denial holen.
br. 5. Canter
28464
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Hong Kong (Sir 1). Trench) ref (6) -29-7.64
8 To Hong Kong (Sir 1) Trench) ref (~)-8.4.64
Mr. Wallace The Garter)
=(through
You will remember that last year we discussed a draft on this vexed
question with Mr Carter. I am sorry it has taken me so long to revise it
and, as you will see, I decided that the best course was to completely
re-write the draft.
As you know my own view is that. reluctant though I should be to see the
abandonment of British Chinese, I do not entirely share the Governor's
view that it would be morally wrong to do so. If it is accepted that no
evacuation plan can be implemented because of the practical difficulties
then this decision about whether or not to discriminate in favour of
European women and children does not arise. But if the conclusion is
that we must continue to have plans in readiness for dealing with the
possibility of evacuation should, for example Americans come to the
rescue in good time view is that the present plan should stand, i.e.,
priority goes to Europeans but we do try and get off as many Chinese
loyalists as possible.
the then my
I do not think the Governor's submissions on this question have taken
sufficiently into account the possibility of American intervention.
Although, as you know, we have felt latterly that it would be unwise to
embark on discussions with the Americans about the defence of Hong Kong.
the fact remains that the Americans are very much concerned with Hong
Kong evacuation plans and, in the early 1950s, were kept in touch with
our thinking. As far as I have been able to trace, the Americans
intended to send in their own ship to Hong Kong. Unfortunately both
plans INCUBATE AND DIGIT (which replaces INCUBATE) cannot be found in
the office so we do not know precisely how it was intended to deal with
American and Commonwealth nationals. I suspect that, if the Americans
scented an emergency in the offing, they would try and get as many of
their people off before hostilities; but of course there might be very
little time to do this (at the end of 1964 there were nearly 3,500
Americans in Hong Kong).
I hope that the draft note is self-explanatory and covers most of the
main points. H. 504 are continuing the search for the evacuation plan
and will let Mr. Carter know how they fare.
on
(J. D. HIGHAM) 20 April, 1965.
(Mr Wallace) Mr Highe
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Mr. Lu.5. Carl
Mr.
Mr.
TOP SECRET
File No. FE) $2.5/4.00/pi
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
Mr.
Sir
Your Reference.
DRAFT
L
t
Date
!
Iefence Issues:
Three
Heng Keng
defence senes
сепсанита
Hong Kong
have been
et officit level for a conus'dratlan
In der
FURTHER ACTION
(E6098) WI 42332-8537 50m 1/64 V.L. Op 791
1.
(a)
consideration) by officials:..
The evacuation of culiaris
(b) The Governor's Dormant
Om
Commission.
(4) Denial pokeys.
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The fent l'ivo
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musicsterial
are required.
matter of which
The 12urd
17we
should be aware,
Secretary of
State
3.
Au Three
Dure
regarded by the
as extremely
Honą Kaną Government
sensitive subjects
true won the cause
+
of
publé reference to it
This is
particularly
evacuation; any
wered be
Comstoned in the Colony as indicating
an intention to abandon
chy position
there and would be Chely to have
NOTE
TOP SECRET
HONG KONG
(a)
Evacuation of Civilians in Wartime
(b)
Assumption of Government by Commander British
Forces in Grave Emergency
(12) on 14521/15 of
1950
(a)
Evacuation Introduction
At the time of the Korean war the Governor of Hong Kong was instructed
to prepare plans for the evacuation of civilians,
He was told by the then Secretary of State, Mr. Griffiths, that while
every effort must be made to avoid racial discrimination. in the last
resort, public opinion here would expect H.M.G. to ensure that no
British women and children were unavoidably left behind. It was
eventually agreed that plans should be on the basis that preferential
treatment should be given to those who, if left behind, would be in
danger of special discrimination or mistreatment and were least able to
bear such treatment. By this yardstick top priority would be given to
the dependents of service personnel, European women and children and the
dependents of Hong Kong Chinese who had actively assisted Government.
e.g. in the Volunteer Forces. Numbers involved were expected to be some
10,000, with a further 10 - 20,000 in lower priority categories, such as
men and women of friendly
neutral countries and wives and families of British Chinese on
a "first come first served' basis. The current version of the plan is
now some 8 years old (plan DIGIT). Subsequently a plan was drawn up for
the evacuation, at a later stage, of non- essential civilians and of the
garrison; but this plan was abandoned some years ago (plan BITING).
