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Methods by which the Allies could Strike at Russia.

Northern Europe.

(xix) Russia's seaborne trade would be interrupted and her northern bases could be subjected to seaward attack (paragraphs 32–33).

(xx) On land and in the air we could not strike directly at Russia, but if we gained access to Scandinavia we might defeat any Russian attempt to reach Narvik and thereby impose an added strain upon the Russian military effort. Moreover, successful operations in this area would secure Galivare (paragraph 34).

Near and Middle East.

It is,

(xxi) It is in this area alone that the Allies could strike at Russia effectively; namely, by attacking her oil supplies in the Caucasus. however, impossible to carry out this attack unless we first obtain Turkish or Iranian co-operation or infringe their territorial rights (paragraph 40).

(xxii) Provided the problem of Turkish or Iranian neutrality could be over-

come, the best method of attack would be by air.

(xxiii) The objectives for air attack comprise the groups of refineries at Baku, Grozni and Batum. The destruction of these might be achieved by sustained operations over several weeks, by at least three bomber squadrons (paragraph 42).

(xxiv) The area is heavily defended against air attack. There must therefore remain an element of doubt as to our ability to achieve the wholesale destruction of all refineries. It would be most important to under- take the operations at the earliest possible moment so as not to give the Russians time to improve the defences still further, possibly with German help (paragraphs 42 and 43).

(xxv) The only British squadrons now in the Middle East which could reach the Caucasus are not suitable for day operations against the Russian defence and could not alone achieve effective results. Such results could only be achieved by Mark IV Blenheims, which would have to come from the United Kingdom (paragraph 44).

(xxvi) The transfer of three squadrons of Mark IV Blenheims from home to the Middle East could be effected by the end of April if prepara- tions were put in hand now and if the following implications were accepted:

(a) The air striking force for our major air plans or for the attack on a German invasion through the Low Countries would be correspondingly reduced.

(b) Important developments such as the provision of fighter squadrons for Scapa, expansion of the bomber force, trade defence squadrons, and re-equipment generally, already delayed by preparations for a certain operation, would be further retarded (paragraphs 44–45).

(xxvii) Air attack of the Caucasus area could not be carried out without casualties to civilians. Our existing rules governing air bombard- ment would have to be modified (paragraph 49).

(xxviii) There is a possibility that we might be able to operate the bomber squadrons now in the Middle East from Teheran, but since we cannot rely on Iranian co-operation, plans cannot be framed on this basis (paragraph 47).

(xxix) The French have a project for attacking the Caucasus with long-range- bombers operating from Syria. This is now under discussion (paragraph 48).

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