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8.

forces, and a force at Salonika by threatening German communications through Yugo-Slavia would give more effective support to Turkey than direct assistance in Thrace itself.

We have been much impressed by the French conception of this policy for the Allies in the Balkans, not only because they themselves urge it so strongly, but because it does appear to offer a possibility of positive action against Germany with a limited expenditure of Allied forces. We agree with the French view that a direct threat to Turkey cannot develop until after either Roumania or Yugo-Slavia has been over-run. If the French view of Balkan reactions to a German attack is correct, the presence of an Allied force at Salonika might well exert considerable influence against the German L.. of C.. towards Turkey in either of the above cases. In the former hypothesis a landing at Salonika would form a useful diversion; in the latter it would be an essential avenue for launching a counter stroke.

9.

At the back of the French mind there is unquestionably the idea of seeking in the Balkans a new theatre of war in which to wear down and drain Germany's strength, and from which to develop eventual offensive operations, possibly on a decisive scale. While these aims are in accordance with the agreed long-term objects of Allied policy as stated in Paper No. M.R. (J)(39)8, paragraph 6, we were unable to obtain any clear idea of when or how the French envisage undertaking large-scale offensive operations, or of what the objective of such operations would be. They did refer to an offensive drive towards Belgrade-Vienna from the line R. SAVA-TRANSYLVANIAN ALPS, but they have not yet studied the practical details of decisive operations against Germany from a base at Salonika.

We do not minimise the difficulties of such operations, but in view of the lack of other avenues of attack, we suggest that the project should be closely examined.

10. No specific reference to Russim aggression is made in the French plans because, in the event of a Russian attack through the Balkans, the problem would, in the French view, be similar to that of German aggression through Roumania. A Russian attack on Turkey through the Caucasus is an entirely separate problem to that of Balkan strategy.

11.

We attach as an annex* a summary of French and British views on the Salonika project which was drawn up in conjunction with the French Representatives. They have concurred in the general interpretation which has been placed on their views, and this summary shows that we are in general agreement with the French, both as to the line which should be held in order to maintain a foothold at Salonika, and as to the number of divisions required to hold that line. The crux of the tactical operation is the provision of adequate air defences, and if, at the right time, the scale of anti-aircraft equipment and of fighter and bomber aircraft indicated in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Innex can be provided, the operation of Allied forces based on Salonika appears to be tactically feasible, as well as strategically attractive. It is to be noted that there is some difference of opinion on the number of aerodromes which are available in Northern Greece. This should be cleared up by the Air Staff.

Also,circulated separately as Paper Ho. M.R. (J)(40)17.

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