-
•
2. These plans were drawn up when there was a large garrison in Hong
Kong (20 major units in 1951), when a prolonged and even a successful
resistance was contemplated, when Singapore was available as a staging
post for evacuees and when there was some possibility of finding
permanent homes for Asian evacuees in territories under British control.
Even then 4 days' notice would have been required to provide shipping
for 10,000 and 10 days' notice for 16,000 refugees.
The Military Situation
3. By 1960 circumstances had changed so radically since 1951 that
existing plans for evacuation were reviewed. With the 8 major units then
at his disposal (the garrison has since
/been
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
been reduced to 63 major units) the Commander British Forces advised
that he might be able to hold the rim of the harbour area for up to 3
days and to contain internal disorder, but he could not at the same time
deploy the substantial forces that would be necessary to cover an
evacuation. As the Airport would have been made unusable at an early
stage evacuation by air would be impossible. Organised movement in the
harbour would not be possible and, with the Chinese controlling by
artillery, air and naval units all the approaches to Hong Kong, any
major movement in or out of the Colony could not be contemplated. For
any shipping that got away there would still be the hazards of a 640
mile journey to Manilla, the nearest reception port.
4.
Given this new military appreciation it is obvious that shipping for
evacuation could not be brought in from outside.
Reliance would have to be placed on shipping already available, and this
could take only a very small proportion of those eligible for
evacuation,
5.
The Governor held that indications that the evacuation of a
favoured group was being organised, consisting largely of European
women and children, and "white" British manpower military and civil -
was being diverted to do it would tend to accelerate the breakdown of
law and order, seriously affecting in particular the morale of the
Chinese public rank and file, and thus increasing the risk of attack on
"foreigners". Any
evacuation could include only small numbers of the European women
and children. Those remaining and Chinese loyalists who
had to be left behind would be at greater risk because of the
evacuation attempt.
6.
The Governor's conclusion, backed by the military authorities
in the Far East, was that any planned evacuation after hostilities had
started was quite impracticable, and he recommended in 1962 that
existing plans for evacuation should be abandoned, He rejected the idea
of any attempt to organise an evacuation before the start of
hostilities. This would be interpreted both in Hong Kong and in China
not as clearing the decks for action but as an admission of defeat and
an open invitation to a Chinese attack, As an attack could be mounted at
very short notice and at least 6 days would be required to assemble
additional shipping from Singapore and elsewhere, there would be no
certainty of being able to complete an evacuation in time.
17.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
(30) on 14521/15 1950
Discrimination in favour of Europeans
7.
In 1949
From the very outset of evacuation planning successive Governors of Hong
Kong have expressed the strongest objection to any evacuation plan based
on racial discrimination. Sir Alexander Grantham said that he was
certain that his Executive Council, if they were consulted, would insist
that equal opportunities to leave must be available to all, irrespective
of race. It was thought that the numbers of non-Europeans wishing to
avail themselves of evacuation opportunities would be limited, though it
was recognised that any estimate of numbers must be highly conjectural
time it was thought that a total of some 30,000 including Europeans)
might wish to leave.
8.
At that
Subsequently, when it became clear that shipping could not possibly be
made available for numbers of this order, the Governor agreed to the
scheme described in paragraph 1 above and felt that this, while being
"beyond justifiable criticism" would in fact enable the highest priority
to be granted to European women and children since it could scarcely be
denied that they were the most vulnerable group of all. At a later stage
still however the view has been taken in Hong Kong that even this echeme
is politically most objectionable in that it would be obvious that its
practical effect would be to give preference to
Europeans.
The more categories have to be pared down because of the very small
totals that can be catered for compared with those envisaged in 1950,
the more racially discriminatory the
scheme becomes.
9. When Sir Robert Black put forward his recommendation that the present
evacuation scheme should be scrapped (in 1962) he expressed the very
strong opinion that, even were evacuation feasible, it would be morally
and politically wrong that any scheme should favour, or appear to
favour, Europeans as against those Chinese, Indians, etc. which might
wish to leave. He
considered that an evacuation scheme of this kind would deal a
severe blow to our international prestige particularly in Asia and
Africa and in the new Commonwealth;
and that it would,
for example, cause doubts to arise in Malaysia about whether, under
direct attack. British troops might not be employed for the evacuation
of British subjects rather than for the defence of Malaysia. Sir Robert
expressed the view that European women and children would not be in
greater peril than non-Europeans in the event of a Chinese attack, that
the Chinese might be expected to deal far more harshly with those of
their own race
/whom
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
whom they held to be "collaborators" with the British, or to be
committed anti-communists; that the large number of European internees
would be an embarrassment to the Chinese Peoples' Government who would
wish to get rid of them eventually; and that the greatest danger to the
European community would
arise not from Chinese Government troops but from mob violence
before the Communist authorities had established themselves and
which would be certain to occur if a breakdown of law and order were
precipitated by the diversion of British troops to cover an
evacuation.
