.).
20 majer
In 1960 the Commander British Forees in Hong Kong expressed
the view that, in the face of air attack and under conditions office.
serious internal disorder (which it must be assumed would
accompany a Chinese attack), he could not with the forces
available carry out the task (then included in his directive)
of covering an evacuation after the outbreak of hostilities, A
review of evacuation policy was accordingly undertaken by
BDCC (F.E.) in consultation with the C.B.F. and Governor,
Hong Kong.
Ivacuation after the Outbreak of Kostilities
e...
the
7 5. The remiltant nižštery assesment (with which the Governor
agrees) confirmed the ¤‚B;P's-view-that any large-scale evacuation
after the outbreak of hostilities would be impracticable,
except conceivably in the event of imediate American assistance,
On this latter point the Governor considers that a decision mast
be taken on the basis that there is (and will be) no firm American
ommitment.
86. In covering an evacuation, British troops and the Pelios
Ferce would be deflected from their primary tasks of meeting
aggression and of maintaining law and order. People on
/unprotected
W.5. Carter
12 528/400/01
a
serious effect on public confidence.
(monly but by is wean. escheme Forsplan)
I Evacuation of Civilians
from Hong Kong
[This is regarded by the Hong Kong Government as
extremely sensitive subject; any public reference to it
would be construed as indicating an intention to abandon
our position there and would be likely to have a stricis
effect on public cọnfidence 7.
lux..
Since 1951 there have been in existence plans/for the
evacuation of/women, children and elderly non from Hong Kong
men I
{sodo-names-"-Incubate" and, subsequently, ""Digit"), in the
at twarzenby kse. an attack-by
Chinese on the Colony? And from 1953 there has been in
existence a plan ("Beting2) for the evacuation of civilian
men if a general evacuation became necessary.
These plans had their roots in ciremstances that were
very different from today's (particularly in regard to China's
military strength). They were based on the S. of 8's instruction
in 1950 that ".......public opinion here would expect H.M.G.
to ensure that no British women and children were avoidably
left behind". Their existence was justified on the grounds
that white women and children "would be considered to be in
greater potential danger than local people", The pl
he-plane-de
sht
_of_other
as a second priority.
TOP SEORIT
unprotected avacuation ships would probably be in greater
danger at sea than in Hong Kong.
Evacuation before the Outbreak of Hostilities
97.
The Governor has argued that any attempt at large-scale
svacuation before the outbreak of hostilities would be incapable
of execution and politically inacceptable.
|
o 8.
There would be no means of transporting all who wished
to go. Organised evacuation would be interpreted as an
admission of defeat and would lead to a rapid deterioration in
the morale of the Chinese population and to a serious internal
security situation greatly impeding (and perhaps preventing)
efforts to arrange the departure of any section of the civilian
population.
19. Limited selective evacuation on the basis of race would be
morally indefensible and, in these days, might have grave
political repercussions for H.M.G. (o.g. in terms of relations
within the Commonwealth), Moreover, Europeans would not
necessarily be in greater danger of ill-treatment from the
aggressors than others. On the contrary, the main danger to
them would arise from the breakdown of law and order and the
development of mob violence and looting.
inding striking a
- Govenor and [T3DCC (FE).
Govornegie Roscmandations
Rescomendations Govend
2 10.
The Governor has accordingly recomended that
(a) Before the outbreak of hostilities: the
Hong Kong Government should ensure that, in the use
of available sea and air transport, such arrangements
as are possible in the situation at the time should
be made to facilitate the departure of those who
wish to leave, with priority for women, children
and invalids and for people particularly liable to
/retaliation
F
!
!
(b)
TOP
1
SECRET
retaliation by the Chinese; the Government should take
only the minimum action necessary to achieve this
aim.
After the outbreak of hostilities: plans should be made
for the Navy to evacuate as many as possible of the
on pret cont qrammals) particularly vulnerable who still remain when
hostilities
start.
In both cases, no element of compulsion or of racial discrimination
would be involved.
3 11.
While EDCC (F.E.) accepted these recommendations, they
in for general
apa
Fune considered it necessary to retain some outline evacuation plan in
A
order to take advantage of a military situation which, in the event,
Eight prove to be less unfavourable than envisaged. The Governor,
Let The W
suduration
on the other hand, takes the view that "there should be no 'evacuation
+
plans' - outline or detailed - for the general evacuation of any large
part of the population either before or after the outbreak of
hostilities".