10.
Speculation on the likely behaviour of the Chinese Government towards
its troops must necessarily be of an uncertain
nature. To some extent this attitude would be conditioned by the
circumstances under which Hong Kong were taken over, If our Forces had
done little more than "identify aggression" and had
thereafter been content to fight a delaying action without exposing the
Colony to all the horrors of a resistance à outrance it is to be
expected that the Chinese Government's desire to avoid unnecessary
adverse publicity by illtreating the local inhabitants - Asian or
European would prevail. On the other hand, in the unlikely event of
nuclear weapons being used against the Chinese mainland as part of the
defence of Hong Kong, it could well be that the Chinese Government
Forces would do little to protect their enemies from the wrath of the
mob. It is not to be denied however that in either eventuality a
comparatively small number of Chinese loyalists and their dependents
would be at greater risk than even Europeans and their families.
-
11.
Had it been possible to implement an evacuation scheme under
which a considerable proportion of those categories included in the
original plan (see para, 1 above) would have had a reasonable prospect
of safe removal, it is not thought that the Governor's objections to an
arrangement which in effect would have led to a preference for Europeans
need have been regarded as overriding. If, however, the military
argument is accepted that any large-scale evacuation is impossible, then
a decision of this question of principle raised by the Governor is not
required. A decision would however be required if there was any question
of: (a) an organised evacuation before the outbreak of hostilities, (b)
if it were decided that plans should be held in readiness in case
American military support and shipping were
/available
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
available to an extent which greatly improved the prospects of a
successful evacuation, and (c) if it were decided that outline plans
should be in readiness in case the military situation were not as
desperate as assumed in this paper.
The Governor's Proposals
12. On (a) above the Governor's views are clear and are stated in
paragraph 6 above. He does however agree that, before the outbreak of
hostilities, the Hong Kong Government should ensure that, in the use of
available sea and air transport, such arrangements as are possible in
the situation at the time should be made to facilitate the departure of
those who wish to leave, with priority for women, children and invalids
and for people particularly liable to retaliation by the Chinese.
possible these arrangements should be left in the hands of the shipping
and air companies and the Government itself should take only the minimum
action necessary to ensure that orderly arrangements are made.
As far as
On (b), the Governor thinks that the prospects of American intervention
are insufficiently firm for evacuation plans to be based on this
possibility.
On (c), the Governor's view is that shipping is not likely to be
available for anything approaching large-scale evacuation. The furthest
the Governor believes we should go is to accept, assuming shipping space
were available and the risks at sea deemed acceptable, the ad hoc
organisation of the evacuation of Service families, on the grounds that
they could be got together quickly and virtually without planning or
warning. For the rest, if the shipping companies had space, the most
that should be done is to encourage them to make the best use of it,
women and children first, on a first come first served basis, without
racial discrimination.
A short list of particularly vulnerable persons should however be drawn
up and advantage should be taken of any evacuation opportunities either
by
commercial or naval transport.
Recommendations
-
13. Further discussions will be necessary with other Departments notably
the Kinistry of Defence, Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations
Office before final recommendations can be made to Ministers. It would
however be helpful to have guidance from Colonial Office Ministers
before
we embark on these. It is suggested that our preliminary views should be
on the following lines:
(a) on the assumption that resistance to a Chinese attack would be
limited to what could be achieved by the present garrison, it should be
accepted that any large-scale evacuation would be impracticable and that
the present plan should be abandoned;
(b) it should be accepted that there could be no question of a planned
evacuation before the outbreak of hostilities;
TOP SECRET
/(c)
1
Mr.
Mr.
File No..........
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Sir
Secretary of State
Your Reference.
Date
DRAFT
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FURTHER ACTION
(86098) WI 42332-8537 50m 1/64 V.B. Gp 791
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To deny any aggressor
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and so
the least hardship to the
civilian population.
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to cause
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assume
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From the Colony. A dormant commision
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The
at was made in 1951.
present military
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that Hong Kong is indefensible against
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The role of the
to identify aggression
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Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
File No...
Permi. U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
Sir
Your Reference..........
DRAFT
Recommendation.
Date
18. Sz
is therefore
recemmented
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Manning
For the large-scale
evacuation of
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The
population
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.