12.
The Governor's view is based on the argments set out in para".
5-9 above that any large-scale evacuation is impracticable and
politically unacceptable, whatever the military situation. In
particular, he argues that shipping is not likely to be available
"in those last few days" and the numbers who will be able to take
advantage of the opportunities offering will be so small that it
would be a misuse of words to call the necessary preparations an
"ovacuation plant, se onvisages that planning should amount to
no more than preparing lists of those who fall into the vulnerable
categories. The evacuation of women, children and invalids prior
to hostilities should be left to the shipping companies to arrange
on a first-come-first-served basis, in the light of shipping space
available and of the current assesment of the risks at sea;
Minit.
L
I
TOP SEORIT
a possible exception might be made in the case of service families
whose organised evacuation might be feasible because they could be
got together quickly and with the minimam of planning and warning.
Considerations
13.
Failure to arrange for the compulsory evacuation of all
European women and children before the outbreak of hostilities
could be a source of political embarrasment for H.M.G.
14. On the other hand it would be of little avail after Hong
Kong was overrun to point to the existence of well-laid evacuation
plans if, in the event, they were shown to be patently unrealistic
and incapable of execution. This would indeed be the case if
events were to show that, on a proper appreciation of the situation
to be faced in Hong Kong, no effective plans could be made to
divert the necessary shipping and aircraft or that an evacuation
could not be coväred with the forces available.
15.
It has been recognised (0,D.C. (62)1) that, in the event
of an apprehended or actual outbreak of global war:-
(1)
with the dispersal of shipping to safe havens, there is
likely to be little or no transport either during a
precautionary period or after the outbreak of
global war;
(11)
apart from some possible opportunities for local
evacuation from likely target areas plans for the
movement of large numbers by sea or air would be unwise
and unrealistic.
There is no scope in Hong Kong for purely "local" evacuation.
16. In the event of a limited Chinese attack on Hong Kong, all
available information points to a deliberately mounted and rapid
assault in overwhelming force which will give little time for
precautionary preparations. It will be preceded and/or accompanied
by serious internal disorder fomented from outside the Colony (and
aggravated by any sign that the Colony was being abandoned), which
Avill
TOF
SECRET
ל
1
will fully occupy the garrison and police force to the exclusion of
covering an
evacuation.
17. There are no plans to reinforce Hong Kong in the event of external
aggression. There is no American commitment to come to the Colony's aid,
The end is likely to come very quickly before transport for evacuation
could
be mobilised.
Conclusions
18. Any large-scale evacuation of non-Chinese elements of the population
from Hong Kong, whether compulsory or voluntary, is seen to be
impracticable
on the following grounds:-
19.
(1)
(11)
(121)
Serious internal disorder would precede and/or accompany a
Chinese attack, with the result that military and security
forces would be unable to cover evacuation.
A Chinese attack would be sudden and in overwhelming force; no
external assistance can be expected and the end in Hong Kong
would come very quickly.
Transport would not be available in the event of a global
war and could not be mobilised in time in the case of a Huited
attack on the Colony.
Such large-scale evacuation would have serious looal political
consequencer
aggravating the anticipated internal disturbances and night, because of
its
selective application to non-Chinese elements of the population, have
embarrass-
ing political side-effects on H.M.G's relations with the Commonwealth,
20. Any outline planning to this end would be more window-dressing
which,
in the event, would deceive no one,
21. It is therefore recommended that there should be no planning for the
large-scale evacuation of non-Chinese elements of the population, either
before
or after the outbreak of hostilities, and that the Governor's proposals
in para 10 above for making use of such limited opportunities as my
arise on abain free from raund discomm walioù
Ashould be accepted,
TOP
SECRET
unprotected evacuation ships would probably be in greater
danger at sea than in Hong Kong.
Evacuation before the Outbreak of Hostilities
7.
The Governor has argued that any attempt at large-scale
evacuation before the outbreak of hostilities would be incapable
of execution and politically inacceptable.
8.
There would be no means of transporting all who wished
to go. Organised evacuation would be interpreted as an
admission of defeat and would lead to a rapid deterioration in
the morale of the Chinese population and to a serious internal
security situation greatly impeding (and perhaps preventing)
efforts to arrange the departure of any section of the civilian
population.
9.
Limited selective evacuation on the basis of race would be
morally indefensible and, in these days, might have grave
political repercussions for H.M.G. (e.g. in terms of relations
within the Commonwealth). Moreover, Europeans would not
necessarily be in greater danger of ill-treatment from the
aggressors than others. On the contrary, the main danger to
them would arise from the breakdown of law and order and the
development of mob violence and looting.
Governor's Recommendations
10.
The Governor has accordingly recommended that:-
Before the outbreak of hostilities:
(a)
the
Hong Kong Government should ensure that, in the use of available sea and
air transport, such arrangements
as are possible in the situation at the time should be made to
facilitate the departure of those who
wish to leave, with priority for women, children and invalids and for
people particularly liable to
/retaliation
TOP SECRET
itsiy
(b)
retaliation by the Chinese; the Government/should take
only the minimum action necessary to achieve this
aim.
After the outbreak of hostilities: plans should be made
for the Navy to evacuate as many as possible of the
particularly vulnerable who still remain when hostilities
start.
In both cases, no element of compulsion or of racial discrimination
would be involved.
11.
While BDCC (F.E.) accepted these recommendations, they
considered it necessary to retain some outline evacuation plan in
order to take advantage of a military situation which, in the event,
might prove to be less unfavourable than envisaged, The Governor,
on the other hand, takes the view that "there should be no 'evacuation
plans* - outline or detailed for the general evacuation of any large
-
part of the population either before or after the outbreak of
hostilities".
12. The Governor's view is based on the arguments set out in paras
5-9 above that any large-scale evacuation is impracticable and
politically unacceptable, whatever the military situation.
particular, he argues that shipping is not likely to be available
"in those last few days" and the numbers who will be able to take
advantage of the opportunities offering will be so small that it
would be a misuse of words to call the necessary preparations an
"evacuation plan". He envisages that planning should amount to
no more than preparing lists of those who fall into the vulnerable
categories. The evacuation of women, children and invalids prior
to hostilities should be left to the shipping companies to arrange on a
first-come-first-served basis, in the light of shipping space
available and of the current assessment of the risks at sea;
/a
TOP SECRET
a possible exception might be made in the case of service families whose
organised evacuation might be feasible because they could be got
together quickly and with the minimum of planning and warning.
Considerations
13.
Failure to arrange for the compulsory evacuation of European women and
children before the outbreak of hostilities
could be a source of political embarrassment for H.M.G.
14.
On the other hand it would be of little avail after Hong
Kong was overrun to point to the existence of well-laid evacuation
plans if, in the event, they were shown to be patently unrealistic
and incapable of execution. This would indeed be the case if
events were to show that, on a proper appreciation of the situation
to be faced in Hong Kong, no effective plans could be made to
divert the necessary shipping and aircraft or that an evacuation
could not be covered with the forces available.
15. It has been recognised (0.D.C. (62)1) that, in the event
of an apprehended or actual outbreak of global war:-
with the dispersal of shipping to safe havens, there is
likely to be little or no transport either during a
precautionary period or after the outbreak of
(i)
to least
Alsbad wan
fitely
event
Jou
global war;
(ii)
apart from some possible opportunities for local
evacuation from likely target areas plans for the
movement of large numbers by sea or air would be unwise
and unrealistic,
There is no scope in Hong Kong for purely "local" evacuation,
16.
In the event of a limited Chinese attack on Hong Kong, all
available information points to a deliberately mounted and rapid
assault in overwhelming force which will give little time for
precautionary preparations. It will be preceded and/or accompanied by
serious internal disorder fomented from outside the Colony (and
aggravated by any sign that the Colony was being abandoned), which
/will
TOP SECRET
will fully occupy the garrison and police force to the exclusion of
covering an
evacuation.
17. There are no plans to reinforce Hong Kong in the event of external
aggression. There is no American commitment to come to the Colony's aid.
The end is likely to come very quickly before transport for evacuation
could
be mobilised.
Conclusions
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.